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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
SILENCED BODIES: (EN)GENDERING SYRIAN REFUGEE INSECURITY IN
LEBANON
by
Jessy Abouarab
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Susanne Zwingel, Major Professor
While there has been a shift in security studies from the security of states to that of
people, realpolitik still takes place under the banner of an emerging discourse of ‘refugee
crisis.’ Refugee insecurities are (en)gendered and experienced where their depth and breadth
pose significant challenges to asylum seekers, neighboring host-states, and humanitarian
agencies. To this end, this research captures the unique dynamics of a South-South refugee
crisis in Lebanon, in which Syrians residents make up nearly one-third of its population. It
applies a transnational feminist framework to trace how refugee security norms get defined,
are managed, and how they impact local context. In effect, a gender lens enables an in-depth
investigation of the day-to-day challenges Syrian refugee women experience and manage
within an unreceptive environment that disproportionately affect their resilience efforts.
Located at the intersection of Security Studies and Refugee scholarship, this
dissertation provides a much-needed feminist approach that can bridge the tension between
two paradigms previously perceived as exclusionary when exploring a transnational
phenomenon such as forced migration. In a refugee-security context, an interdisciplinary study
sheds light on how impromptu choices made by involved bodies—such as the Lebanese

vii

government and the UNHCR—can significantly impact local realities, creating a vicious cycle
of refugee insecurities. This research, thus, addresses the political, sociocultural, and
organizational dynamics that disproportionately affect the majority of registered Syrian
refugees in Lebanon: Syrian women. It utilizes several tools, including expert interviews, indepth longitudinal cultural-theme analysis, and an action-oriented participatory method called
Photovoice. These tools help this research explore the multilayeredness of Syrian refugee
(in)security in Lebanon with structural and gendered implications. Hence, this study adds to
the critical knowledge from Security Studies, Refugee Protection Regimes, and Women’s and
Gender Studies, serving as a useful tool for future projects on the contested politics of refugee
(in)security and gender practices.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation investigates the inherently political concept of “security” as it
permeates a forced migration case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. In that respect,
since the refugee status belongs to “a movement of populations between existing
and autonomous juridical states,” 1 various sites of refugee crisis construction,
management, and implication are contextually relevant. One finds that global
discourses and local attitudes often differ, (re)shaping host states’ perception and
juridical practices towards incoming refugees. Although the diversity of Lebanese
political opinions is often vast, it seems that most Lebanese public and social outlets
now have one commonality: “The Syrian displaced persons have no place in our
home country.” 2 Even when not long ago many Lebanese witnessed similar
displacement challenges during recent wars, some of them even question the
legitimacy of Syrian refugees being forced to flee their homes, willingly
disregarding the widely televised human atrocities that are happening in Syria. The
projected official Lebanese anxieties, mostly found in public statements and policy
reports, focus solely on repressing and resisting an overwhelming number of Syrian
asylum seekers, preventing diverse groups of people with different needs from
posing further damage to the already destabilized Lebanese state.

1

Judith Butler and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Who Sings The Nation-State?: Language, Politics, Belonging
(London, England: Seagull Books, (2007), 6.
2

Human Rights Watch, Our Homes Are Not for Strangers: Mass Evictions of Syrian Refugees by Lebanese
Municipalities, (April 20, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/20/our-homes-are-not-strangers/massevictionssyrian-refugees-lebanese-municipalities.

1

1. Background
My consideration for this study derives from being a Middle Eastern, LebaneseAmerican female with an Arabic, French, and American background. My longstanding interest in social justice, women’s rights, and gender equality have
directed my interest in international law, field organizing, and recent doctoral
studies. My interest in Syrian women’s rights in Lebanon and refugee protection
materialized in 2015 during a family visit. Throughout this time, Lebanese media
outlets and local politicians were highlighting the burdens that Lebanon was
enduring due to the increasing Syrian refugee influx. On the one hand, host states’
public discourse of masculinized threats—such as Syrian men committing crimes
and terrorist attacks in several Lebanese towns—legitimized their ad hoc aggressive
practices of stripping Syrians of refugee status, disqualified from being fully
integrated into the host communities. On the other hand, humanitarian agencies’
feminizing depictions of passive Syrian women and children living in impoverished
areas in need of saving accorded Syrians a de facto refugee status, actively
qualifying them for international protection and assistance.
The previous anti-Syrian sentiments towards their presence continued in
Lebanon. This fact was evident during my two-month pre-dissertation field
research in Lebanon, where a substantial amount of Lebanese families continued to
dislike the Syrian presence, despite the change of the latter’s status in the country
from an occupying force to a group of forced migrants, who continue to threaten
the country’s security, economy, and demographic structure. Syrians prior to the
refugee crisis were perceived as an extension of the occupying army of the Assad

2

regime. My father, General Said Abouarab, was a Lebanese army officer who
fought for Lebanon’s stability his entire life. He witnessed several wars, deterred
several coups d’états, and even took bullets and missiles that marked his body when
he was safeguarding his country from any foreign and domestic threats. His
resilience did not extinguish when the Syrian army took over the Ministry of
Defense in October 1990, marching all the way to his office that still had the residue
of a missile blast that went in, a few weeks earlier. While shredding all sensitive
documents that might put other people in jeopardy, my father outwardly welcomed
the new Syrian occupiers, keeping a low profile, while still serving his country.
My mother, like many Lebanese mothers, was a “forgotten soldier”3 whose
resilience protected four children from bombshells and Syrian captivity. We were
internally displaced for almost a year but privileged for having strong family
support and allies, sheltering us until the end of the Lebanese Liberation War in
1990. Although I was very young at the time, this experience carried on with my
parents long after the war, from health problems to psychological traumas that
forced them to migrate in the early 1990s for a year to the United States of America.
The fact is that the Lebanese civil war was one of the most gruesomely convoluted
long-term conflicts lasting 15 years, from 1975 till 1990.4 The collective memory
of modern Lebanese society mostly blames the start of the Lebanese civil war on

3

Svetlana Alexievich, The Unwomanly Face of War: An Oral History of Women in World War II (New York:
Random House, 2017), 5.
Hassan Krayem, “The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement,” in Conflict Resolution In The Arab
World: Selected Essays, ed. Paul Salem (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1997), 411-436.
4

3

the actions of Palestinian refugees, trickling to a sectarian war, where a person’s
identity card served as a potential death warrant and “people would often be shot
on the spot if their documents revealed the ‘wrong’ sort of sectarian affiliation.”5
Military checkpoints spread across the country where different militia groups
would ask those who tried to pass for their identity cards, which revealed a person’s
sectarian affiliation.
It is important to note that, coming from a Christian-Maronite family, I was
socialized in an all-French Christian school, living in an anti-Syrian and an antiArab bubble, not knowing and yet fearing the Muslim “other.” I later became highly
involved in anti-Syrian occupation student organizations and local resistance
efforts. I witnessed Syrian soldiers arresting several of my friends in street protests,
harshly interrogating and torturing them. During that time, I enrolled in the
American University of Beirut (AUB), in 2001, pursuing a bachelor’s degree in
political science. This experience allowed me to be submerged in a diverse group
of academics, significantly different from the protective anti-Syrian culture I was
accustomed to. Not only did I learn a great deal about the intricacies of Lebanese
politics and street cultures, but I also became more aware of the complexities within
the Lebanese sects and the multiple views of the Syrian role in Lebanon.
Accordingly, I took part in political arguments within safe student spaces about the

5

“Lebanon
‘Moves Right
Way’
On
ID,”
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7906125.stm

4

BBC

News,

February 24,

Syrian presence in Lebanon, while avoiding voicing anti-Syrian opinions too
publicly for fear of Syrian retaliation.
Before AUB, I always thought that all Lebanese wanted the Syrians out of
the country. Nevertheless, attending a diverse campus with a plethora of religious
sects challenged some of my subconscious beliefs, assumptions, and prejudices
related to this occupying Syrian presence. With time, I formed close and
meaningful relationships with many Syrian students from different religious
backgrounds. I regularly engaged them in heated political and religious discussions
about Lebanese, Syrian, and regional dynamics. On the one hand, I witnessed the
lack of political justice and the often-intersecting impacts of socio-cultural
discriminations that hinder Lebanese from overcoming previous conceptions of
Syrians. On the other hand, I had the privilege of participating in community
engagements and cultural awareness exercises, strengthening individual
rapprochement towards the Syrian “other.”
These experiences allowed me to connect on an empathetic level and
appreciate the common humanity within the diverse Lebanese–Syrian
communities, siding politics and government activities from respective individuals’
views and religious beliefs. Still, conversations about the gendered power relations
and the daily challenges of the conflict were nonexistent at that time. Most research
and policies sidelined women-centered issues and agency for the sake of other
issues deemed more important when exploring people’s experiences and
government activities during that time.

5

Being privileged enough to later travel, live abroad, and experience the
world, my conception of race, class, ethnicity, nationality, and faith matured.
Having meaningful conversations about gender, religion, and other multiple
identities that affect people’s everyday experiences enhanced my perception of the
relationality of world politics. I came to understand how backgrounds and cultures
(re)shape one’s identity, values, and beliefs, influencing the type of topics a person
felt suitable to discuss.
Many years away from the region’s torments, I found myself back in
Lebanon in 2015 for a family visit with a million and some officially registered
Syrian refugees present in the country. 6 During this time, I was asked to help
organize and facilitate a municipal electoral campaign for a relative. My attempt
barely lasted one night before I realized that his anti-Syrian rhetoric shifted from
the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad to the Syrians displaced in Lebanon,
scapegoating al-Assad’s reign. It was surprising to me how fast and easy political
rhetoric changes. A few years back, I remember that same relative catechizing
about the duty of Syria to host and assist their displaced Lebanese “brothers” during
the 2006 Lebanon–Israeli war. However, his position switched as circumstances
shifted with now millions of Syrians seeking refuge in Lebanon, considering them
a risk and a burden, not welcomed in the country. Meanwhile, ironically like many

6

“Refugees From Syria: Lebanon,” UNHCR, March 2015, 6, http://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/refugees-syrialebanonmarch-2015.

6

other Lebanese employers, most of the employees he illicitly hires, till this date, are
Syrians who can be paid lower wages with no legal benefits.
This personal experience motivated me to critically question the current
Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. I initially found the various excuses for not
wanting Syrians in Lebanon to be very challenging. The former Lebanese
resilience, strength, and optimism of ending the Syrian occupation of Lebanon after
the Syrian troops withdrew at the end of April 2005 shifted to extraordinary
discriminatory claims of Syrian refugees becoming a never-ending occupying
menace. Such types of mixed feelings and experiences that Lebanese have had with
Syrians in their country, mostly as occupiers, led to my research in exploring the
web of power relations that exacerbated this type of rhetoric in Lebanon and the
significance of all the contentions that accompanied it in terms of refugee
management and impact.
2. Research Problem

Figure 1. Refugee (In)security

7

The figure above displays how forced migration due to warfare is one of the most
traumatic types of human experience, where its depth and breadth pose significant
challenges to interweaving refugees, neighboring host states and their communities,
and humanitarian agencies, such as the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Moreover, a massive and sudden inflow of
refugees embodies great security and socio-political concerns for hosting
communities. In that respect, this dissertation explores the following research
question: “How do refugee security norms get defined, how are they managed, and
how do they impact local contexts, for women particularly?” The dissertation chose
the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon as a case study that illustrates how various
socio-political dynamics lead to the construction, management, and practice of
Syrian refugee (in)security in Lebanon. The reason behind this choice is that
contrary to popular perception, most global forced migration trends occur between
less developed or developing countries—often referred to as the “Global South”—
with contiguous borders.7 Triggered by the ongoing war in Syria, millions of Syrian
nationals sought refuge in neighboring countries such as Lebanon, a nation
populated by roughly four million people.
Although Lebanese authorities made tremendous efforts in containing the
refugee crisis, their attention has primarily focused on direct short-term solutions
such as providing their most vulnerable Lebanese citizens shelter, food, or securing

7

Ratha, Dilip, and William Shaw. “South-South Migration And Remittances.” The World Bank, (2007), p 2.

8

their borders against the influx of new refugees. 8 This narrow, traditional
framework of security prioritization has thus been implemented by focusing first
on the national security of the state, then on citizen security, and only last on the
security of refugees—in a genderless, over-generalized manner. Moreover, since
Lebanon’s stability is still an ongoing challenge, capturing the unique dynamics of
this South-South forced migration case between contiguous developing countries,
in which Lebanon is undergoing a massive demographic transformation—in which
Syrian refugees make up nearly one-third of its population—is a thought-provoking
research task.

Figure 2. Syrian Registered Refugees with the UNHCR—August 2016 99
The figure above provides the number of Syrian refugees registered with the
UNHCR in Lebanon and some demographic estimates of the particular groups that

Mark Manly, “UNHCR’s Mandate And Activities To Address Statelessness In Europe,” European Journal
of Migration and Law 14, no. 3 (2012): 261-277.
8

“SGBV
Dashboard,”
Interagency,
Lebanon,
January–August
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/working _group.php? Page=Country&LocationId=122&Id=47.
9

9

2016.

it includes. Correspondingly, this figure shows an estimated sixty percent of
registered Syrian refugees are without legal residency in Lebanon due to various
biased laws and security practices that generate or perpetuate an unabated cycle of
refugee insecurities. In that respect, despite the effort Syrian refugee women and
children make to escape the horrors of war, the Lebanese government and
international agencies seem to provide little to no relief to the majority of the Syrian
refugees.
In theory, a refugee has a special status in international law and is defined
by the United Nations as a person who:
“Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”10
However, it is critical to note that women are, mostly, absent from this
traditional refugee definition. 11 In fact, Syrian women refugees are not isolated
from the various types of insecurities as they form most of the officially registered

“1951 Refugee Convention And 1967 Protocol Relating To The Status of Refugees,” United Nations,
General Assembly, http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.
10

Elisabeth Olivius, “Constructing Humanitarian Selves and Refugee Others: Gender Equality and the Global
Governance of Refugees,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 18, no. 2 (2016): 276.
11

10

refugees in Lebanon.12 Moreover, since women and men experience (in)securities
distinctively spatially and by gender,13 refugee women, in this regard, are doubly
marginalized, due to their refugee status and gender. Congruently, gendered power
relations are everywhere in global politics and “whenever they are not recognized,
the silence is loud.”14 That is why understanding these dynamics is essential when
contextualizing the different (re)productions of Syrian refugee security strategies
and protection mechanisms in the case of Lebanon. With so much attention going
towards both; the need for international aid to protect refugees, as well as national
security concerns to assure state stability, a gender lens would provide a more indepth exploration of how the plight of Syrian women does not seem to receive the
necessary attention that they so desperately need. In turn, the study investigates
how Lebanese refugee policy plans and practices tend to silence Syrian refugee
women, where their insecurities are often absent, not prioritized, and are generally
neglected.
Under the guise of sovereignty, state-centric structures for addressing
forced displacement and the lack of a commonly agreed international legal
framework are severe obstacles for addressing both short and long-term refugee
insecurities and resilience efforts that displaced persons endure within a specific

Rola Yasmine and Catherine Moughalian, “Systemic Violence Against Syrian Refugee Women and the Myth
of Effective Intrapersonal Interventions,” Reproductive Health Matters 24, no. 47 (2016): 27–35.
12

Lene Hansen, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma And The Absence Of Gender In The
Copenhagen School,” Millennium: Journal of International Relations 29, no. 2 (2000): 285-306.
13

J. Ann Tickner and Laura Sjoberg, “Feminism”, in International Relations Theory, Discipline and Diversity,
3rd ed., ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 209.
14

11

host country such as Lebanon. Concurrently, state-centric research on the
securitization–refugee protection nexus—what the study refers to as “refugee
(in)security”—and how they matter in global politics, are limited from being
potentially useful for examining the critical gaps within the (en)gendered politics
of Syrian forced migration into Lebanon. That is why this research asserts that the
transnational politics of forced migration requires a multileveled initiative under a
gender lens to better explore these gaps within the divergent perceptions and
practices of Syrian refugee insecurity in the case of Lebanon soundly and
ethically.15
Correspondingly, gender, as a term, possesses a dual meaning: firstly, this
research defines gender as a social construction of being perceived as a male or a
female, and secondly, as a structural system of privileging male behaviors that can
feminize or masculinize diverse groups of asylum seekers and their
interrelationships—what the study refers to as “gender(ing)”.16 Accordingly, this
study uses a gender lens to highlight the current dyadic construction of Syrian
refugees as either men/masculine, framed as a security threat, or women/feminine,
depoliticized with no agency, in which the meaning of one is dependent on the

Amitav Acharya, “The Limitations of Mainstream International Relations Theories for Understanding the
Politics of
15

Forced Migration” (lecture, Centre for International Studies, Oxford University, 27 October, 2008). Karen
Jacobsen and Loren B. Landau, “The Dual Imperative in Refugee Research: Some Methodological and Ethical
Considerations in Social Science Research on Forced Migration,” Disasters 27, no. 3 (2003): 185-206.
Alexander Betts, Forced Migration and Global Politics (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2009).
16

Jane Freedman, Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 19.

12

meaning of the other.17 By exploring this dyadic social construction and cultural
representation of Syrian refugees and their gendered performance in the case of
Lebanon, this research aims to disrupt the perceived dichotomy of refugee
perception within the schemes of refugee insecurity, providing a space for
productive dialogue across disciplines. Thus, the study explores how underlying
factors, such as geopolitics and biased cultural influence on strategic policy
planning, that significantly inform this research affect social perceptions and
subsequently impact how policies are to be professed and implemented.
In that regard, the Middle East and, in specific, Lebanon has a long history
with Syrians, in which political and sectarian conflicts have altered the fabric of its
society, influencing attitudes, opinions, and politics both internally and on a
regional scale. Communities are products of historical and social contingencies
that shape specific cultural identities, reflecting individual and collective security
interests and practices. Lebanon’s case with the Syrian refugees is still an ongoing
problem awaiting a resolution. In particular, public policies play a huge part in that
they delineate a de facto refugee’s ability to secure their life without discriminatory
labels that might constrain, and marginalize them as unwelcomed displaced persons
that threaten the host state’s stability. 18 After all, being recognized as a refugee
signifies that the international community and government agencies should strive
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to ensure the empowerment of the acknowledged groups of people for equal access
to education, healthcare, safety, shelter, and most importantly, gender sensitive
employment opportunities. Still, refugee integration and assimilation processes are
state dependent, manifesting asymmetrically within populations, with women often
being subjected to greater adversity than others. These dynamics, thus, necessitate
an empirically motivated gender approach to meaningfully examine how the Syrian
refugee crisis is (en)gendered in the case of Lebanon and how it profoundly impacts
Syrian refugee women.
3. Aim and Purpose
This research draws on feminist critiques of security studies and refugee-protection
regimes to enhance the examination of the refugee-protection regimes’ efficiency,
while also accommodating host states’ security concerns in a constructive way. It aims
to shed light on the relational challenges across the different stages of refugee
(in)security with a focus on the majority of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon;
Syrian women, who seem to be silenced the most through this entire process. I chose
Lebanon’s case of the Syrian refugee crisis because it adds value to the general debate
on security construction and gender norm translation in refugee governance
mechanisms within a neighboring developing country. Considering the absence of
extensive South-South forced migration studies, Lebanon’s case in light of the Syrian
refugee crisis serves as a starting point to further investigate such a heated topic.
In this context, incorporating a gender dimension into analyzing the nuances
of security norms’ construction and implementation can improve our understanding
of how these norms are formed and internalized, as well as shed light on their local
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impact. In that regard, a feminist read on the refugee protection regime unearths
many issues and gives voice to people who have been marginalized by traditional
security and refugee protection methods. The study uses cross-disciplinary tools
such as expert interviews, in-depth longitudinal cultural-theme analysis, and a
participatory method named Photovoice, to understand the multilevel challenges of
the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, in which Syrian refugee insecurity is gendered
and experienced. These tools contribute methodologically to the understanding of
how gender plays into an increasingly securitized refugee migration and how this,
in turn, affects Syrian women’s experiences and resilience efforts in the case of
Lebanon. The study is significant in a refugee security context, in which
(inter)national decisions impact diverse groups of refugees for the rest of their lives.
Accordingly, this approach gives a much more applied assessment, offering, at an
additional level, a critique, and expansion of appropriate IR methods.
4. Structure
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter II outlines the dissertation’s
essential concepts and analytical framework, situating gender within critical
scholarship in the field of security studies and refugee scholarship. This chapter
brings a suitable strategy for the dissertation inquiry that would bridge both micro
and macro refugee (in)security discourses and provide multiple research techniques
as the best frames to study the Syrian refugee case in Lebanon. Through a
transnational feminist lens, this chapter is both a process and a product that
discusses the various relevant literature of security studies and global governance,
highlighting the research’s fundamental concepts and tools for inquiry. Each
15

literature focus builds on the previous one, tracing normatively the construction,
management, and impact of the politics of refugee (in)security. Accordingly, this
chapter critically examines both kinds of literature on securitization of forced
migration and the refugee-protection regime, which explicitly and implicitly
(en)gender the refugee (in)security conception and management between host
states, refugee protection regimes, and refugees, with particular attention to women.
It then explores the literature on impact translation, where power hierarchies
(re)shape intersectional refugee realities and resilience efforts, not recognized in
dominant IR scholarships, such as Realism and Liberalism.
Chapter III describes the research design and methods applied in this
dissertation. It evaluates a combination of three areas of research method
scholarship under a qualitative multi-methods approach aiming to provide a
sophisticated understanding of refugee (in)security constructions, practices, and
experiences. The study uses multiple tools—such as expert interviews, in-depth
longitudinal cultural-theme analysis, and a participatory method named
Photovoice—to fully understand the multifaceted connections and challenges
between traditional security and human security regarding gender insecurities
confronting the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. By providing complementary
insights, this section discusses the potential of comprehensively triangulating all
three methods as a dialectical process to trace the securitization–refugee protection
nexus and process in the case of Lebanon. These methods combined would then
bridge the international, national, and local contexts, formulating an adequate
analytical approach in the field of IR.
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Chapter IV traces the shift of geopolitical and Lebanese social attitudes
towards Syrian refugees by highlighting important critical junctures in the
Lebanese–Syrian relationship. It, then, explores the official Lebanese sensitivities
towards the term ‘refugee,’ and official attitudes toward refugees, in general, and
Syrians in Lebanon, in specific. Lastly, this section analyzes the political
implication on explicit and implicit changes in security practices right after the last
significant political juncture post-2014. It, ALSO, highlights the aggressive and
regulative refugee control approach that bolstered the role of local authorities and
municipalities to legitimize ad hoc and, at times, illegal actions furthering
securitized practices across Lebanon.
Chapter V analyzes the contextual dynamics, tension, and resistance that
shape and are shaped by specific refugee crisis response plans between
collaborating political institutions with distinct visions and goals. Specifically, the
focus will be on two core institutions: the Lebanese government and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The study chose Lebanon as
an example of a sovereign developing state that hosts refugees, while the UNHCR
is the leading international organization responsible for refugees’ protection.
Although roles played by other UN agencies and regional organizations to prevent
and reduce statelessness as well as to protect refugees are important, the UNHCR
plays a significant role, in the case of Lebanon, where most response projects are
either funded or implemented between Lebanon and the UNHCR. A longitudinal
comparison of consecutive Syrian Crisis Response Plans—LCRPs—and their
triangulation with other primary sources highlights the transformation of Lebanon’s
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Syrian refugee crisis management. It brings to view the power dynamics between
two collaborating bodies of different knowledge-claims and approaches to
managing the Syrian crisis.
Chapter VI explores how gender (in)security norms are applied on the
ground. It highlights the gendered impact on refugees’ (in)securities practices in
general, Syrian women in specific. Accordingly, trough Photovoice methodology,
this chapter enables local Lebanese volunteers to facilitate some visibility to the
Syrian refugees by recording and reflecting their views of the Syrian refugee
realities through pictures and voice to reach normative policy change. Through a
participatory action research approach, this section helps the study observe,
analyze, and transform our understandings of the daily Syrian refugee anxieties and
resilience efforts in ways that extend beyond the narrow policies that hinder
contextual contributions to general knowledge. It elaborates the local participants’
important contributions to the study by voicing out complex realities of different
Syrian refugees’ daily insecurities, while, at the same time, recognizing their
anxieties as Lebanese citizens towards the Syrian presence within their
communities.
As for the concluding chapter, it explores the local repercussions of the
Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon due to the imposition of restrictive policies on the
entry, movement, and residence of Syrians in Lebanon after December 2014. It
provides a synthesis by discussing the importance of situating gender within critical
scholarship in the field of security studies, refugee protection regimes, and norm
translation, when highlighting what seems to be a vicious cycle of insecurities

18

across Lebanon due to securitized Syrian refugee management practices that
legitimized ad hoc and, at times, illegal actions. In that respect, this concluding
section highlights the benefit of an interdisciplinary research method in IR
scholarship as a strategy to integrate insights across disciplines and levels of
analysis, furthering our knowledge of multi-layered social phenomena with
structural and gendered implications.

19

A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING REFUGEE
(IN)SECURITY
As forced migration is a multidisciplinary field of study, to understand the way
refugee (in)security norms get defined, are managed, and how they affect local
contexts, specifically Syrian women, an interdisciplinary exploration is required.
This chapter provides a general overview of interweaving feminist scholarships on
security studies, refugee politics, and norm translation that are relevant to this
research study, situating my research question in a broader range of academic work.
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first section explores
feminist literature on security studies as it highlights the relevance of gender in the
(re)production of refugee insecurity by questioning explicitly and implicitly the
securitization of refugees as a threat to host state’s security. Most importantly, this
section examines feminist critiques of securitization theory that is of relevance to
this study for it is a process that explains the extreme prioritization of a specific
issue that is not inherently threatening, moving it beyond ordinary politics, where
securitized objects increasingly become homogenized, objectified and alienated as
faceless imminent threats.19
The following section identifies the structural limitations and gender biases
inherent within the refugee-protection regime. It explores the sites at which power
hierarchies (re)shape securitized refugee protection practices. Thus, the literature

Sara Meger, “The Fetishization Of Sexual Violence In International Security,” International Studies
Quarterly 60, no. 1 (2016): 149-159.
19

20

review of this section covers postcolonial feminist critics of the refugee-protection
regime. It assesses the benefit of including a social theory to provide an adequate
framework to explore the multilayered humanitarian rationalities and mechanisms
used in translating refugee protection norms into concrete response practices that,
according to Elisabeth Olivius, seem to objectify, alienate, and subordinate the
diverse groups of refugees.20
The third section sums an analysis of the securitization-refugee protection
nexus in that they mostly dismiss contextual realities and resilience efforts of
refugees, women in specific. It draws on Susanne Zwingel’s transnational
theoretical framework on norm translation and, more precisely, “impact
translation” gearing the third part of the study to pursue a bottom-up, communitybased, participatory approach that would better examine the local repercussions of
securitized refugee practices and Syrian refugees’ resilience efforts in the case of
Lebanon.21 Accordingly, uncovering the scholarship on resilience is of the essence
in providing a complementary framework to explore the missing link between the
current humanitarian and security practices toward Syrian refugees that seem to
silence them and ignore their agency through systematic securitization and genderneutral protection practices that reinforce a cycle of depoliticized refugee
victimization.

Elisabeth Olivius, “(Un)Governable Subjects: The Limits of Refugee Participation In The Promotion Of
Gender Equality In Humanitarian Aid,” Journal of Refugee Studies 27, no. 1 (2013): 42-61.
20

21

Susanne, Zwingel. “Translating International Women's Rights.” Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. p 156.

21

1. Securitization of Refugees
The use of the term security in the field of international relations (IR) is not novel
and has been subject to extensive debate.22 While Feminist theorists hold distinct
theoretical frameworks and lenses, bringing unique perceptions and experiences,
they mostly critique traditional IR’s state-centric conception of security for the lack
of attention it gives to both people, let alone women, and gender as a category of
analysis. 23 One main critique of ahistorical traditional IR paradigms—such as
Realism, Liberalism, and their subsequent “neos”—is that they are primarily
defined in state terms with gendered qualities, as there is no higher authority above
the state in legal and governance terms. 24 Their grand narratives essentialize a
refugee’s identity, silence the different factors and bodies involved, and (re)produce
simplistic, somewhat harmful, readings of refugees’ insecurities. On the one hand,
Realist security concerns focus on the sovereign states as unitary actors securing
themselves from any form of threat to survival, reinforcing territorial boundaries
through hard military control and balance of power practices. 25 Within an
“anarchic” state-based system, Realists construct asylum seekers in security
discourses, mostly portraying them as opportunistic masculine threats to national
security and socio-economic stability. On the other hand, the human security
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literature, dominated by Liberalism, identifies a broader human security approach
that commits to generalized, inalienable human rights, and promotes a state’s legal
and moral state responsibility to protect and secure human lives. Consequently,
Liberalism frames refugees as passive, feminized, and depoliticized victims,
awaiting humanitarian assistance and protection. Still, both paradigms’ concerns
seem to be ahistorical and state-focused on national and international security
policies.
Congruently, Feminist approaches made outstanding contributions to the
literature on security, where only with the reduction of all forms of physical,
structural, and social violence can security be achieved. 26 Feminism played an
essential role in widening the security agenda, challenging the idea of the state
monopoly over the provision of security that often causes insecurities to a large
section of its subjects, specifically women, due to their social positioning.
Accordingly, these feminist theories are of interest to this research in expanding
and enriching the concept of security by bridging the gap between theory and
practice. Many feminist critics build upon social constructivist theories’ view that
ideas shape the world, not just rules or legal treaties, which are necessary but
insufficient.27 The state-centric conceptions of security are essentialist, inaccurate,
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and biased.28 According to social constructivist scholars, a state’s security interests
are multilayered, carried out by distinct people ot different social levels with
different values, who, in turn, unevenly affect local contexts. Therefore, widening
and expanding the concept of security, beyond the safety of a state and its duty to
its citizens, would deepen our understanding of the commonly known concept of
Human Security.29
As a matter of fact, the concept of “securitization” developed out of social
constructivism’s focus on perception and interpretation, in which security is a “selfreferential practice.”30 Securitization theory highlights the process of how and why
specific issues and subjects are constructed as security threats, prioritizing
perceived problems over other issues deemed tributary with normative
consequences.31 Local contexts that are contingent on specific geopolitical, social
factors, and connotations, unique to their respective political cultures, are essential
in understanding the concept of securitization within that context. What is
perceived as a security threat is subjective, relatively dependent on the observer and
their intersectional background. It is a result of a process of social construction,
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which calls into mind that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”32
How security threats emerge, evolve, and dissolve, shapes “the intersubjective
establishment of an existential threat, which demands urgent and immediate
attention, as well as the use of extraordinary measures to counter this threat.”33
One example is based on Lene Hansen’s definition of “security as
silence.” 34 Her article, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the
Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,” criticized the lack of gender in a
particular tradition of IR security research framework, silencing or even
aggravating alternative threats being faced.35 In that context, securitized discourses
reflect gendered, constructed identities— who are we—and what is considered a
national threat. Moreover, security approaches might not be necessarily positive
nor universal. Instead, they are subject-dependent and, unevenly, harmful at times.
A gender lens helps this research focus on particular kinds of power
relations that are absent in traditional IR security scholarships, further complicating
the heterogeneity of multilayered (in)security dynamics. 36 Hansen’s study uses
(in)security as an umbrella term for describing a range of security discourses that
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reproduce gender hierarchies and hegemonies, negatively affecting local
experiences. Therefore, Hansen’s argument provides valuable theoretical insights
into this research. According to Hansen, gender is one crucial component that statecentered security perspectives ignore when homogenizing intersectional
asymmetric problems. As a matter of fact, the gendered concept of security through
state sovereignty, in the modern world, is enshrined in the notion of masculinist
governmental leadership, effectiveness, and control within a feminized subordinate
state’s territory. Their creation is associated with the notion that a state’s leadership
is “monolithic, hierarchical, and violent.”37
Hansen’s critique casts new light on how two images simultaneously silence
and structurally oppress alternative femininities and masculinities within a refugee
population, stripping away their agency and homogenizing their resilience
capabilities. In fact, the whole process of becoming a refugee becomes dependent
on a constructed patriarchal international system of nation-states with security
implications. On the one hand, Hansen argues that securitized political discourses
that exaggerate the stereotypical male behavior through an emphasis on sexuality,
aggression and physical strength become hypermasculine. 38 On the other hand,
feminization tactics, such as humanitarian rhetoric, reinforce an image of people,
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in this case, refugees, as “backward, disempowered, passive and helpless.” 39
Consequently, Hansen’s analysis informs this research regarding how two images
get simultaneously projected and securitized: faceless numbers of refugees become
both potential masculine threat with the ability to cause physical aggression and
danger, and feminized mothers, elderly, and children who are a burden, in dire need
of protection.
As a transnational phenomenon, labeling a person a “refugee” challenges
the political territoriality of a state, as it operates across national boundaries,
entailing legal obligations for sovereign host states regarding how to manage people
entering their territory. This transnational phenomenon becomes simultaneously
descriptive and controversially transformative as it engenders a homogenized
identity of individuals who cross state borders, providing them an internationally
recognized legal status depending on the definitions ascribed to them. In that
regard, these people’s political, cultural, and national identities are constructed
through discursive differences by comparing two or more things as right or wrong.
We find that in the ever-evolving literature on forced migration and security studies
various labels were used to define individuals that forcibly leave their home
countries such as “asylum seeker” or “refugee” silencing them and striping away
their agency.40
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With the modern proliferation of forced migration, the very concept of
becoming a refugee took a negative turn. Refugees, in that case, are especially
portrayed as foreigners attempting to seek asylum within state borders of what
Benedict Anderson calls an imagined homogeneous community that is limited.41
From that aspect, Anderson’s depiction of this homogeneous community sheds
light upon the inaccurate construction of refugees as a security burden that
legitimizes ’extraordinary measures’ as the only way of protecting a false
community identity of the insecure “Us” (citizens) from the dangerous visualized
“Other” (a foreign threat).42 These generalized constructions of identity gradually
reinforce statist assumptions about the importance of securitizing citizenship and
immigration control, framing the humanitarian identity of the host state as a
vulnerability it cannot afford. Sovereign states become reluctant to accept a group
of ‘intrusive’ people with this label for fear of regularizing the refugees’ legal status
and potential assimilation. Therefore, granting refugee status politicizes and
stereotypes refugees as a threat to a state’s national security, welfare, and, most
importantly, identity.43 All refugees become homogenized into one big group of
threats that is politicized as an uncontrollable transnational group of homogenized
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individuals, whose rights and duties depend on the jurisdiction of the sovereign host
state.
Still, as a highly politicized current crisis, protecting the forcibly displaced
is a transnational collective problem that no state can handle alone. Threats do not
exist independently from the discourses that mark them as such. 44 Because this
study is concerned with Syrians forcibly crossing Lebanese borders and
(un)successfully registering with the UNHCR as refugees with inalienable rights,
this study chose to explore the host state’s juridical translation of their legal status,
management, and (in)securities.
As a political act, the visual securitization of refugees as distant “others”
transforms them into matters of security rather than humanity, legitimizing strict
border security mechanisms on the entry and status determination of politicized
asylum seekers.45 In his article “Manufacturing Threats: Asylum Seekers as Threats
or Refugees,” Scott D. Watson studies the influx of refugees from Sri Lanka to
Canada to assess the implemented refugee policies. Watson’s research provides
evidence on how refugee policies shift from the societal to the political. The
author’s argument is critical in unlocking how forced migration push host states to
securitize their borders, where refugees get framed as opportunistic individuals
seeking to take advantage of the host state’s vulnerability; “‘bogus’ refugees,
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Journal of

criminals, terrorists or otherwise threaten the nation by virtue of the magnitude of
the flow,” thereby imposing a threat to the nation.46 This theoretical view explains
the framing and stigmatization of distinct groups of individuals as either potential
terrorists and criminals or victims who institutionalize dependency on both the state
and the international community. The Sri Lankan asylum seeking process in the
Canadian context established both: securitized mechanisms of racial exclusion
through background security checks—designed to either weed out potential refugee
applicants or surveil post-intakes—and institutionalized aid programs that force
asylum seekers to depend on them when adapting to their new realities. This
conduct reinforces a dyadic privilege of the benevolent host state granting
securitized Sri Lankans conditional asylum. 47 The portrayal of a “global-local
divide” between protecting refugees and protecting host state sovereignty
reinforces narrow securitization approaches as a zero-sum game. The outcome
leads to what seems like a paradoxical shift from aid to deterrence, detention, and
deportation, justifying individual and institutional violence as a means to control
the foreign population in a dialectical manner.48
Watson’s literature provides adequate empirical work on the shift of the
social attitudes in local contexts, building on Canadian cultural biases towards the
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homogenized Sri Lankan refugees. The perceived mutually exclusive categories
reinforce the framing of the opportunistic ‘Other,’ who is taking advantage of the
host state’s benevolence. With nationalism and xenophobia on the rise, recent
perceptions of refugees—a burden and a threat—erroneously push back the need
of protecting the displaced who are forcibly fleeing from war, conflict, and
persecution. Controversially politicized local practices against refugees get either
justified or criticized for securitizing national measures governing the entry, and
status determinants of refugees. 49 By constructing refugees as potential security
threats, their humanity is denied; making it dangerous to engage the “Other”
inclusively. Projecting a threat as existential impedes refugee integration and
assimilation.
Meanwhile, it is imperative to know those forced migrants entering the host
communities. Even though refugee men do witness gendered discrimination and
marginalization, Syrian women’s (in)securities are the focus of this study. After all,
they represent the majority of Syrians who registered as refugees with the UNHCR
in the case of Lebanon. 50 And, borrowing Sara Meger’s theoretical framework
regarding securitization, this study can highlight the fact that Syrian refugee
women’s everyday insecurities are multidimensional and go beyond just the
physical. They cut across many aspects of human security, starting from the
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fundamental right to live free from torture and slavery, to different political, socioeconomic, cultural, physical and psychological safety.
In Merger’s article entitled “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in
International Security,” the author detects a non-linear chain of securitization
processes of homogenization, objectification, and “blowback”—a metaphor to
denote unintended negative consequences of operations.51 By objectifying security
problems, state-focused securitization processes tend to decontextualize and
homogenize the process, oversimplifying and exploiting specific approaches that
fail to adequately address issues such as gender violence. Consequently, women
refugees, specifically, tend to be affected by the host states’ securitization
discourse, silenced and portrayed as passive victims. Her work backs the feminist
call for academic and policy practices to go beyond gender-blind efforts that tend
to strip the different types of violence of their contextual meaning, becoming
objects of fascination, consumable, and banal—fetishization, maximizing
counterintuitive approaches.52
According to Meger, women’s victimhood only served as an instrument for
patriarchal political interest that silence intersectional gender inequalities.53 It is
crucial to note that women are not one homogenous group that host states
discriminate against. Interlocking dynamic systems of privileges such as class,
ethnicity, and gender play a dominant role in (re)positioning some at an advantage
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over others.53 Through state-centered securitized rhetoric, distinct groups of female
refugees get exposed to various types of marginalization, often linked to their socioeconomic, cultural, and political backgrounds. Instead, Meger presents an
important solution that this study could benefit from; the need for the
desecuritization of gendered violence encouraging unexceptional practices that
would not fetishize nor obscure the root causes of the problem at hand, namely
gender hierarchy.

54

That way, gender-sensitive sustainable development

approaches would better promote inclusive human rights and social justice.55
Then again, securitization processes are multileveled frequently politicized
procedures through different forms of representations, such as political speeches,
media representation, provocative images, and local legislation.57 Their
depoliticization would require deeper research. Speech acts are influential in the
construction and legitimization of specific security measures.56 However, they are
not the only form of action that constructs security frameworks. Security studies
underlining the role of practice can reveal patterns of securitization that might not
be shown when focusing solely on discourse or speech act. Practices are cultures in

Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, and Leslie McCall, “Toward A Field Of Intersectionality Studies:
Theory, Applications, And Praxis,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 38, no. 4 (2013): 785-810.
53

Sara Meger, “The Fetishization Of Sexual Violence In International Security,” International Studies
Quarterly 60, no. 1 (2016): 149-159.
54

55

Ibid

56

Barry Buzan, People. States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era
(Colchester, England: ECPR Press, 2008), 36.

33

action.57 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot’s “practice turn” provides a hands-on
analytical framework for operationalizing security research and enhancing a crosstheoretical conversation.58 It allows the study to bridge the different paradigms and
disciplines in order to understand refugee (in)security better. Complex security
activities are made up of countless local everyday practices—“patterned ways of
doing things”—that tend to get overlooked in mainstream scholarly research.59 By
bridging theories into empirical cases, security practices change the physical
environment as well as the discursive social ideas surrounding them.60 Practices are
performances and contextually meaningful patterns of action, socially developed
through learning and training.
As a matter of fact, Lene Hansen investigates how insecurity discourse and
bodily threats become framed as sporadic instances of “individualizing practices.”61
According to Hansen, even though these latter are directed at specific individuals,
they simultaneously (re)produce collective fear. 62 Gender-blind bureaucratic
prioritization and stratification of perceived masculinized individual threats create
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painful policies that silence women’s basic needs.63 These practices reciprocally
represent, enact, and possibly change the organizational culture and related
discourses in (and on) the material world.64 Unlike habits, practices do not need
extensive repetition to be acquired. Also, their performances, correctly or
incorrectly done, are appraised on a social level.65 Practices are highly political for
they could sustain or undermine existing patterns of power relations. 66 Therefore,
with continuous feedback and change, new iterative problem-solving mechanisms
will build on new shared practices and experiences.
Moreover, security practices tend to be contextually relative due to different
viewers’ interests. Security, according to Didier Bigo, is neither about survival nor
urgency. 67 Practices engage with their respective environment and its objects,
whether those are natural, cultural, or political. The process of securitization could
be linked to routinized practices of security professionals as well as “anchoring”
practices, which means that a certain body would define their own set of strategies
for action over others by setting new standards for “good” or “bad” domestic
policies within specific sovereign states.70 As such, routinized or anchoring
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practices make other related local practices flourish or diminish. 68 Accordingly,
Bigo’s concept of securitization—as mundane bureaucratic practices, drawn from
everyday politics—further elaborates this research’s argument by explaining how
the process of a host society’s conduct of unease can direct the security norms and
expectations of homogenized Syrian uncertainties. Routinized practices of security
professionals, bureaucrats, and police reinforce counterintuitive “conditional
hospitality.”
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Through hyper-regulated visa requirements, these practices

counterintuitively silence refugee insecurities and inhibit them from accessing
much needed essential services.
In that regard, practices possess a co-constitutive structural power of
reinforcing and (re)producing securitized issues and rules.70 Norms in that sense
are not static. They are continuously (re)interpreted, localized, and contextualized,
forming organized and meaningful behaviors that create a variety of meanings,
different patterns of accepted practices, and lead to a variety of outcomes. 71
Accordingly, Susanne Zwingel’s book Translating International Women’s Rights
helps this research demonstrate how international norms resonate in local settings.72
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Zwingel states that there is no global consensus, but rather sites for various
constructions, (re)definitions, and contestations of what gender equality norms
mean to engaged, often competing, interest groups. 73 Even though the author’s
work does not discuss security specifically, it traces how norms in general are
negotiated between various interest groups when they aim to translate their shared
vision into actual transnational activities and contextual policy practices.
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Consequently, practices of adoption, resistance, and opposition to refugee
migration transform universal norms, such as human rights, into securitized state
practices of controlling refugee migration, legitimizing ad hoc discriminatory
agendas in the name of sovereignty.
These practices, in turn, explain how national interest measures lead to
justifying exceptional mechanisms of refugee deterrence with counterproductive
consequences. Not recognizing the gendered hierarchies and security practices
result in a limited understanding of the issues at hand, (en)gendering what
constitutes refugee (in)security practices.75 In turn, their strategies have gendered
dimensions in which practices of hypermasculinity and feminization have
diverging effects on women’s and men’s opportunities and experiences of seeking
asylum.
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Gender, in that sense, is performatively constituted, establishing the identity
it is purported to be.76 Judith Butler's thesis on performativity states that recurrent
gendered actions and practices within a rigid regulatory frame “congeal over time
to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being.” 77 Moreover, in
the case of refugee power politics, security is understood as a means, a process
rather than an ideal end. Security practices expose different social and structural
hierarchies that might be invisible to external investigators, showcasing how these
hierarchies construct and are constructed by a patriarchal system.78 Accordingly,
local dynamics and biased social attitudes are crucial in influencing how specific
policies appear as local discriminative practices, even in the case of sympathetic
political rhetoric. A testament to this reality is forced migration, in which
governments show empathy to forcibly displaced people while, at the same time,
their contextual interests are silenced through securitized practices of maintaining
state stability when asylum seekers attempt to come in.79
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2. Refugee Protection Regime
Since the modern system of nation-states inhabits an evolving international
humanitarian regime, the study of refugee protection policy construction and
practice is essential to understanding the (en)gendered Syrian refugee protection.
Within the realm of refugee assistance, the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) is commonly the most authoritative agency. 80 Till this date,
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,
through UNHCR, remain the sole legal instrument that determines the policy of
refugee legal protection and assistance.81 Even with official declarations in favor of
refugee protection, in general, most refugee security rhetoric portrays refugees as
faceless people who need saving, while posing a burden on the already prevailing
social, political, economic, and environmental troubles within the host state’s
communities. Therefore, it is essential to establish an adequate framework that
better explores the explicit and latent power dynamics that guide this refugee
protection regime construction and goals, where an (en)gendered refugee insecurity
is often a matter of context.82
Accordingly, this section builds of interweaving Feminists theories when
examining and criticizing international organizations, such as the UNHCR, for
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using mismatched procedural measures that often end up blurring the already
marginalized population. 83 Elizabeth Olivius’ thesis on “how gender equality
norms operate as governing tools […] in refugee camps in the context of global
relations of power and marginalization,” is of relevance. 84 Her thesis findings
examine how gender equality in global refugee governance is “rarely treated as a
goal in its own right.”85 Notably, governing refugee management’s processes of
gender equality construction, interpretation and application are, either promoted on
“the basis of their usefulness” or as a means to different ends, limiting refugee
gender empowerment and social change.
Effectively, Heather Johnson’s argument that “the refugee has been
racialized and victimized, she has also been feminized” in the international refugee
regime is of interest. 86 Johnson’s article “Click To Donate: Visual Images,
Constructing Victims And Imagining The Female Refugee,” sheds light on the
visual construction of the myth of a refugee identity, in which female refugees are
portrayed as innocent people, whereas men lose their status as fathers, husbands, or
sons, becoming potential terrorists or economic opportunists existentially
threatening the host state’s security. Her analysis helps this research push the idea
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that various groups of refugees, as subjects of the refugee protection regime,
become heavily dependent on the framing of different aid agencies, not capable of
capitalizing on their own skills as self-help mechanisms. Johnson argues that
refugee protection policies silence the diversity within the refugee population
through the use of visual techniques and rhetoric that construct a ‘female’ refugee,
depoliticizing refugees legally, socially, and economically for the success of
humanitarian missions.
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Their feminization entice the curbing preexisting

dialogical representation of refugees as radicalized foreigners, in which women and
children are perceived as a lesser threat than men, who are still under the scrutiny
of being an imminent menace.88
Consequently, as Johnson concludes; “how we imagine particular
categories of people determines how we engage with them.” 89 Tracing the
contemporary history of UNHCR’s media images of refugees, Johnson states that
the inherent bias of the international community and humanitarian workers’
personal values tends to perceive refugees as different—a radicalized foreign threat
to their way of life. 90 Therefore, Johnson’s argument reinforces this research’s
theoretical claim that gender is significantly in humanitarian aid to the refugees, for
gendered expectations of these agencies intersect with their aid workers’ class,
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national, and background privileges, constructing a false refugee identity in their
quest to protect asylum seekers.
In that respect, Charli Carpenter, in her article “Women, Children, and
Other Vulnerable Groups,” observed the repeated and exclusive frame of women
and children within the transnational donor-seeking literature as one innocent,
vulnerable, and a passive group of civilians who require saving and protection.
Without a comprehensive understanding of the gendered underpinnings, this
neoliberal portrayal of a vulnerable community seems to narrowly focus on just the
utility perspective of gender in garnering international and host states’ support and
funds. 91 Consequently, neoliberal practices get stuck between the tendencies of
developing and modernizing the perceived “backward” refugee society and the
need to respect harmful cultural relativist state practices that challenge basic
women’s rights. Thus, Carpenter’s article also reinforces the argument that false
gender identities are hierarchically displayed between the benevolent, altruistic aid
workers and the backward, oppressed victims who host governments can neither
criminalize nor manage on their own.
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Consequently, relief efforts often

undermine the potentials for refugee resilience and coping strategies, whether
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positive or negative, through the way in which humanitarian selves and refugee
others are constructed.93
One of the problematic issues with emergency relief is that its design is
based on the assumption that it has the moral capacity and the role to save refugees
and do for them rather than work with them and empower them.94 The construction
of altruistic selves assumes that the providers and administrators of relief are in a
power position since they possess a mandate to save those who are silent,
oppressed, and in need. The visual narratives’ construction of the feminized victims
or masculinized threats strips away the diverse asylum seekers’ voice, agency, and
humanity in public humanitarian discourse once they are labeled as a refugee
“victim.” 95 Those refugees are survivors. By labeling refugees as victims, this
otherness of the refugee is constructed with the assumption that refugees are all
needy, helpless, and passively dependent on those who will help, save, and
modernize them. 96 The representation of humanitarian workers as the sole
promoters of gender equality strips refugees of their agency. It tends to mask the
power dynamics of social relations, reinforcing structural and individual gender
hierarchies between the different micro-groups that form the refugee population.
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As much as initiatives push for refugee security, there is a disjuncture
between international norms promoted by state representatives, international
agencies, and bureaucrats, and the reality on the ground. Refugees are thus being
structurally gendered and silenced through refugee protection practices privileging
feminizing standard operating procedures.97 Looking at the covers of refugee crisis
response plans or any other humanitarian “promotional” brochures or pamphlets,
there often seems to be an image of a powerless yet exotic foreigner, mostly a
young girl, a mother, or a powerless old couple displayed to incite empathy.98 These
images are necessary for the refugee protection regime’s survival in theory and
practice—for these are the tools that will generate enough money to keep their relief
programs and their jobs up and running within the host communities. The
depoliticized representation of refugees has been strategic in the construction of
political (non)agency, mobilizing public support and gathering more funds to curb
the plight of worthy refugees and their insecurities further objectifying them.99
One issue that seems to be missing in Johnson’s argument is that
bureaucratic organizations, such as the UNHCR, struggle to adapt their
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internationally recognized norms within a sovereign domestic polity.
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Unsurprisingly, celebrated gender mainstreaming norms in refugee protection
principles get distorted when translated domestically. Zwingel offers a novel
theoretical insight and extensive empirical research findings on the process of
norms, which she calls; “trans-nationalization” and gender mainstreaming. Using
different case studies of how an international norm resonates in different local
realities, Zwingel in her book; “Translating International Women's Rights,”
highlights how the gap between international norms and local contexts gets closed
through a continual long-term process of (re)negotiation and (re)interpretation.101
In that respect, contested global refugee norms do not linearly diffuse in the local
context. A translation process occurs depending on engaged translation work
through norm entrepreneurs and social advances. However, in the refugee context,
humanitarian agencies, such as the UNHCR, are not just biased, but they are also
codependent on a state-based system. They tend to work closely with host states
that would ultimately influence whom to feminize as a refugee victim and whom
to label as a hyper-masculine foreign threat. After all, host states and the
international community, at large, play a significant role in the refugee crisis policy
plans, constructing and (re)shaping their ‘strategic partnership’ with concerned
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humanitarian agencies in managing a refugee situation, such as securitizing it a
‘crisis.’
Managing actors, such as sovereign states and humanitarian agencies are
too interested and at the same time constrained to apply these international norms
without any compromise. When collaborating with host states in refugee
management policy creation and implementation, the neutrality and independence
of humanitarian agencies, such as the UNHCR, is undermined, becoming more
politicized than ever. 102 Most refugee protection policies are shared with host
government authorities, humanitarian NGOs and other UN agencies, among many
other interest groups. While these bodies have different security interests and a
considerable say in the refugee protection regime, humanitarian and refugee
security practices become integrated, and not merely parallel endeavors. This
would mean that the UNHCR’s multilateral involvement in refugee protection can
never be objectively altruistic as states, interest groups, and multilateral governing
institutions inter-subjectively prioritize their interests in securitizing the refugee
threat through different processes, such as institutional funding or labeling a
situation as a “humanitarian crisis.”
This argument reinforces the study’s goal in highlighting how gender
mainstreaming efforts based on need get downgraded to sustainable long-term
programs and future goals as a compromise to gain access to refugees within
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culturally relativist host communities and concerned donor funds with distinct
securitized goals–realpolitik.103 In that respect, the UNHCR operations rely on and
compete almost entirely for, voluntary contributions from member states,
international and regional organizations, as well as some pooled funding
mechanisms that include the private and politically affiliated sectors. Donor states
became the UNHCR’s main patrons with up to 98% of funds provided by sovereign
states, limiting thus the organization’s commitments to refugees.104 According to
Michael Barnett, donor states possess considerable influence over the UNHCR’s
agenda while refugees become voiceless recipients in need of the international
community to compassionately help them.105 Donor states voluntarily choose who,
what, where, and when to fund. 106Accordingly, the universally recognized human
rights regime translates into a plethora of competing humanitarian agencies whose
specialization depends on the number of funds they get from different interest
groups.
For the sake of success, UNHCR programs that promote women’s
participation do not capture the discriminations that refugee women brave through
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as women.107 Ultimately, they reinforce existing rhetoric that depoliticizes women
and children refugees as passive victims heavily dependent on aid assistance.108
Their response techniques end up downplaying their Global–Refugee–Policy
practices that would theoretically guarantee the asylum seekers local integration
and assimilation for the sake of funding and practical opportunities among others.
Meticulous exercises of counting, calculating, and coding refugees, and the genderneutral methods of “knowing” the refugees, contrast with and contradict the idea of
gendered refugee protection that was meant to alleviate their daily (in)securities.109
Moreover, in the case of Lebanon, the primary agency managing refugees is the
UNHCR whose responsibility is to support the Lebanese government in procuring
technical, administrative state support in managing registered refugees and not just
providing much-needed protection and assistance to individual asylum seekers.110
Refugee managing organizations like the UNHCR face many ethical criticisms to
reconsider their operational practices that end up securitizing refugees by adopting
controversial technological practices.
In that regard, Laura Barnett’s article “Global Governance and the
Evolution of the International Refugee Regime” situates this research within the
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literature on the securitization-refugee protection nexus. By employing evolution
as a historical technique, Barnett’s article traces the historical genealogy of the
UNHCR, as mandated by the United Nations, whose main task is to protect the
governing standards for how to treat and protect individuals labeled as
‘refugees.’111 These include the promotion of international legal frameworks that
develop and strengthen durable solutions of monitoring and protecting refugees, in
order to ensure their safety and wellbeing. Defining and expanding the minimum
standards of treatment for refugees, the UNHCR’s main goal is to support hosting
states in providing safe refuge, critical emergency, and basic assistance in the form
of shelter, food, healthcare, water, and sanitation, among many other services.112
This effort was designed to ensure voluntary repatriation, local integration, or
resettlement to a third country, aiming to ensure refugees’ self-sufficiency in the
country of asylum.
With time, the purpose of the UNHCR and humanitarian action expanded
significantly, collaborating with compromised states in order to eliminate the root
causes of conflict before their citizens are forced to become refugees.113 However,
and as the UNHCR bureaucratically expanded, with around five thousand
employees, refugee participation in the planning, implementation, or management
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of operations remained very limited, especially for women refugees. 114 This
expansion led to a change of approach, in which incremental protection tasks and
social services were subcontracted to other NGOs that, according to Jane
Freedman’s article, “Mainstreaming Gender In Refugee Protection,” are biased,
and most of the time insufficiently trained to target the diverse groups that make up
the refugee population sensitively. 115 This leads to prioritizing genderblind
assistance over others, increasing the gap between the theory of protecting the
refugee population and the actual mitigation of gender-related political or socioeconomic problems to a perceivably homogenized refugee population.
Barnett’s study reinforces this dissertation’s claim that there is, today, a
refugee regime complex of overlapping competing regimes dependent on
economic, ideological, and practical considerations. Barnett draws attention to how
certain aspects of the refugee protection regime were used by the host state to justify
and impose securitized refugee measures as a deterrence mechanism. Despite the
humanitarian rhetoric fo supporting and aiding Syrian refugees, local practices end
up projecting the organizational cultures and domestic social anxieties upon the
faceless refugees, further complicating refugee realities. 116 Even when refugee
protection policies tend to lump images of women and children as feminized
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victims, refugee management practices end up using aggressive filtering techniques
that target who fits into this category to get the aid needed. Ultimately, the
international community’s “benevolence” would reinforce the binary system made
by the host state’s securitization practices that were discussed in the first section.117
UNHCR’s refugee management processes such as biometric refugee registration
would also end up only benefiting host-state security personnel in tracking the
refugees’ movements and potentially sharing this information with other interest
groups.118 In this case technology measures are seen as a double-edged sword with
unequal consequences. This type of bureaucratization of refugee protection and
assistance agendas, such as refugee camps’ containment, is associated with the
growing priority of what Barnett calls “base organizational interests” such as host
state security and refugee management policy funding.119 Accordingly, searching
for funds, NGOs become subcontractors of governments or the United Nations,
using feminizing practices that depoliticize refugees and foster their oppression.120
Such representations trap refugees in the position of “clients lacking political means
of influencing their place in the receiving society.”121
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Moreover, with increasing refugee flows and enhanced member states’
restrictive asylum mechanisms, the UNHCR proactively expanded its operational
approach from mere refugee protection to include wider state cooperation in
refugee containment measures, restricting refugee access to genuine humanitarian
relief as a compromise for operating on host state’s territory. 122 The UNHCR’s
refugee crisis responses became increasingly institutionalized, rationalizing
patriarchal Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for intervention and control in
the interests of nationalist donor and host states, devoid of genuine concerns
regarding the multifaceted needs and risks refugee women experience in their daily
lives.123 Consequently, a wider humanitarian approach ends up failing to recognize
the gendered character of refugees’ actual needs. Barnett’s argument further
supports this research in understanding why securitized interests are pushed over
the provision of sensible refugee protection and practical solutions to the complexly
gendered emergency need.124 Correspondingly, the conceptual apparatus of refugee
security as host state’s survival cannot be viewed as objective. It reinforces the host
state’s power to include and exclude refugees within.
Subsequently, limited refugee emergency relief can offer refugees neither
gender inclusive aid, protection, nor real prospects in the long term, especially in
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the context of a protracted crisis that is context dependent.125 Several factors, such
as organizational cultures and networks of power, actively conjoin in influencing
local humanitarian assistance practices that transform the local environment in
unexpected ways, forcing refugees to adapt.126 Without a well-informed refugee
protection, gender-sensitive programs would overlook the various refugee
(in)security dimensions that are present in certain situations. Mainstreaming gender
requires the acknowledgment of intersectional gender inequalities occurring within
many socially constructed spaces and contexts. The structural implications of these
strategies reinforce the perceived dualism that is reproduced and contextualized,
neither benefiting refugees nor the host communities. 127 They emphasize the
politicization of the refugee crisis while at the same time depoliticizing all refugees
through the creation of meaningful behavior, different patterns, and mundane
bureaucratic arrangements of newly accepted norms.
3. Impact Translation And Resilience Efforts
While considerable scholarship sees universal human rights and statist cultural
relativism as oppositional, the process of translating refugee protection norms from
a global discourse of refugee protection into securitized local understandings of
social justice, bridges this divide. Therefore, Susanne Zwingel’ s theoretical notion

Sue Lautze and John Hammock, “Saving Lives And Livelihoods: The Fundamentals Of A Livelihood
Strategy.” Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University, (1997).
125

Raffaela Puggioni, “Refugees, Institutional Invisibility, And Self-Help Strategies: Evaluating Kurdish
Experience In Rome,” Journal of Refugee Studies 18, no. 3 (2005): 319-339.
126

127

Jane Freedman, Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015), 19.

53

of “impact translation” as different types of reactions to global norms in a domestic
context provides a necessary lens to explore the local dynamics in which Lebanese
communities and Syrian refugees adapt to new adversities through resilience
efforts. Even when there are clear differences between refugees, host communities,
and humanitarian aid agencies, Zwingle’s theory of impact translation asserts that
these refugees are not passive recipients of refugee security norms 128 . Instead,
refugees appropriate, negotiate, reject, and modify established rules as norm
entrepreneurs for personal uses, further complicating the translation effects of
refugee humanitarian interventions.
In that respect, Alice Szczeoanikova, in her article “Gender Relations in a
Refugee Camp: A Case of Chechens Seeking Asylum in the Czech Republic,”
studies how refugee realities are complex, with room for both opportunities and
misfortunes. Based on her study, undiversified perception and “gender-blind
construction of refugees position refugee women as passive objects of aid,”
awaiting the impact of universal norms translation in their local realities, latently
sustain gendered violence. 129 According to Szczeoanikova, abstract macro-level
norms do not deterministically shape localized refugee politics for assumptions of
a top-down direction are biased and inaccurate. 130 Her argument about how
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geography and different social elements influence the active translation of refugee
protection norms and impact helps my research understand the Lebanese political
and socioeconomic predicaments that (re)produce a vicious cycle of Syrian refugee
insecurities. Therefore, both Zwingel’s transnational theory and Szczeoanikova’s
refugee fieldwork approach inspired my work in conducting a multilevel, bottomup approach to exploring the power relations between different bodies, working
across local, national and international levels, shaping contextual ideas and
practices.131 This analytical framework would enrich this research by underlying
the dialectical experiences of power relations and refugee (in)security microdynamics, reproducing Syrian refugee (in)securities.
In that respect, exploring the issue of accountability is key. Knowing the
different institutions’ responsibilities, and to whom these institutions answer, also
affects the way refugee protection norms get translated and the types of local impact
they aim for.132 Context-sensitive measures and strategies are essential for impacttranslation, and norm entrepreneurs—agents interested in changing social norms—
to further the rights of Syrian refugees, especially women.133 Accordingly, through
norm entrepreneurs and social developments, this research needs to explore the
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complex dynamics between the different refugee (in)security bodies that are
decentralized in a multidisciplinary, outside the box manner.
On another note, identity with all its ramifications is particularly relevant
for exploring a silenced body such as the Syrian refugees who experience
multidimensional and (dis)continuous (in)securities in the case of Lebanon. A
refugee’s identity construction influences their agency. Histories and contexts are
significant in appropriating, translating, and remaking transnational discourses into
the vernacular. 134 Therefore, a study separating the local from national and
international politics will not be efficient in providing adequate research on refugee
insecurities and resilience efforts. After all, the story of every refugee is a story of
resilience. Resilience, in this context, may be defined as a social process in which
groups and communities can ‘bounce back’ by engaging in everyday life activities
and creating a form of normalcy. 135 This resilience does not happen only at the
individual level, but also through a micro–meso–macro supportive environment
that empowers individuals in ways that are relevant to their culture. 136 The
traditional literature on securitization and refugee protection has generally
discounted these dimensions of normalcy and silenced refugee resilience. In fact,
refugees were defined as needy communities at best, and as a liability at worst.
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Approaches that highlight resilience and livelihoods, on the other hand, challenge
such essentialist assumptions. As such, Philippe Bourbeau’s notion of resilience as
a dynamic process, continually changing and highly relevant to the context, helps
emphasize on the need to establish normalcy in the lives of asylum-seeking groups
in adversity. 137 Accordingly, Zwingel’s concept of norm internalization—"the
phase where the norm is implemented in domestic settings, e.g., in state
bureaucracies”—is also relevant when examining domestic dynamics of gender
norm translation depending on gender biased local policies.138 Her concept sheds
light on how transnational actors, such as Syrian refugees, could appropriate,
negotiate, modify, and contest gender-blind policies, if imposed, with the ability to
connect or bounce back, (re)producing refugee (in)securities. Consequently,
various resilience practices of refugees, particularly women, internalize and
externalize different localized norms and practices for personal goals, further
complicating issues of agency and ownership.
In the article “Everyday Resilience: Narratives of Single Refugee Women
with Children,” Caroline Lenette, Mark Brough, and Leonie Cox argue that “more
attention should be paid to daily pathways through which refugee resilience
practices are achieved” and go beyond simplistic binaries of whether resilience is
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present or absent.139 According to the authors, the complex nature of resilience is
influenced by biological, socioeconomic, cultural, and legal factors that intersect
with one another, determining how one responds to stressful experiences.
Accordingly, through resilience practices, refugees attempt to contest, resist, and
(re)construct their gendered insecurities. 140 By “shifting, changing, building,
learning and moving on,” 141 refugee resilience is dynamic and multilayered in
nature, and these practices cannot be stereotyped as signs of resilience or not. 142
When disturbances happen, resilience occurs through various adapting practices.
According to the authors, “it is the day-to-day pathways through which resilience
outcomes are achieved.”143 Different individuals witnessing the same disturbances
might practice resilience differently at different times, making resilience a relative
concept. Refugee resilience can be interpreted in many ways by different interested
bodies; it can range from adapting to new realities and maintaining the securitized
refugee system to contesting unfavorable practices and creating disturbances within
the status quo.144
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Accordingly, Lenette, Brough, and Cox’s argument reinforce the normative
aspect of my work by stating that without inclusive support, resilience as a
contestation can become counterproductive to all the involved bodies. As a result,
this type of resilience would reinforce the (in)security vicious cycle by reproducing
more insecurities within host states, such as Lebanon, affecting the Arab region and
the international system as a whole. In turn, through the practice of resilience, the
more oppressed refugees are through securitized refugee management practices, the
more their retaliatory grievances would cause a backlash on host state’s security.
This gendered phenomenon is central to my research in exploring the impact
translation of Syrian refugee (in)security norms and their multifaced experiences
through fieldwork.
4. Implications
This chapter aimed to examine interweaving feminist scholarship on humanitarian
and security practices toward refugees. It specifically sought to explore theoretical
and practical contributions to refugee security and refugee protection concerns. The
chapter focused on three general trends; the first concerned the contested concept
of security, in which security-threat construction and practices of refugee
securitization depend on the gender bias in the host state’s sociocultural, political,
economic structure. Therefore, the feminist critiques of securitization theory direct
this research’s attention to the fetishization of refugee insecurity discourse with
real-world implications. However, this approach only challenges the role of the
state in managing refugee insecurity, while disregarding other forces. That is why
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bringing a second set of literature on postcolonial feminist theory constitutes a
necessary point in exploring the refugee protection regime.
The second section brings out relevant literature on (en)gendered
humanitarian norm construction and its translation within domestic contexts. This
scholarship sheds light on the gender bias and structural limitations that are inherent
within the refugee-protection regime by exploring the sites where power hierarchies
(re)shape humanitarian norms into compromised and gendered Standard Operating
Procedures—(SOPs) in managing a refugee crisis. By exposing the rationalities and
power relations of managing refugees, this approach challenges the universalist
assumptions of a universal human right approach diffusing into gender-sensitive
local refugee practices.
That is why combining a transnational feminist theory with a relevant
analytical tool of organizational longitudinal cultural change of governmentality
provides a useful analytical framework for the analysis of how refugee protection
norms translate in a local context. While the second body of literature sheds light
on the collective experiences in translating refugee security norms into local
practice, their gendered implications are still missing. That is why the third body
of literature on norm impact translation and resilience guide the research in
addressing the impact of the securitization–refugee protection nexus, where Syrian
refugees’ agency is highlighted within particular spaces of research interactions.
In effect, the contributions of this dissertation are twofold. In that respect, my
dissertation expands existing literature on security studies, refugee governance, and
norm translation by exploring the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. First, this

60

dissertation offers an alternative understanding of what it means to be a refugee in
a neighboring Middle Eastern country that shares a long history with the home
country that a person is trying to escape. Although there has been sufficient
scholarly attention to refugee (in)security and protection mechanisms, there is little
academic writing focused on the views and perspectives of silenced stakeholders,
especially local host communities and refugees themselves, particularly in
securitizing southern neighboring countries, where refugee crises have been
extensive and protracted. Accordingly, this dissertation is responding to feminists’
call for implementing a multileveled research approach that will close the gap
between the knowledge of what works and their practical solutions. This brings us
to the second contribution, methods as adequate tools to improve research on a
transnational phenomenon of refugee insecurities. Accordingly, the following
chapter seeks to address this second gap by combining and developing a relevant
research design and methods through which to examine the (en)gendering of
refugee (in)security.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
This section discusses the methodological choices made to address this
research task. As outlined before, the overarching aim of this research is to trace
how refugee (in)security norms get constructed, are managed, and with what
effects. The exploratory study engages a wide range of sources, including
newspaper articles, journals, scholarly works, research assessments, and reports
mostly published by international aid organizations involved in the relief process.
In that respect, using a case study design, this study requires applied qualitative
research methods rooted in phenomenological ontological perspectives of ‘beingin-the-world’ and having ‘inalienable presence,’ emphasizing the utility of the
study rather than explaining a perceived absolute truth.145 By using a case study
design, this research provides insights into how gender plays a vital role in
(re)shaping specific refugee (in)security contexts, where international refugee
norms and (in)security structures materialize across different stages. Accordingly,
this chapter first discusses the research assumptions that guide this project. It, then,
narrates a detailed account of the main researchers’ positioning towards the case
selection and methods. As for the third section, it explores the various methods,
including the recruitment of participants, data collection activities, and data
analysis processes.
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1. Research Assumptions
This research aims to uncover the various systems of oppression regarding Syrian
refugee (in)security in the case of Lebanon. In that respect, positivist research
methods would narrowly capture contextual, relational dynamics engendering
refugee (in)securities with no parallel narratives.146 However, there is no absolute
external truth but the belief in the existence of multiple evolving realities. The
individual and shared systems of meaning are fluid—co-constructed through
intersubjective lived experiences and social interactions. 147 Realities can be
(re)created and expressed in different settings, which are influenced by the
spatiotemporal conditions and cultural norms of their respective communities.148
Accordingly, a transnational feminist approach informs and shape this research’s
methodology providing the tools needed for this study to trace Syrian refugee
(in)security across different levels of analysis and explain how gender and power
play an essential role in the (re)production of specific empirical constructs as more
influential than others.149
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In that respect, a constructivist ontology is of value for this research, where
reflexivity relies on varied theorizations of gender and interpretive methods to
identify the generative force of gender in a multiplicity of contexts.150 Elizabeth
Prüegl’s statement is consistent with the study’s assumptions about the ontological
nature of refugees, in general, and, in this case, the double marginalization of Syrian
refugee women’s insecurities in Lebanon. As Prüegl states: power as a social and
gendered construct play an essential role in shaping gendered social phenomena
where agency and structure are co-constituted as “multi-faceted, encompassing
multilayered processes of identity formation,
institutionalization, and symbolization.” 151 In that respect, the refugees’ lived
experiences of forced migration, resettlement, and integration processes within the
host communities create subjective implications of what refugee (in)security
means. Therefore, this research understands refugee (in)security as being a social
construct based on relational experiences. Through localized experiences, this
study traces the different perceptions and interpretations of refugee (in)security
rather than making possible generalization beyond the specific case at hand.
Congruently, interweaving feminist scholarships help develop an
interdisciplinary approach, drawing on insights from a range of disciplines, across
all level, to broaden the knowledge on the inherent gender hierarchies within
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refugee—(in)security studies. And, since this research strives to acquire a
sophisticated understanding of refugee (in)security practices and experiences, a
qualitative pluralist approach would guide this study to implement exploratory and
inductive research techniques to triangulate and evaluate the gendering processes
of the transnational phenomena of refugee insecurities adequately. By exploring
several social mechanisms of norm translation; cooptation, exploitation,
reproduction, and normalization across different levels, this research would better
trace the (re)production of Syrian refugee (in)security norms and practices as
mechanisms implicated in the perpetuation of a masculine rule.
Epistemologically, the referent subjects, in this study, interact to co-produce
shared understandings of Syrian refugee (in)securities, creating a collaborative
exploration of diverse refugee experiences and their underlying connotations. The
study’s findings become the product of the Lebanese government, UNHCR, nongovernmental organizations, local communities’ and co-researchers’ lived
experiences. For that reason, it is essential to recognize some of the researchers’
background and positioning, especially when interpreting the views on Syrian
refugees’ local insecurities. Only then will there be an original interpretive
understanding of historically situated data regarding the topic of inquiry.
2. Researchers’ Background And Positioning
As the principal investigator, I am both an emic and etic. Despite being born in
Lebanon, I was privileged to live abroad and possess dual citizenship. Given that I
am both physically and culturally detached from the daily Lebanese intricacies, I
am conscious of the gender differences between Lebanon and the country I chose
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to call home, the United States of America. It was these types of spaces that made
me both an insider and an outsider to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, in need
of constant reflexivity in determining how this research is conducted and to whom
it is intended.
The question that must inevitably be asked is: for whom am I speaking? To
which my answer would be: Anyone who studied, witnessed, or heard of someone
who braved through, some type of displacement. Accordingly, this dissertation
project is at its core a personal project aiming to explore the gendering of refugee
(in)security in the case of Lebanon. Although the diversity of Lebanese political
opinions was often vast, it seemed that most Lebanese public and social outlets
differed from my personal opinion, having one commonality: “The Syrian
displaced persons have no place in our home country.”152
I had many Lebanese acquaintances even questioning the legitimacy of
Syrian refugee claims of being forced to flee their homes, oblivious of the widely
televised human atrocities that were happening in Syria—even though not long ago,
they witnessed, like I did, similar challenges during the many wars. Still, unlike me,
their projected anxieties focused on how to deter Syrian residents from “taking
over” Lebanon. This positionality geared me towards planning and conducting a
multi-leveled exploration of refugee (in)security in accordance with the everyday
practices that are subject of this study.
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In that respect, a participatory research approach with the people who lived
through these experiences enriches this research by fundamentally questioning and
rethinking previously established top-down knowledge. No matter how wellintentioned, this research runs the risk of missing out on the securitization–refugee
protection inner dynamics of Syrian refugees without collaborating with local
Lebanese supporting Syrian refugees in a genuine participatory way. This process
would also allow the participants to reflect on their daily practices and power
relationships, questioning and rethinking established gendered structures and
rhetoric that mostly silence variant Syrian refugees’ everyday practices,
contributing fruitful knowledge-generating narratives. Even though the five
research participants—Lebanese volunteers assisting Syrian refugees—are not the
subjects of research, their interaction and knowledge of their surroundings enrich
this research.
Therefore, it is important to highlight their positioning as co-researchers,
emphasizing their background and expertise. The co-researchers’ lived experiences
within both Lebanese, and Syrian refugee communities put them at a unique
advantage of being privileged to understand the intricacies and perceptions within
both groups. Even though the participants come from different Lebanese social
upbringings, all of them come from relatively privileged middleclass settings,
where the Syrian refugee presence in their country does not threaten their
livelihoods (in)directly. As a matter of fact, three of the co-researchers’ livelihoods
(in)directly depend on working with the Syrian refugee population across Lebanon.

67

Meanwhile, most of the participants acknowledged that their Lebanese
entourage (sub)consciously pressures them to perceive the Syrian crisis as a threat
to the overall Lebanese society, even though they believe that the media and official
rhetoric (un)intentionally simplify the contextual dynamics of the Syrian crisis in
Lebanon. The coresearchers’ dissenting views of the Syrian refugee situation are of
essence when producing knowledge for “they promise a new and different take on
the subject under study” by elaborating their own opinion and experiences.153 Their
collaborative input provided important contributions to the study by voicing out
relational complexities of different Syrian refugees’ daily (in)securities, while, at
the same time, recognizing their anxieties as Lebanese citizens towards the Syrian
presence within their communities.
3. Methods
The theoretical approach is qualitative using multiple methods to ensure a
comprehensive triangulation and in-depth analysis of refugee (in)security in the
case of Lebanon. 154 This triangulation process conjuncts the different attitudes
towards Syrian refugees through exploratory frameworks using multiple methods
and research, while reviewing a broad array of relevant secondary sources, official
documents, research studies, and statistics. Through a gender lens, the study utilizes
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the following methods, complementing them with primary and secondary sources
to strengthen the gathering of information and research findings: (1) a longitudinal
cultural theme analysis of refugee crisis response plans; (2) semi-constructed expert
interviews, and (3) a grassroots participatory action-oriented method called
Photovoice. This project triangulates all three methods as a dialectical process to
provide a more in-depth understanding of the research findings while highlighting
the various results.155
The study is based on field research completed in Lebanon from April till
August 2017. Before that, the research process began in Miami, with an analysis of
the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan—LCRP. During that time, the required
processes of acquiring the approval to conduct the fieldwork from the University
Institutional Review Board (IRB) were essential for involving human subjects in
this study. Having to conduct the fieldwork on international grounds, it was
necessary to get an expert in the field for IRB purposes. Dr. Guitta Hourani—the
Director of the Lebanese Emigration Research Center (LERC) and Assistant
Professor at the Faculty of Law and Political Science at Notre Dame University
(NDU), and Director of the International Campaign, as well as the Secretary
General of the Lebanon Dialogue Initiative (LDI)—facilitated the participatory
methodologies, as she had access to Notre Dame University facilities to conduct
the expert interviews and Photovoice sessions. This process allowed me to
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understand all the considerations required to conduct successful research while
collaborating with a local expert from an accredited institution. The informed
consent adequately protected the welfare and rights of human subjects, thus
providing prospective interview and photovoice participants the detailed
procedures, risks, and benefits from collaborating in this research.
3.1 Thematic Analysis
The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) provides an example of how
international norms are translated and managed in a local context, through a joint
strategic response plan, co-created by the Lebanese government, the UNHCR, and
a growing collective effort of different interest groups at the sectoral level.
Accordingly, the power dynamics between differing institutions, with distinct
understandings of refugee (in)security and goals, influence a plan’s agenda and
policy tools. 156 Therefore, studying the organizational culture and tracing the
changes within offers significant insights into the Syrian refugee protection strategy
in Lebanon, reflecting the previously silenced collective group dynamic and
divergent interests when formulating specific response plans.
To that end, this study uses Dennis Wiedman’s applied methodology of
longitudinal cultural theme analysis of strategic planning and organizational
change.157 It builds from a grounded theory’s epistemological and methodological
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approach, guiding this research in tracing the significant themes of Syrian refugee
crisis management policies and their development.
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Wiedman’s article

“Organizational Culture Theme Theory and Analysis of Strategic Planning for a
New Medical School,” in collaboration with Iveris Martinez, provides valuable
insights into organizational themes/patterns changing over time. This method
creates a relevant analytical tool to read into explicit and latent cultural themes that
guide a policy’s mission, goals, and specific practices. Culture here signifies the
norms and values of interacting groups and stakeholders identified within a
strategic plan. When initiated, this culture stimulates predictable practices,
becoming central in all aspects of organizational planning and cooperation.159
On the one hand, Wiedman’s method enabled me to highlight the norms and
values that shape specific interests and choices of which the refugee policies
prioritized. Different organizations’ stakeholders manage dynamic norms by
underscoring standards for their mission’s success, highlighting and framing
specific refugee insecurities that are deemed relevant to their goals. Meanwhile,
strategic planners manage the differing sets of concepts, procedures, and tools in an
effort to assist organizational leaders with the task of creating a common policy
framework that enhances their organization’s dynamic achievements.160
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On the other hand, the method brought insight to rethinking policy
documents, such as the LCRP, as dynamic. These plans are products of dynamic
relational practices between diverse social entities and interest groups becoming
what John Bryson refers to as moving actants. These moving actants also have
agency in (re)structuring local refugee (in)security practices and social relations.
Even though local practitioners rarely implement the plans as intended, their
translation of the LCRP documents still shape the daily activities of government
employees and humanitarian workers concerning refugees. When initiated, a
specific policy establishes contextual knowledge and a management culture within.
It becomes central in all aspects of organizational planning, strategies, and
cooperation, stimulating predictable practices.161 After all, from public professional
meetings and accords to informal private local spaces, these cultural organizational
themes impact what become accepted norms, expectations, behavior, and
experiences, increasing the influential power of language in shaping everyday
refugee management practices.162
To that end, this project analyzed two versions of the LCRP: the first twoyear plan (2015–2016), and its revised four-year version (2017–2020). The
framework of the inquiry included textual interpretation and systemic coding that I
developed to focus the data collected on key ideas/themes. Analyzing the major
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themes longitudinally in both LCRP documents yielded further insights into how
strategic plans emerge, elaborate and are transformed based on their original intent,
thus reflecting contextual variances.163 Reading through the documents, I began to
identify what themes the plans commonly mentioned and the contexts that they
were brought into the discussion. Through an intuitive interpretive strategy, I
familiarized myself with the context, subjectively discerning the important themes
and categories that informed the collected data. This reflexive method sheds light
on the different descriptions, interpretations, and critical analyses of the attempts
of gender norm translation reflected within the texts.
The first stage of the thematic data analysis looked at the general
background of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon to situate the construction of
the LCRP. Using NVivo, computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software
(CAQDAS), this study provided a thematic qualitative analysis of contextual
themes and patterns within both documents. It highlighted the specific cultural
themes of the evolving crisis as well as key definitions within the crisis response.
While there is intersubjectivity when examining the language of the LCRP
documents, the research findings were triangulated with other sources, making the
content interpretation reliable. Thus, this methodology drew on primary mediasources and expert interviews to establish a contextual foundation for the refugee
crisis in Lebanon, enriching the study in gaining more insight into the sociopolitical environments and critics that were present during the (re)production of the
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Syrian refugee crisis response plans. Accordingly, local newspapers are a relevant
information source for social research. They are often complementary to research,
containing unique detailed information about local events. They also reflect the
socio-cultural values of a specific time and place, which cannot be found outside
context.164, critically tracing the experts’ perceptions of the changes of themes and
patterns in the 2017 version of the LCRP. Such patterns are what the NVivo
program identifies as “nodes.” According to Bruno Latour’s concept of the
“network”— the circulation of strategic characters—is pertinent to this study.165
These networks/nodes are heavily interconnected and “have as many dimensions
as they have connections.”166 Accordingly, nodes are not fixed, for connections and
practices are relational and contested.
3.1.1 Steps for Cultural Theme Longitudinal Analysis
Time Period: The 2017 updated version of the LCRP portrays the cultural
changes that occurred from the time when the first strategic plan was made in 2015.
A longitudinal cultural theme analysis helped compare both crisis response plans
in order to provide an empirical example of how norm construction gets affected
by the dynamics of refugee (in)security management. Given that both LCRP plans
are dealing with a “crisis,” the comparatively short timeframe between both plans
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is justified by the highly dynamic changes and interests, happening at a fast pace,
when coping with volatile contextual realities.
Using NVivo software, the 2015–2016 Crisis Response Plan was analyzed,
containing the first details of the proposed delivery of “integrated and mutually
reinforcing humanitarian and stabilization interventions.”
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The first plan

established the platform baseline against which strategic program change resulted
in the second plan. The longitudinal comparative analysis with the following 2017–
2020 version thereby provided a view of how of the second crisis response plan
built from the previous one when conceptualizing and operationalizing its Syrian
crisis response.
Units of Analysis: A careful selection of the units of analysis was necessary
to conduct a preliminary examination of Lebanon crisis response strategy towards
the increasing number of Syrian refugees. By having both LCRP documents serving
as my primary unit of analysis, the research presented and traced the overall
intentions of the major parties regarding the future direction of refugee (in)security
management in the case of Lebanon. At an average of thirty-two pages, both plans
tackled similar topics. The first included a “Forward/Preface,” and an
“Introduction.” Then, they presented the overall local impact of the forced
migration from Syria to Lebanon, with the intentions of “Needs Overview”
providing the foundational concepts related to the refugee crisis. Finally, both plans
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conveyed the LCRP “Response Strategy” and “Monitoring and Evaluation”
processes, serving the collective vision and aim at how to manage refugee
(in)security strategically.168
Through

NVivo,

the

Organizational

Evaluation

Coding

(OEC)

systematically collected the major themes of the different activities, characteristics,
and outcomes within both plans.169 In the first coding cycle, a “word frequency”
analysis provided a visualization of the lists of word clouds highlighting the rank
order of the words in each LCRP document. Then, an “In Vivo” coding was
necessary to capture the context of certain phrases in their natural language. 170
Recurrent words such as “beneficiaries,” “target,” and “poor urban neighborhoods”
are not symbolic expressions. According to Wiedman, these recurrent words have
a strategic impact on guiding future practices, becoming dynamic forces of
culturally accepted behavior.171 Later on, in the second coding cycle, a “manual
coding” of implicit themes was made explicit using definitional words and phrases
that express specific latent and manifested meaning towards the identified themes.
These findings are, later, triangulated with evidence from expert interviews,
secondary sources and historical records, documenting the major themes in both
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strategic plans. That way, the study explored the significance of each finding and
assessed the development of the organizational structure and operation
management across both plans. After reviewing the word list and phrases, I
conducted a “domain coding,” grouping similar words and phrases together under
a common code category—node. These nodes will later on form child nodes
hierarchically falling under major categories—what is known in NVivo as “sub
coding” into parent/child nodes. 172 Once I finalized the categorization, themes
emerged from the coded data, bringing meaning to recurrent patterns, capturing and
unifying the dispersed information into a longitudinal coding of major themes.173
Through “matrices,” the project examined the qualitative increase, decrease,
constancy, and so on, within the qualitative data gathered. This method helped
compare and generate inferences of change between both policy plans—if any.174175
Accordingly, this study used the previously established table below by Dr.
Wiedman and Dr. Martinez that identifies six major categories portraying the
Longitudinal Cultural Theme change over time.
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Table 1. Longitudinal Cultural Theme Categories
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When evaluating and comparing both Crisis Response Plans, continuous,
elaborated, or transforming themes demonstrated the efficacy and influence of the
2015 LCRP on the newly established 2017 Plan and the power of cultural themes.
Meanwhile, diminishing themes would serve as evidence that some cultural themes
created in the 2015 strategic plan were inconsistent and had little effect on the
subsequent development of the 2017 organization of the LCRP. As for the new
cultural themes, they served as evidence that new realities emerged and required
innovative interpretations and strategies for action, diverging from the original
themes established in 2015.176
3.2 Expert Interviews
Many social science researches utilize qualitative semi-structured expert
interviews, in which their process varies from case to case. 177 These experts
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represent their organization’s views and mission goals.178 Experts are commonly
knowledgeable about the topic they are interviewed on and are thus of essence to
have a holistic view on the research topic. In the case of the Syrian crisis in
Lebanon, this method was geared to understand how the interviewed experts
perceive the LCRP, generating their respective organization's attitude towards the
implications of the plan formulated on refugee (in)security in general, women
specifically.
Knowing that the LCRP is the result of the collective effort of ninety-five
partners, including government ministries, UN agencies, national organizations,
and international NGOs, it was essential to conduct interviews with key
practitioners and leading officials involved directly in the construction of the
LCRP. After identifying all interviewee prospects through an online search,
professional networks, and family acquaintances, I reached out to plausible
candidates, scheduled interview appointments, and coordinated all the logistical
requirements for conducting the interviews.
Five participants were chosen to conduct expert interviews. Starting with
the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs – MOSA. The advisor of the minister for
the refugee portfolio and general supervisor of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
agreed to conduct the interview. He was involved in the LCRP since the beginning
of the crisis. Regarding the UNHCR, the interagency coordinator officer and the
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sexual gender-based violence— (SGBV) sector coordination team officer in the
UNHCR agreed to conduct a conjoint interview. They were explicitly assigned to
create the Crisis Response Plan in coordination with the Lebanese government. As
for the regional NGOs, the Abaad organization that promotes “women’s equality
and participation through policy development, legal reform and gender
mainstreaming”179 recommended their program and technical coordinator for the
interview. Last but not least, the study chose Justice Without Borders, a local
human rights association that works on providing free legal support to women and
children who are victims of social violence, develops and promotes democratic
reform and the rule of law to support human rights. Accordingly, its founder and
director provided critical information regarding the Syrian refugees’ legal status,
specifically women. The conducted interview was highly informative, lasting
approximately one hour.
All Interviewees were identified through their respective agencies and the
depth of their involvement in the crisis response plan. The expert interviews were
on average between 20 to 40 minutes and audio recorded. Having these experts as
interviewees allowed the study to gather the many organization's attitudes towards
both LCRP documents. From government officials—represented by MoSA—,
international organizations—represented by UNHCR—, non-profits—represented
by Abbad—, to local grassroots organizations—represented by Justice without
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Borders— a representative sample of crisis response planners gave the study
validity. Each organization interviewee represented the perception of the various
interest groups coordinating the crisis response plan. Although interviewees had
different backgrounds, all interviews were conducted in English.
Interviewees faced minimal to no risk during and after the interview for all
the questions were geared to their professional positions at work and not their
personal lives or opinions. All questions were exploratory in nature and
professionally geared to provide greater insights into the creation process of the
LCRP policy. No answer provided within the study disclosed the anonymity of the
interviewee’s personal information. If there were any discomfort in discussing and
expressing issues of refugee (in)security, interviewees had the opportunity to back
out of their commitment and retract anything or everything they shared with the
interviewer beforehand. Explaining the project and providing interviewees the list
of questions before having them sign the written informed consent form was critical
to have them feel more comfortable in participating in the project. Once the
interview was over, the interviewees had ample time to provide an answer they
deemed fit and, later, review them once the transcriptions were made.
Through those interviews, this study traced the creation and evolution of the
Lebanon Crisis Response Plan and the participants’ different positions from the
security strategies developed for Syrian refugees, especially women. Being
physically in the field helped me better communicate in person through one on one
meetings and not just via telephone or email. The research provided open-ended
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questions, allowing some space for the interviewees to reflect on certain points they
deem relevant. Key participants from the Lebanese government, UNHCR, and
other NGOs involved in the final version of the LCRP gave this study a better grasp
of the Syrian refugee crisis.180

The questions provided to the interviewees are

listed below:
•

How long have you been working in (Lebanese government/UNHCR/NGO)?

•

How did your organization become involved in the LCRP?

•

What was your role in this project?

•

Can you briefly explain the policy process that went into the development of the
LCRP?

•

How was your overall experience in being part of it?

•

What are the greatest weaknesses and/ or strengths in this policy?

•

Does (Lebanese government/UNHCR/NGO) have a gender policy? Content?

•

Do you believe that the Action Plan helps protect Women specifically?

•

How could the plan improve a gender-sensitive approach to Syrian Women’s
Insecurity?

•

What expectations do you have for the future of the LCRP?
Is there anything else you want to share/anecdote/comment?

•

Tentative follow-up questions:
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•

Do you feel that the inclusion of your organization into the LCRP helps or
challenges the neutrality/credibility of UNHCR in aiding the Syrian Refugees?

•

What about the different objectives/goals of other groups such as the Lebanese
government? Do you believe that they conflict or accord with the UNHCR aim at
protecting and alleviating the Syrian refugees?

•

Do you think including in the Project Lebanese citizens limits or enhances the
UNHCR goal in aiding Syrian refugees?

•

How do you see the role of NGOs as partners in the application of the LCRP?
(Essential or complimentary? Constructive or difficult? Agenda-setting or decisionmaking?)

•

Is there a set of tools established within the LCRP for future follow up/enforcement
mechanism?
This method proved to be beneficial for this research project which was geared to
find out what the interviewees knew, did, and thought about the LCRP.
3.2.1 Problems and Success
The purpose of the expert interviews was informational conversations, exploring
the implementation of the LCRP process while analyzing the different
organizations’ day-today practices of politics. My choice of experts’ selection was
directly related to the research interest in tracing the LCRP creation and processes.
Except for Justice Without Borders’ interview, all selected experts bore critical
positions within their respective organizations having a critical role in the creation
of the LCRP.
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One element that I could not control is that each expert was presented as an
individual, a representative, and a strategist. 181

The validity of the shared

information gets problematized when the study is not able to discern the
participants’ private opinion from their official position within their respective
organization, or strategic rhetoric aiming for personal political gains. That is why
the questions were carefully selected, enhancing trustful engagement. Each
question maximized the dialogical conversation, during the interview session,
while at the same time minimizing the danger of the interview being
instrumentalized for political gains.182 It is also worth mentioning that gender was
a constitutive factor in the interviews and that gender-specific behavior influenced
the way I conducted the interviews.183 I could not help but notice the gendered
interaction that, ultimately, contributed to gaining information positively. In fact,
being a foreign academic—not affiliated to any organization involved in the LCRP
formulation and implementation, as well as a woman—whose opinion within the
Lebanese community is generally seen as less influential than that of men, my
position was not threatening to the interviewees’ input of the LCRP plans within
their respective organizations.
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Still, one must not ignore the limitations that came along with being a
foreign female academic, as interviews create temporary relational spaces, varying
from one interview to another, where different expectations affect the patterns of
interactions. 184 One example where I noticed such behavior was during the
interview conducted with the MoSA representative. This interview was almost
impossible to schedule nor conduct under the pretext of having more pressing issues
on the Assistant Minister’s schedule. Also, the interviewee, in the beginning, was
distrustful, answering questions defensively by stating that all the information
asked of him were in the LCRP document. Gendered dynamics were vividly present
when at one point the interviewee switched the gear into bringing up questions if I,
a ‘female’ researcher, am knowledgeable about the LCRP plan, offering me the
latest version booklet in case I would like to be updated. This nonchalant approach,
later, switched to a paternalistic trend, extending to the point of asking me questions
that go beyond the scope of the interview. That particular interviewee took a
protective approach, inquiring if I was able to successfully conduct fieldwork
within informal Syrian refugee camps, thinking perhaps it would be harder on a
female researcher to do it on her own. The interviewee also recommended websites
and offices to reach out in order for me to get more informed about the situation
and gain ‘proper’ access to the field. This standard paternalist behavior could also
be connected to the interviewee being a Lebanese male expert providing input to a
female university student, who is seeking knowledge about the ministry’s official
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position towards the LCRP. Still, this behavior was not found in the other
interviews for most of the interviewees were females, except for one of the experts
from the UNHCR—who identified himself as a foreigner on a brief mission in
Lebanon.
3.3 Photovoice
An adapted version of Wang and Burris’s participatory research method thickens
the research’s understanding of issues within their context. Having local
participants providing a set of visual representations of certain local realities is
deemed relevant to this study. As local participants, the co-researchers discussed
the collected pictures, elaborating their own opinions and individual experiences
with the Syrian refugees. Through group discussions, the research participants were
able to disclose their personal views within a safe space confident that their
utterances and diverse positions will not be judged and used against them later on.
This approach aimed to enrich the research and give more insights into previously
invisible Syrian refugee practices. In the case of Lebanon, this methodology
provides a “culturally-grounded contextually-situated site for reflection and
elaboration on visual images and associated meanings,” by describing,
understanding, and elaborating the complexities within, rather than predicting and
controlling.185
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Including local participants, this study captured the intersectional Syrian
refugee (in)securities through a relatively new participatory method—
photovoice—that brings different visual narratives from local contributors.
According to Caroline Wang, photovoice helps the principal researcher engage a
specific community in critical dialogue around what they perceive as (in)securities
within their local realities. 186 In that respect, Lebanese volunteers were locally
situated, knowledgeable in the daily refugee anxieties within their respective
communities. Having their input on local impact and power dynamics enriched the
research with unforeseen micro-variables, usually missed when looking at the
refugee situation from a top-down lens.
This study benefited from capturing multileveled concerns through an
innovative approach that brings different visual narratives from the local
population. Even though the participants were not refugees, the perception of
engaged local volunteers brought this study closer to the local impact and realities
of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. Including local participants was of
importance when there is a need to display the contextually complex realities within
certain communities that might be invisible to external investigators. At the same
time, the participants projected their anxieties as Lebanese citizens towards the
multiple local backlashes to contested refugee (in)security practices. Photovoice
research participants were, thus, able to empathetically describe the various local
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(in)securities that Syrian refugees go through while still projecting the Lebanese
anxieties to the Syrian crisis’ repercussions on their communities. Hence, this
section first discusses the benefit of visual narratives for this research. It, then,
recounts this method’s framework and the different steps taken throughout this
process. Lastly, it reflects on the successes and complications encountered
throughout the development and implementation of the field research.
3.3.1 The Impact Of Visuals
Inherently biased social inquiries should not disregard local pointers, where
norms are multiple and complexly interrelated.187 Limited framings and deductive
methods do not achieve comprehensive examination of policy practices such as
refugee (in)security. Accordingly, conventional research approaches narrowly
capture the contextual dynamics and emotions that shape the gendered refugees’
realities. The example of Alan Kurdi’s—a three-year-old Syrian boy of Kurdish
ethnic background—picture, taken by Turkish journalist Nilüfer Demir, made
global headlines after he drowned on September 2nd, 2015 on Turkish shores.188
Even if short-lived, this specific photo aimed for disruption and resistance to the
current European refugee security policies, provoking temporary changes within
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their immigration policies and humanitarian aid. 189 The photo personalized the
Syrian refugee crisis with the image of a boy’s tragic death, refocusing people and
states' attention and securing millions of dollars of donations for refugee assistance
and protection overnight.190
In that sense, visuals are not objective; they are political acts, dependent on
their authors’ perception of exposing what should be accounted within the
politicized frame. 191 They can be used as compelling alternative forms of
accountabilities in global politics. Images have agency by actively illustrating
certain scenarios, transforming them into what Brent Steele calls “scars of
violence.” 192 A visually provocative photograph of gendered (in)security and
silenced violence disrupts abstract policies that are considered convenient when
dealing with faceless numbers of threats or victims. The impact of visuals prints a
strong impression on readers’ minds compared to mere words.193
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Still, photos can be deceitful as well, for they alone do not tell the entire
story.194 As much as they are the product of their reality, the integrity of visual
production is inherently contested. 195 The timing and conditions of them being
taken reflect their author’s subjective experience. 196 In fact, photographs cannot
objectively translate different scenarios at hand, as images produce their own biased
‘truths’ and are also heavily dependent on the observer’s interpretations. For this
reason, accompanying visuals with written narratives played a major role in
disclosing background stories and intentions. Complementary captions and written
paragraphs were necessary for (re)constructing a specific scenario, having a
stronger impact on the viewer’s mind.197
3.3.2 Photovoice Framework
The Photovoice participatory visual method shifted the focus from the main
researcher to the participants’ perspectives. These local volunteers became coresearchers, depicting their grounded intake on certain refugees’ lived realities.
Through thoughtful discussion and reflection, the research participants co-created
contextual knowledge of respective refugee insecurities, building local critical
consciousness. The multiple views collected from the participants brought a
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collaborative (re)construction of the multiple gendered realities of the Syrian crisis,
projecting the participants’ personal views and anxieties while depicting their
perception of the various refugee (in)securities.
Due to the geographical and cultural proximity with the Syrian refugees,
local volunteers were well positioned to address the local practices and challenges
of refugee security policies. The local volunteers became the subjects of the study,
showcasing the impact of specific policies on the (re)production of refugees’
(in)securities within their communities. Through an inductive bottom-up approach,
the trained participants took photographs, voiced out their concerns, and conversed
about the significance of their respective and each other’s photographs.
According

to

Alice

McIntyre,

this

participatory

action-oriented

methodology lacks a definitive structure for designing, practicing, or implementing
photovoice research. Therefore, there is room for certain flexibility within the
general framework of the study, which overlaps with the theoretical and ideological
perspective of the principal investigator.198 Voicing out what a person sees through
photographs creates the agency to provoke a reaction—a new discourse that cannot
be predicted. Adopting a feminist intersectional approach challenges the
universalistic assumptions of a collective experience that all refugees endure,
exploring the different research participants’ perceptions of refugee agency and
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resilience, especially women. The photovoice process has various components
illustrated according to the following framework:
Photovoice participants’ recruitment.

a.
b.

Introductory group session.
c.

Ethics of photography.
d.

Informed consent.
e.

f.
g.

Fieldwork.
Data collection.

Photo elicitation and analysis.
h.

Future planning.

a. Recruitment of Participants
Having access to local networks and government officials puts me at an advantage,
especially given that I am fluent in Arabic. The initial study intended to use
photovoice with the marginalized refugee population. However, it was difficult to
conduct this type of fieldwork on foreign soil without the university’s Institutional
Review Board approval (IRB), let alone gain access to members of the Syrian
refugee population without being potentially harmful.
Other than the fear of igniting psychosocial and legal damages to Syrian
refugees, the international setting of the research conducted would require
extensive funding for local institutional support and time for fieldwork translation.
Due to the sensitivity of interacting directly with the targeted vulnerable population,
the photovoice process was used to identify nonpartisan Lebanese individuals and
groups that work or volunteer with Syrian refugees. Dr. Guitta Hourani played a
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crucial role in the successful completion of the IRB procedure and recruitment
efforts. She provided institutional support and academic referrals of potential
participants to partake in the field research safely and ethically.
As clarified, the study opted for local Lebanese volunteers who expressed
interest in innovative and flexible techniques to voice out their perceived local
(in)securities. It helped identify the complex dynamics and (in)securities that
Syrian refugees experience and project within different Lebanese communities.
Acknowledging the diverse participants’ personal views and positions towards the
Syrian refugees was important and formed the central focus of the study.199 The
findings did not aim to provide a general representation of refugee (in)securities in
the Lebanese context. The goal here was indicative, identifying the context-specific
trends that complement some of the other methods’ findings.
Historical and social contingencies shape cultural identities differently,
reflecting specific individual and collective security views, interests, and practices.
The cultural proximity and contested sympathetic relationship between the
Lebanese volunteers and Syrian refugees brought more insight into the
complexities of the dynamics that one gets from policymakers, who are distant
physically and socially from their policy implementation and practices. Even
though the participants are not living in the refugee camps and experiencing the
daily (in)securities that Syrians do, they are still affected by those security practices.
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After all, the Syrian refugees’ agency and responses do affect locals’ social milieu
(in)directly.
After completing the Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocol and gaining
approval, the next step was to identify the right participants. I used purposeful
sampling. Throughout the preliminary interviews with local (non)governmental
agencies that work directly with Syrian refugees, the study took their referrals to
recruit potential volunteers as participants. By using the snowball sampling method,
the solicited study recruited future subjects from among their acquaintances.
Having only four weeks left to conduct the fieldwork, the study aimed for a group
size of seven participants, just in case some would withdraw from the project.
I met virtually and in person with several volunteers and college students
referred by local networks, organizations, and Notre Dame University’s faculty and
friends. I introduced myself and informed the potential participants about the
project and the overall aim of the study, inviting them to an introductory training
session where I introduced the project’s aim and method. The initial meeting
comprised seven participants (Bechara, Hanan, Maria, Diana, Mazen, Yves, and
Lina). The following five remained throughout the entire project:
1. Maria S. worked as a senior outreach and psychosocial support (PSS) worker under
two UNICEF projects with the Makhzoumi Foundation: Child Protection and
GenderBased Violence. Her tasks were to do psychosocial support to Syrian
refugee women and children. She was referred to the project by common
acquaintances from the Lebanese Red Cross. Her work experience motivated her
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to voice out the real conditions that Syrian refugees endure in different parts of
Lebanon.
2. Diana H. is a design practitioner by trade and a volunteer at the Kayany Foundation.
The latter organization was founded in response to the growing needs of Syrian
refugee children in Lebanon. Diana spent three months providing basic aid to some
of the most vulnerable youth living in informal tented settlements scattered
throughout hometown of Kefraya, Bekaa.
3. Bechara B. is an undergraduate engineering student at the American University of
Beirut (AUB). His interest in social work started with the AUB Neighborhood
Initiative promoting the neighborhood’s livability and diversity through innovative
outreach activities such as the “Civic Engagement and Community Service”
(CCECS), teaching, in Hamra, Beirut, vulnerable Lebanese and local Syrian
refugees English.
4. Mazen J. worked as the head of the Statistics department at a non-disclosed research
company. When trying to expand my knowledge on the Syrian refugee situation in
Lebanon, I made the first online contact with Mazen over Facebook. An initial
meeting was set up over WhatsApp where I explained the research study and
purpose. Mazen showed much interest in the project. He later volunteered, wanting
to voice out the refugee insecurities within his hometown village in Bekka,
Mansoura. This town is strategically located by one of the most important rivers in
the area, the Litani river, hosting the biggest informal Syrian camps in Lebanon:
Ghaze.
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5. Hanan A. was referred to the project by her close friend Mazen. She joined the
team, showing much interest in the photovoice methodology, and wanted to partake
in the fieldwork to highlight Syrian women and children are begging for money in
the streets of Beirut. She also wanted to shed light on the reasons behind this
phenomenon that, in her view, dehumanizes this vulnerable population.
The other participants’ details will not be shared for I did not get their informed
consent to share their information. As co-researchers, the five participants went
through the following research steps, becoming co-producers of contextual refugee
(in)security knowledge.
b. Primary Group Session
There are three main purposes from the primary group session:200
i.

Introduce and establish relations between the participants

ii.

Explain the Photovoice research processes

iii.

Discuss the risks and responsibilities of being a participant and co-researcher.
The site of this session is the gendered space of my family’s house in Lebanon,
which gave me power over the potential participants in controlling the
conversations. In the first part of the meeting, I introduced the project backed by a
PowerPoint presentation explaining the goals, key components, and the ways to
conduct participatory action research –(PAR). The PowerPoint was previously
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created during the IRB protocol to set the framework of the research.201 I explained
to the potential participants that the study would enable them to record and reflect
refugees’ reality and concerns. I also explained that the project would promote
critical dialogue and knowledge about the different issues that participants deem
essential, providing a space for synthesis and empowering recommendations for a
normative change in understanding refugee (in)security.
All participants welcomed the idea of becoming co-researchers, taking on
the role of photographers. The session explained all the fieldwork responsibilities,
such as capturing photographic evidence, setting research goals, data collection,
and data analysis.
Starting with the first section on photography tips, I explained the following
procedures:
Observe what is happening.
Analyze why that picture is important.
Act on how we can use this experience to recommend policy change.

c. Ethics of Photography
As it was necessary to protect all parties—the research participants, Syrian
refugees, and the research as a whole; participants were to refrain from
photographing any illegal activities. Instead, they were to suspend all photographic
activities, warn of any unexpected situation, and retreat when there were risks.
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Participants needed to also refrain from entering dangerous spaces or situations to
complete the project. Having prior knowledge of the areas and different context
helped evade dangerous positions. If they were ever put in any emergency or health
situation that would inhibit the participants from continuing the project, they were
expected to communicate it to the principal investigator.
Participants needed to protect the communities they are researching by
abstaining from taking pictures that may harm people’s reputation, safety, or
individual liberty.202 Consequently, no pictures were taken in private settings or
without the subject’s consent. All photos included partial facial and body parts that
do not identify a specific person or an illicit activity. As for the issue of false light,
the participants were previously warned that it was necessary to make sure that the
situations in the refugee communities are reflected accurately. Necessary steps were
introduced in the first session to portray the community accurately and to avoid
taking photographs and images that could be out of context.
Since all participants owned personal smartphones, there was no need to
provide them with additional digital cameras to take meaningful pictures. After
training the participants on how to take pictures safely and ethically, I outlined the
suggestive vision for the project and welcomed their comments, recommendations,
and concerns. All participants agreed on the logistics and the four-week timeframe.
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Some even suggested the idea of having group field trips during the weekend,
where, each Saturday, one of the participants would try to get permission, through
institutional or personal connections, to visit some of the informal camps or
locations deemed interesting and accessible.
d. Informed Consent
Obtaining an informed consent was mandatory, especially when participants
examined sensitive issues. The consent came in two parts; The first written consent
was distributed at the end of the first training session, explaining the goal of the
research and the voluntary participation of all the participants. It was signed before
the commencement of the study, indicating all the potential benefits and risks that
may arise from the participants’ involvement in the study. 203The second form of
consent came after the participants conducted all field work and provided all photos
and narratives. This form, when signed, ensured that the participants approved my
choice to decide which pictures can be publicized within the study and in any future
research.
e. Fieldwork
The field project established was short-term, spanning for four weeks. Adapting to
the volunteers' availability and accommodating everyone's time, the study
encouraged the participants to take photographs on their own whenever they
encounter, work, and or volunteer with Syrian refugees. Two participants managed
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to get permissions for the entire group to conduct simultaneous field research on
two different occasions inside a couple of informal Syrian settlements.
On both occasions, I visited the Syrian refugee informal camps with the
group, under the role of the group supervisor. While the participants were busy
taking photographs and engaging the refugee community, I was conducting a
participant-observation and informal face-to-face discussions with Syrian refugees,
mostly women passing complaints and personal requests. It seemed that they,
initially, confused the research group with practitioners or activists coming on
behalf of either the government, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), or other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). When the
refugees found out about the study project, they were eager to let the participants
wander around and take photographs of the public spaces, wanting to share with
the principal researcher their destitute and troubled stories of neglect and despair.
The fieldwork ended with the distribution donations acquired before each visit to
thank the local Syrian communities for hosting the participants.
f. Data Collection and Analysis Processes
After the field work was over, the participants agreed on a specific date to meet for
a follow-up session to discuss the photographs. Meanwhile, they needed to share
individual photographs with respective narratives, before initiating a critical group
discussion in the final session.204 The interpretation of the photographs was critical
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to the success of the project for the visual narratives were the ultimate objects of
group reflection. All coresearchers agreed to create a shared google drive and
upload their captioned photographs with annotated narratives answering the
following five questions.
This research used the original Wang's and Burris technique termed as
"SHOWeD" for the participants to follow while discussing each image. 205 This
technique's term is an acronym for different questions that the participants needed
to answer while selecting the photographs. Thus, the participants posted each
picture answering Wang and Burris’ methods’ main questions:206
1. What do you See here?
2. What is Happening here?
3. How does this relate to Our Lives?
4. Why does this situation, concern or strength exist?
5. What can we Do about it?
These questions would later engage group discussions and generate new findings
of different experiences and reflections, creating new forward-thinking knowledge.
Consequently, the participants became agents of change, shifting their role from
being a silent group of local actors to a powerful complementary voice with unique
perspectives on Syrian refugee (in)securities, women in specific.
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Accordingly, the Photovoice participants shared their photos, discussing
and reflecting on perceived presence and absence of insecurities within each
photo. 207 Even though images are worth a thousand words, the participant's
expanded narratives accompanying each photo ignited interesting, sometimes
heated, discussions regarding the local dynamics and their impact on Syrian refugee
(in)securities. Since photovoice is an action-oriented research that encourages a
critical dialogue, each participant shared their visuals and captions with the rest of
the volunteers, while projecting their anxieties towards elements that are absent
from common policy rhetoric of the complex Syrian refugee (in)securities.208 Once
the second group and final session were scheduled, the group then discussed the
appropriation of each photo and the emerging themes and correlating issues—
Photo elicitation—developed through the discussions.
g. Photo-elicitation Process
Photo-elicitation is a participant-directed analysis process. This session was also
facilitated in my family’s house, where both my personal and academic researcher’s
identities could have affected the responses of the five remaining voluntary
participants. Still, the photo-elicitation process encouraged all the participants to
participate while understanding that each image might generate different meanings
and critiques. It guaranteed both personal storytelling and group discussions on
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what to highlight and reflect on each picture. The main goal from the photoelicitation session was to record the participants' views of each picture and engage
in a discussion about the different responses to the images. Each participant ended
up personalizing each photograph, attributing their social and personal values when
explaining. Mixed emotions were elicited throughout the photo analysis.
Discussions helped bridge the distinct views that each photo provided, providing
insights into how alternative practices could better alleviate the daily refugee
insecurities.
Even when there was no group consensus, the multiple views of different
realities in each photograph enriched the project when collected. They brought a
joint collaborative reconstruction of the multiple perceived gendered realities that
Syrian refugees witness. They also reflected on the latter group’s impact on their
overall communities, critically analyzing plausible measures of empowerment to
overcome their daily insecurities. The photovoice methodology brought the
volunteers to take responsibility for exposing local realities and become agents of
change. Since knowledge and training are the primary sources of change, the
participants’ input was original and necessary for this research to grasp the
transformative information on local realities.
h. Future Planning
At the end of the process, the participants chose the top ten elected themes deduced
from the group discussions. The corresponding photo-narratives found most
relevant to this study were selected and coded. As co-researchers, all the
participants signed a release form for their pictures and narratives to be handed to
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me, while still having access to the google-drive document in case anyone would
like to review, edit, add or update any information within. The session ended with
a unanimous recommendation for a follow-up meeting session once the research
was done to plan future opportunities for the project.
3.3.3 Problems and Success
The group discussions and photo-analysis brought out a deeper understanding of
the complex intersectional realities that Syrian refugees, especially women, endure
“solely by virtue of belonging to a particular gender, a certain age group, or social

status.”209 By sharing individual and group intake of all the photos collected, this
method challenged the narrow assumptions of a universal refugee’s experience. A
collaborative work in
discussing each visual and sharing narratives within a safe space brought to light
significant considerations of what types of Syrian refugee insecurities exist, while
still exhibiting the local participants’ anxieties, hopes, and fears. As such, the
participatory nature of the Photovoice methodology made the implicit explicit. It
educated everyone who participated, including the principal investigator, on the
complexity of relevant refugee insecurities when explored within a bottom-up
socio-cultural gender approach.
There were various challenges in using this method. A closer examination
of sensitive issues could cause negative feelings among the subjects of the study.
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Using inductive research, I had little control over the participants’ choice of subject
matters for their analysis. Participants had the complete freedom to decide what to
include or exclude in their photographs and respective narratives. These choices
influenced the research findings and interpretation. Still, the aim of this study was
not for a non-biased accurate representation of all the micro-dynamics of refugee
(in)securities nor the principal researcher’s sole perception. After all, the goal of
this research was to promote visual ethnography methods for exploring the local
impact of refugee (in)security and practices. Still, I was cautious that the visuals
selected did not entrap the damaging responses leading to vicious cycles of negative
coping-skills of resentment and violence, having all sides blame each other for their
respective visual insecurities.
After all, this study was about Syrian women and their (in)security.
However, rather than being able to do research ‘with’ these women, this study opted
to research with Lebanese volunteers in observing, reading, listening and learning
more about refugee (in)security on multiple levels of analysis. Moreover, through
all the methods mentioned earlier, the various findings, when triangulated, provided
rich and complementing knowledge on the intersectional gendered Syrian refugee
insecurities in the case of Lebanon.
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IV. LEBANESE SYRIAN (IN)SECURITY PRACTICES
With the growing international refugee crisis, geopolitics and biased social attitudes
play an instrumental role in shaping refugee (in)security construction with gendered
practices. The Middle East, specifically Lebanon, has a long history of political and
sectarian conflicts that have not only altered the fabric of its communities, but also
influenced its local attitudes, opinions, and policies towards hosting neighboring
refugees. Several recent scholarships examined Lebanon’s lack of commitment to
international refugee law.210 Still, most scholarships have not longitudinally traced
the political junctures that led to the nuanced variations within Lebanese
securitization of the recent influx of Syrian asylum seekers. Lebanese perceptions
of the Syrian refugee population and increasing social tensions between both
communities depend upon historical and structural factors. In this regard, this
chapter addresses this gap in the literature by first examining four significant
political junctures in the gendered Lebanese Syrian relationship. Second, it explores
Lebanon’s sensitivities towards the term “refugee” and the current legitimization
of its rejection of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Third, it analyzes Lebanon’s
securitized refugee management practices that ostracize Syrian refugees in general.
Then, this chapter provides further detail on the systemic gender discrimination that
the Lebanese polity already imposes on its citizens impacting the majority of
registered Syrian refugee women with some analytical implications.
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1. Critical Junctures in the Lebanese Syrian Relations
Historical-critical junctures are relatively short periods of time that lead to
ideational changes within the policy fabric and organizational changes
generate “self-reinforcing path-dependent processes.”

211

that

A wide range of

scholarships refer to these instances as “turning point,” “paradigm shift,” “crisis,”
“unsettled times,” among many others; in this analysis we will refer to them as
“critical junctures.”212 Such crises developed due to “change agents” contesting the
existing status quo and attempting to (re)design policies that were once upheld.213
These endogenous and/or exogenous changes triggered new path dependent
processes that constrain future choices, which become qualitatively different from
previous norms and interests, affecting policymaking. 214 These changes would
cocreate lasting effects on the “choices made during [those] critical junctures in
history,” closing off different paths during that timeframe.215
In the case of Lebanon, contemporary political history has been defined by
many interrelated factors that molded not only its internal structure but also its role
within the region. Religion, which is believed to be one of the cornerstones of the
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country’s fabric, played a significant role in shaping Lebanese dynamics, as
different sects mainly Maronite, Sunni, Shiite, Druze, Greek Orthodox developed
into the primary social organizations maintaining political security. Identity politics
led, most importantly, to communal favoritism over individual rights, causing
resentment and alienation within Lebanese society. Lebanon’s sectarian stability
depends on “the ability of communal elites to sustain the power-sharing agreement
and maintain control” over their respective communities.216
Since its independence, Lebanon’s eighteen religious sects gave room for a
confessional power-sharing system that was further institutionalized under the Ta’if
Accord after the end of the civil war, in 1989.217 The Ta’if Accord—a regional
summit brokered in the city of Ta’if, Saudi Arabia—incorporated in the Lebanese
Constitution a more confessional (a system of government that is a de jure mix of
religion and politics) distribution of political power among the main religious
groups. The three dominant ethnoreligious sects (Maronite Christians, Sunni
Muslims, and Shiite Muslims) took the leading positions, with the office of the
President assigned to a Maronite, that of the Prime Minister to a Sunni Muslim, and
the Speaker of the National Assembly to a Shiite Muslim.218
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Meanwhile, the legacy of the civil war and repeated foreign occupation,
thus, kept the Lebanese polity deeply fragmented.219 During that time, both Israel
and Syria had a heavy military presence within the country. Syrians controlling
most eastern and western parts of the country. While, Israel held its ground in South
Lebanon.” 220 The latter furthered local Lebanese resentment of and contempt
toward the Syrian “brothers” for leaving the Lebanese government pathologically
fragmented and too weak to stand against foreign occupations.221
In the meantime, it is a truism to say that while Syria has dominated
Lebanon until this day, with no major Lebanese political decision made without the
Asaad regime’s blessing, Syrian refugees suffer from the Syrian regime’s privileges
over Lebanon. As long as the two countries do not officially demarcate their
common border, legally Lebanon remains a hostage of Syria’s geopolitical
ambitions in which the Lebanese–Syrian gendered relationship can never reach
equal terms. In effect, the failure to demarcate Lebanon’s boundaries, Syria’s
domination of the Lebanese socio-political sphere remains unabated. It maintained
a strong foothold along the eastern Mediterranean coast and a strategic role in
Lebanon’s protracted war with Israel. Then, as a reaction, most Lebanese public
outcry and constituents’ hostile attitudes towards Syrians taking refuge in their
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communities were only (en)gendered manifestations towards the unwanted
presence of Syrians.
For this reason, historical-critical junctures such as these were points within
a timeframe that led to policy and strategy changes within Lebanese factions that
ultimately shaped the existing Lebanese-Syrian relation and residing Syrian
refugees’ status quo by re-designing the policies that Lebanon once upheld. The
logic behind the critical junctures in Lebanese politics rests on interrelated shocks
or aberrations domestically and within the region. In this respect, the following subsections trace four relevant critical junctures within Lebanese-Syrian relations that
(in)directly led to today’s changes in Lebanese policy practices towards Syrians
residing within the country.

Figure 3. Lebanese–Syrian Relations and Syrian Refugee (In)Security Practices

The figure above provides a graphic representation of the following information
intended to map out the critical junctures in the Lebanese-Syrian relation that led
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to today’s Lebanese (in)security practices in relation to Syrians residing in the
country. The information contained in the figure summarizes the following subsections of this chapter by providing visual information quickly and clearly.
1.1 First Juncture: 1990 – 2005
On October 13, 1990, the Lebanese Civil War came to an end when
favorable regional and international developments overlapped with the anguished
internal parties’ desires of a type of reconciliation. 222 This political juncture
guaranteed Syria’s custodianship over Lebanon, as mandated by American and
European authorities after the Lebanese Civil War, securing a free Syrian hand in
internal Lebanese politics. 223 It is crucial to note that the Ta’if Agreement of
October 22, 1989, a result of a Saudi, US and Syrian agreement imposed on
Lebanon, was the formal pact that ended the Lebanese civil war, establishing
Syria’s control over Lebanon. As a consequence, Lebanese-Syrian relation was cast
in sibling terms: “brotherhood.”224 This “special” relationship strengthened with
its inclusion in the Ta’if Accord—“the roots of blood relationships, history, and
joint fraternal interests”225—and was further institutionalized, later on, through a
formal treaty in 1991—the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination
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Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic. This treaty
streamlined what could be perceived as a gendered relationship between both
countries, in which Lebanese security and foreign policy objectives became
dependent on Syria’s wellbeing. Accordingly, Article 1 of the Brotherhood Pact
engendered new mechanisms for further institutionalization of

bilateral

committees for common security, socio-economic, and foreign policies, stating
that:
“The two States shall endeavor to achieve the highest degree of cooperation and
coordination in the political, economic, security, cultural, scientific and other fields
for the benefit of both fraternal countries within the framework of their individual
sovereignty and independence and so as to enable the two countries to use their
political, economic and security potential to provide for their prosperity and
stability, protect their regional and national security and broaden and strengthen
their joint interests in confirmation of their fraternal relations and as a pledge of
their common destiny.”226
Article 3 of this treaty interconnected Lebanese security with Syria’s wellbeing, a
matter that caused great concern to many Lebanese politicians at that time, as they
feared that they would become hostage to Syrian maneuvers within the region:
“The interdependence of the security of the two countries shall require that
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Lebanon shall not, under any circumstances, be made a source of threat to the
security of Syria.”227 This article called for wide-ranging cooperation between
both countries security apparatus, exchanging any sensitive information that
would eliminate what they deem as a threat with perceivable gendered effects.
Syrian intelligence engendered structural security operations across Lebanese
territories, legally entitling it to scrutinize any Lebanese resident for ‘security
reasons.’ In practice, the Lebanese–Syrian relationship gendered most Lebanese
citizens’ experiences of (in)security. Syrian security agencies in Lebanon had a
free hand virtually to pursue any masculinized perceivable threat or a critic of its
regime, silencing the Lebanese population from the freedom of expressing
concerns or opposition to Syria’s control over Lebanon.228
Meanwhile, Article 4 set the timeline for Syria’s slow withdrawal from
Lebanon, stating that: “After the institution of political reforms in constitutional
form in accordance with the provisions of the Lebanese National Charter and on
the expiry of the time-limits prescribed in the Charter, the Syrian and Lebanese
Governments shall decide on the redeployment of Syrian forces.”229 Subsequently,
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the Alawi regime in Syria subordinated the Lebanese polity by not allowing it selfgovernance. This “brother-sister” metaphor shown in the above articles extended
beyond rhetoric, affecting relations between both states on political and social
levels. 230 With boots on the ground, Syria turned Lebanon into a police state,
‘Dawlat al-Mukhabarat,’ targeting any person or political group who resisted it.231
Syria acted as a colonial administrator in Lebanon, encouraging postwar proSyrian
Lebanese political parties with political and financial rewards; thus these proSyrian parties had a stake in preserving the status quo.232 With Syrian blessings, the
inability of Lebanese political fabric to recover from wartime practices hindered
competitive politics. Anti-Syrian parties were banned, and top Lebanese positions
were closely supervised and manipulated by Syrian agents.233 Several prominent
Lebanese political figures either left the country, were imprisoned, or assassinated
due to their anti-Syrian positions. 234 Lebanon became dependent on the “big
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brother,” stuck in low-intensity conflict with Israel, and not able to conduct
independent negotiations without Syria’s “blessings.” 235 From the widespread
physical presence of Syrian soldiers’ checkpoints to Syrian operated detention
facilities in major Lebanese cities, the visible signs of Syrian dominion over
Lebanon became visible in the majority of Lebanese’s daily lives.236
On a socio-economic level, the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and
Coordination made Lebanon virtually subcontracted to the Syrian economy, where
Syrians were able to work in Lebanon and, in turn, acquired significant
remittances.237A labor agreement was then made in 1994, legalizing the status of
approximately 900,000 Syrian workers in Lebanon, which resulted in the capital
flight of what could be considered as millions of dollars from Lebanon being added
daily to the Syrian economy.238 The Syrian presence in Lebanon radically impacted
the local environment, further magnified by arbitrary naturalization practices such
as the “1994 naturalization decree that granted Lebanese citizenship” to hundreds
of thousands of pro-Syria Arab foreigners residing in Lebanon.
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discretionary power over naturalization allowed pro-Syria political

elites to

distribute Lebanese citizenships to individuals deemed worthy, through which
naturalization became an instrument to develop political clienteles.240
1.2 Second Juncture: 2005 – 2011
The direct reign of Syria over Lebanon lasted till the anti-Syrian occupation
movement—the Cedar Revolution of 2005—called for the withdrawal of Syrian
troops from the Lebanese territories. The Cedar Revolution came fifteen years after
the end of the Lebanese civil war and almost five years after Israeli troops’
withdrawal from southern Lebanon. This political juncture, triggered by the
assassination of late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005,
was led by several anti-Syrian Lebanese factions blaming the Assad regime for his
death.241 However, and even after the military withdrawal in 2005, Syrian oversight
continued to influence Lebanese politics until this date through the presence of
strong Lebanese allies within the country such as Hezbollah and the longstanding
political, economic, and social ties constituted through a vast network of influence
within Lebanese polities.
The void that the Syrian military withdrawal left triggered an increase in
violence with several car bombs, explosions, and assassination attempts on a
number of “anti-Syrian intellectuals and politicians,” mostly blamed on the Syrian
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regime. 242 Complex social organizations before 2005, such as family ties and
religious affinities, created double-edged attitudes between the two communities.
This was coupled with submissive behaviors and continuous expectations from
Syria to lead the country. 243 Even after the 2005 withdrawal, Syria’s political
influence in Lebanon resisted the new realities of slowly constructing a viable
independent country with a somewhat formal relationship with Syria—a move that
was then substantiated by the establishment of the first Syrian embassy in the
country in December 2008.244 Accordingly, Lebanon's president, Michel Suleiman,
held the first state visit to Syria and forged the agreement to establish formal
relations between both countries. 245 This significant act hindered the days of
undiluted Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, where Lebanon as a state became
formally acknowledged by Syria sovereign on paper. In alteration, a variety of
tactics ranging from diplomatic negotiations and persuasions between Lebanon and
Syria increased. At the same time, informal intimidation tactics and assassination
attempts were visibly recorded against local political and security adversaries but
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were inefficient in silencing anti-Syrian denunciations of its control over
Lebanon.246
Still, this new phase in Syrian-Lebanese relations needed time to adjust to
the new reality of Syria’s departure from Lebanon. Without the presence of a Syrian
role in local politics, the political process was at a stalemate, characterized by
unwillingness from the political elites to reach a shared vision of the future
trajectory of Lebanon. 247 Also, Israel’s 33-day attack in July 2006 was more
extensive, more lethal and reached deeper into northern Lebanon than any of its
predecessors. The death and destruction in several Lebanese cities, towns, and
villages empowered pro-Syrian Hezbollah to gain popularity within many
Lebanese communities. By acquiring a reputation for being a legitimate political
actor in Lebanon that successfully fought Israel with the aid of the Assad regime in
Syria, Hezbollah gained direct control of most of the Lebanese intelligence
infrastructure, which made sure anti-Syrian maneuvers were thwarted.
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the borders between them, mostly due to the disputed issue of Shebaa farms—
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which Israel claims is a Syrian land— and keeping Lebanon’s struggle against
Israeli occupation of what is practically a southern Lebanese territory. 249
1.3 Third Juncture: 2011 – 2014
On March 06, 2011, Syria was rocked by anti-regime demonstrations calling for
Assad’s impeachment, creating room for ongoing domestic turmoil in Syria. At the
same time, four Syrian brothers and opposition activists in Lebanon vanished just
after distributing flyers to demonstrate against the Syria’s government in front of
the Syrian embassy in Beirut.250 Human Rights Watch condemned the act, fearing
that Lebanon was “back to doing Syria’s dirty job.”251 Meanwhile, at the onset of
the 2011 crisis in Syria, Lebanon maintained an “open-door policy”—a policy of
welcoming all refugees from Syria without exception.252 Then on June 11, 2012,
the official Lebanese declaration called for establishing a policy of neutrality
towards the Syrian conflict under the banner of a “dissociation policy seeking not
to be involved in the Syrian conflict and maintaining neutrality in international
institutions.”253 This course of action, albeit lauded by the international community
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and various human rights organizations, did not stem from the Lebanese
government’s genuine willingness to practice its humanitarian obligations.254
In actuality, it was the lack of policy that resulted from an amalgam of deep
divisions and conflicting opinions, that crippled the Lebanese political
establishment during this period of deep political deadlock that did not translate
this policy of dissociation into practice.255 Meanwhile, the renewal of a pro-Syrian
president for a second term continued the polarized Lebanese political spectrum by
keeping the Lebanese army and United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon
(UNIFIL) away from safeguarding the blurry and porous Lebanese border with
Syria. As a result, the Lebanese-Syrian responsive relation sustained until the end
of his presidency. In 2011, the borders were left open to virtually any Syrian fleeing
the war just because the Lebanese government was too divided to formulate an
effective strategy to regulate the influx of refugees into the country, while the
presidency remained loyal to previous agreements with the Syrian Assad regime.256
The rift between national political parties, those that are pro-Syrian regime and
those opposing it, prevented Lebanon from responding earlier to the Syrian refugee
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crisis.257 This inaction and the lack of strategic vision led to the fragmentation of
the entire Syrian refugee-population across Lebanese territory. Accordingly, the
geographical fragmentation of Syrians within Lebanon mostly followed a sectarian
pattern, in which Sunnis mostly resided in heavily populated Sunni regions and the
predominantly Christian and Shiite areas welcomed Syrian Christians and
Alawites.258
Moreover, the Lebanese government failed to fight corruption and reach a
consensus over a united foreign policy related to Hezbollah’s military involvement
in the Syrian war. 259 Hassan Nasrallah declared, in April 2013, that Hezbollah
would be giving Syria “a hand,” stating that “Syria is the backbone of the resistance
and we [Hezbollah] will not sit with our hands crossed.” 260 With the active
participation of Hezbollah in the well-known clearing operation in al-Qusayr, this
event marked the official start of Hezbollah’s military intervention in the Syrian
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War. 261 Since then, all other Lebanese political parties felt uncomfortable with
Hezbollah sending an increasing number of its militants to Syria, complaining that
the organization was putting Lebanon in danger by interfering in a foreign war.
Still, the mainstream political climate in Lebanon positioned itself as pro-“opendoor policy” in solidarity with the Syrian refugee community, inconsistently
advocating for aiding the “displaced” Syrians, in high hopes that the Assad regime
would prevail, and displaced Syrians would soon be going back to their land.262
On a social level, many Lebanese, at that time, believed that the Syrian crisis
was temporary, and the Assad reign would endure. 263 Meanwhile, the Labor
Agreement was still in a place through which Syrians were allowed to work and
find jobs to the point of establishing and operating their own small businesses in
Lebanon without any actual restrictions. 264 While this has triggered an outcry
among the Lebanese public complaining about the competition in the labor market
as well as in business areas the Lebanese government still maintained a very
permissive position toward Syrian refugees on its territory, merely because of
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political paralysis.265 However, this sentiment towards the integration of the Syrian
labor-force in Lebanon shifted in the following years.
1.4 Fourth Juncture: Post 2014
On May 25, 2014, pro-Syria President Michel Suleiman’s term expired, and
Lebanon had no president, creating a new political juncture. Consequently, a selfappointed parliament further exacerbated Lebanon’s presidential stalemate, failing
(for the 45th time) to elect a president in three consecutive years.266 As a result of
this political paralysis, a security gap allowed hundreds of thousands of Syrians to
enter the country without official supervision. It should be noted that presidential
elections in Lebanon do not depend solely on domestic politics. Regional powers
and several external factors, such as the Syrian crisis, critically influence local
dynamics, thus creating a power vacuum. Still, these factors create space for new
instabilities and opportunities to arise and galvanize different forces at work.
Moreover, without a strong Lebanese presidential figure to support the
continuance of the Assad regime, the initial mood in the Lebanese public sphere
which had called for a stance of solidarity with their Syrian “brothers” quickly
shifted.267 On June 2014, the presidential elections in Syria occurred with president
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Bashar el-Assad winning with a landslide majority of 88% of the votes. 268 This
event led to tens of thousands of Syrians marching towards the Syrian embassy in
Beirut chanting pro-regime slogans in solidarity with Bashar el-Assad.269 However,
with the Syrian crisis increasing in intensity, turning into a full-fledged war, not
only did domestic actors clash, but the Syrian crisis also resulted in (in)direct
military interventions and political confrontations from Lebanese factions,
competing in a protracted international war of proxies.270 Gruesome war methods,
such as sieges, starvation, and chemical attacks, were criticized by various
Lebanese factions who blamed local political groups such as Hezbollah for being
too invested in the “external” Syrian armed struggle.271 The condemning attitudes
concerning the Syrian conflict did not diminish with the continuous bloodshed and
increased human suffering in Syria, which pushed millions of Syrians to forcibly
leave the country in search for asylum.”272 Alas, the once feeble number of 7,088
registered refugees in Lebanon in March 2012 skyrocketed to more than one million
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refugees in March 2014, legitimizing local calls for securitizing the influx of
Syrians to the country.273
The absorption of such an influx proved to be extremely strenuous for the
Lebanese governmental institutions, which already suffered from shortages in
delivering essential services to its domestic sphere. By the end of 2014, Lebanon,
with an area of 10,452 square kilometers (4,036 sq. mi) and a population of roughly
five million, hosted approximately 1.2 million registered displaced Syrians, almost
one-third of the overall Lebanese population. 274 And now, with the Syrian
government’s threats of confiscating millions of properties of Syrians who have
fled if they fail to register them properly and on time, the odds of Syrians being
“trapped” in Lebanon increased precariously with no viable way to return. In fact,
a new decree introduced by the Assad regime called Law 10, also known as
'Absentees law', could be a means to reinforce the discriminatory gendered relations
between the Syrian state and its outcasts, in which millions of refugees could lose
their lands, legitimizing the government’s seizure of such assets and threatening to
change Syria’s demographic.275276 Even though the Legislation is not yet in effect,
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it still allows the Baathist government to confiscate properties of millions of
displaced Syrians unless they prove ownership with the Ministry of Local
Administration within 30 days. This type of structural violence not only punishes
the millions who have opposed the Assad government by denying them their rights
to their land, but it also silences their claims as outcasts not able to ever go back to
their lands, while rewarding mainly the Allawite and Christian pro-Assad
communities in taking over the confiscated Sunni Muslims’ properties.277

Figure 4. UNHCR Registered Syrian Refugees (2016)

Based on the above figure, the rapid increase of Syrians registering as refugees with
the UNHCR (between 2013 and 2014) led to a shift in Lebanese attitudes towards
the now perceived “refugee burden.” As a reaction to previous Syrian aggressions
when occupying Lebanon, the reevaluation of the “Brotherhood” relationship
enshrined in the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination between
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Lebanon and Syria came under scrutiny.278 The perception of patriarchal kinship to
Syria and its population turned to a perception of either a masculinized burden of a
terrorist threat coupled with political instability or a feminized burden that would
drown the country with socio-economic insecurities that it cannot afford, leaving
all odds manifesting against Syrian refugees in Lebanon. According to one news
article, the Lebanese Patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rahi accused Syrian refugees of
“snatching (the Lebanese people’s) daily bread from their mouths, throwing them
into a state of poverty and deprivation.”279 In fact, his statement was an echo of the
long-standing fear of hosting a big number of refugees, especially Syrian refugees
who threaten Lebanon’s security and burden its sluggish economy, taking jobs or
straining Lebanon’s straining public services. 280 The following section explores
Lebanon’s history with forced migration and the reasons behind its distrust over
hosting a large number of refugees, Syrians especially.
2. Lebanon’s Sensitivity Toward the Word “Refugee”
Since Lebanon functions under a weak quasi-democracy in the Middle East, the
constant influx of people into the country is one of its greatest concerns.281 From
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the day it took its independence, the history of the country is closely intertwined
with forced migration and refugees. This section proceeds with the various
empirical findings that highlight Lebanon’s sovereignty practices of refugee
exclusion. It revisits some crucial issues elaborated in the previous section that lead
to the imposition of restrictive gendered policies on the entry, residence, and
movement of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.
In effect, Lebanon never passed any national legislation pertaining to the
status of refugees on its territories. According to the UNHCR, Lebanon hosts a lot
of Iraqis, Syrians, and Palestinians.282 Some are considered as guests, others are
viewed as a threat. Still, Lebanon does not have an official refugee law, so a big
number of forced migrants are treated as economic migrants and temporary foreign
visitors.283 Even though more than 145 states have ratified the Geneva Convention,
Lebanon, like several other countries in the region, is neither a signatory of the 1951
Refugee Convention. In that respect, a sovereign state’s exclusive control over its
territory is well established in international law, securing its right to grant or deny
asylum to foreign persons coming to its territory.284
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Conventionally, universal obligations on states ensure that no asylum seeker
loses their basic rights and benefits when fleeing persecution. However, no
sovereign state, including Lebanon, seems to have a legally binding obligation to
accept asylum seekers. It is rather non-binding humanitarian concerns that
encourage sovereign states to host those in need of asylum. As a customary practice,
issues relating to the concept of non-refoulement, such as residency permits and the
right to work, are under the host state’s discretion. Consequently, the reality of
domestic exclusionary practices could be warranted for any masculine justifiable
security basis by state authorities. Additionally, Lebanon’s unimpressive human
rights track-record on issues of prolonged detentions, arbitrary arrests, and forced
deportations, fostered a favorable environment for political manipulation and
legitimization of its exclusionary power practices.285 Accordingly, many loopholes
and realpolitik encouraged overwhelmed Lebanon to securitize its borders, denying
incoming refugees entry, threatening them with penalization and repatriation.
Still, once asylum seekers are inside Lebanese territory, Lebanon has a duty
to treat those foreigners humanely without repatriating them to states in which they
would face persecution. We find in the Constitution’s Preamble that “Lebanon is a
founding and active member of the United Nations Organization, committed to its
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” thus warranting

“Pushed To The Edge: Syrian Refugees Face Increased Restrictions In Lebanon.” Amnesty International’
(June 2015):
285

https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/1785/2015/en/

129

individual freedom of opinion, equality, right to access work, and own property.286
Lebanon’s Constitution takes pride in the Lebanese forefather of the Declaration of
Human Right, Charles Malek, stating that it embodies all human rights’ principles
without exception in any sector and scope. Lebanon is, additionally, a signatory of
numerous human rights treaties and conventions that contain provisions relating to
refugees’ protection, including: “The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966), and the 1965 International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).”290 Accordingly,
nondiscrimination of refugees, access to education, work, and housing, are
enshrined in most of the above treaties, which Lebanon already endorses. In this
respect, Lebanon seems to be fully engaged in the social construct of collective
sovereign states’ efforts towards human rights, ratifying norms of previously
agreed covenants that are deemed universally essential for human security,
especially for prohibiting refoulement.
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Consequently, the internationally

guaranteed human rights—what became known as human security: “freedom from
want” and “freedom from fear” that ranged from personal to socioeconomic and
political security—ensured that Lebanon, as a sovereign state, secures a minimum
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of individual autonomy and preserves the right of foreign individuals residing
within the country to be protected when fleeing their home state.287
In addition, once Lebanon as a host state accepts foreign citizen, it is
theoretically required to provide that individual the basic rights that any other
foreigner who is legally residing within the country is given legal rights and duties,
including freedom of thought, of movement, and freedom from any degrading
treatment towards a person’s liberty.
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However, according to the expert

interviewee from the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs,
“The only legal mandate you have is towards the Lebanese citizens. In relation to
Syrian refugees you have some type of Sharia courts even in some informal
settlements and informal groupings of Syrian refugees where they are also treating
these cases: cases of divorce, cases of death; the issue of people of Syrians who are
dying and getting buried in Lebanon, also this is another problem so also we have
Dar Al-Fatwa because 90% of the Syrian refugee there are Sunnis and Dar AlFatwa is managing the religious aspect of the presence of them through the
Cheikh.”289
This statement exemplifies how, in practice, Lebanon’s intricate translation
processes its commitment to the global discourse of human rights, in effect denies
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de facto Syrian refugees from legally accessing adequate government assistance
and protection.290 The official’s misguided statement about Lebanon’s mandate is
legally wrong. It dodges Lebanon’s international responsibility to provide refugees
their basic right to security, liberty, and freedom of movement, by relinquishing the
Lebanese government’s duty towards non-citizens to unaccountable self-interested
third parties with sectarian ambitions. In that respect, the issues and occurrences
that Lebanon perceives as a security threat are subjective, a process of its social
construction, dating back to historical events and the social makeup of the country.
As discussed in the previous section, Lebanon suffers from a chronically unstable
political system that it is gendered and path dependent. Founded on sensitive
political, religious, and sectarian balances, Lebanon bases the Lebanese citizenship
on one’s communal identity, tribal loyalty as opposed to equality and individual
rights.291
Each refugee group is perceived differently according to the many criteria
that enter the equation, including but not limited to their race, their social status,
but mainly their religious affiliation. The discriminatory Lebanese nationality law
and penal code reinforce the numerous personal status laws that engender longstanding sectarian patriarchal social norms. Lebanese authorities often promote this
judicial pluralism as essential to protecting the sectarian diversity within the
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confessional country. In practice, the multiplicity of laws deterred Lebanese
citizens from intermingling across religious groups for fear of losing their religious
identity or further complicating key aspects of their lives, such as marriage, divorce,
and child custody.
The sectarian sensitivities present within the country created a space for
refugee groups belonging to privileged sects to gain better treatment than others.
For example, through history, Christian Armenian refugees in Lebanon fully
integrated without having to assimilate. Other than Armenia, Lebanon is the only
country that guarantees its Armenian community both parliamentary and
ministerial representation. 292 Armenians enjoy anomalous communal autonomy,
preserving their identity, administering their private schools that are taught in
Armenian, and regulating their personal status through their own religious courts.293
Christian Palestinians enjoy similar rights whereby Lebanese citizenship was given
to most of them.294 However, when it came to the resettlement of Sunni Muslim
Palestinian refugees, it was, and still is, a controversial issue. In fact, the perceived
impact their settlement would have had on the sectarian balance of the country
created a feeling of insecurity, even within the government, which resulted in
barring Palestinian refugees from employment in the public sector, limiting them
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from permits to work in the private sphere, or even buying properties. The Lebanese
government, dominated then by Maronite Christians, justified its discriminatory
laws and practices that would hegemonize the entire Palestinian refugee population
as instigators of war, objectifying the Palestinian refugees’ presence as a security
threat of overcrowded, volatile,
ungoverned spaces.
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Meanwhile, Christian micro-communities enjoyed

prosperity, political representation, and communal autonomy, while the Sunni
Palestinians have languished as an underclass, abandoned to political and sectarian
marginalization.296
2.1 The Palestinian Refugee Case
When it first started, the Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon provoked deep
communal, political, and ideological divisions.
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Still, official Lebanese

statements have always rejected the permanent settlement, commonly known as
‘tawteen,’ of the Palestinians in Lebanon.298 The inherent fears related to refugees
and their permanent residence in Lebanon, by both officials and citizens, was
legally manifested in Lebanon’s refusal to join the 1951 Refugee Convention.
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Lebanon’s attempt to shield itself from the prospects of permanently settling
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon further justified these measures as a supportive
move to the forcibly displaced Palestinians’ “Right of Return.”299 This advocacy
was complemented with the denial of legal integration and assimilation of most
Palestinians, not including Christian ones, within the Lebanese fabric. Even when
the Civil War ended, all local factions supported the amended Lebanese
Constitution of 21
September 1990 that introduced a new provision in the Preamble, Section I;
“There shall be no segregation of the people on the basis of any type of belonging,
and no fragmentation, partition, or settlement of non-Lebanese in Lebanon,”300
Even though the above provision established a rule of no segregation, its
vagueness still left room for interpretation, making sure that the only people not to
be segregated were Lebanese, while clearly stating that non-Lebanese, such as the
Palestinians residing within the country cannot settle within the country.
On another note, Lebanese mistrust of Palestinians residing within their
country transcends sectarian fears. In 1969, the Lebanese skirmishes with the
Palestinian Liberation Organization—(PLO) operating within the country ended
with the Cairo agreement between Yasser Arafat heading the PLO, and General
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Emile Bustani, the Lebanese military commander. 301 In effect, this agreement
legitimized the PLO's presence in Lebanon having the legal right to fight Israel
from Lebanon. 302 The primary objective behind Lebanon’s endorsement was to
sideline itself from the Arab-Israeli conflict, while still advocating for the
Palestinian cause. However, this led to a failed attempt to establish a system of
cooperation between both parties and could not prevent the PLO’s threat to
Lebanon’s sovereignty. 303 This agreement counterintuitively granted militant
Palestinians the right to use the refugee camps on its territory as military bases,
establishing autonomous regulatory institutions for Palestinians living inside
formally acknowledged refugee camps. 304 Consequently, this agreement created
space for Palestinian institutions to develop in Lebanon, the outcome of which was
called “a state within the state.” The PLO’s heavy presence in major strategic areas
within Lebanon aggravated existing sectarian tensions between Lebanese
factions.305 Historical accounts demonstrated the aggression and the taking up of
arms by Palestinian refugees, targeting Lebanese nationals and political parties.306
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Taking over west Beirut, the PLO took part in the Lebanese Civil War, where
“thousands of Palestinians became both victims and victimizers.”307 As a result, till
this day, Lebanon characterizes refugees, such as the Palestinians, as “ticking time
bombs,” and, ever since, Lebanese security and intelligence forces consistently
targeted Palestinian refugee formal settlements within the country.308
2.2 Memorandum of Understanding Between Lebanon and the UNHCR
Advancing to September 2003, Lebanon signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) with the UNHCR, defining each party’s role concerning incoming refugees.
Accordingly, the UNHCR’s primary responsibility in Lebanon was to support
Lebanon in registering incoming applicants, issuing them temporary residency
permits, providing protection and assistance, until the UNHCR finds a durable
solution for de facto refugees.309 Initially, Lebanon had maintained a gentleman’s
agreement with the UNHCR, relying on its operations within the Lebanese territory
to adjudicate asylum applications, deciding who is eligible for protection,
assistance as de facto refugees.310 The UNHCR strengthened its position within the
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country by taking over the responsibility of being the primary provider to Syrians
refugees from the host state.311
On the one hand, this lenient approach provided space for a significant
increase in refugees from different nationalities to enter and settle in Lebanon,
triggering a series of local and international security concerns. On the other hand,
The MoU contained some gendering structural measures that would shortly bring
about its demise. The MoU clearly states that Lebanon is “no country of Asylum”,
rather a “transit country,” due to its sociopolitical considerations and concerns. It
goes as far as defining the term “asylum seeker” as a “person seeking asylum in a
country other than Lebanon,” making Lebanon a
transitionary state and not a permanent one. 312 After all, the MoU was only utilized
to shift refugee management responsibilities from the state, which is a primary duty
bearer to the UN agency.313
The MoU stipulated that, as part of its responsibilities, the UNHCR is tasked
with processing asylum applications for asylum seekers, granting refugee
certificates valid for two years (eligible for renewal). Meanwhile, the Lebanese
government was tasked with only tolerating de facto refugee presence temporarily
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while making sure that Lebanese citizens’ rights are being protected.

314

Simultaneously, the agreement allowed the UNHCR to secure short-term solutions
by providing the registered de facto refugees basic assistance and protection while
expecting that the UNHCR would resettle those registered to third countries within
that period. 315 Accordingly, the UN agency was compelled to formalize this
compromised arrangement with the Lebanese government, struggling when
attempting to regulate the main aspects of what is an obvious case of refugee
protection with the lack of any encouraging national refugee law. 316 In the case of
permit expiration, Lebanese authorities had the legal right to take necessary action
against any illegal resident, defeating, in the first place, the purpose of temporarilly
hosting those fleeing their home country to seek protection.317
Although the international community criticized these shortcomings, the MoU
between Lebanon and UNHCR was at first considered a positive preliminary step
for protecting registered de facto refugees with the UNHCR. For the first time, the
Lebanese government recognized those de facto refugees’ semi-legal presence in
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Lebanon by offering them temporary residency permits.318 Still, the MoU clearly
stated that Lebanon was a ‘transit country’, mainly due to its socio-political
considerations and concerns. Accordingly, the temporary legal residency permits
introduced by the Lebanese government only curtailed UNHCR’s capacity to
continuously ensure that residing Syrians would register their detailed information,
hence, preventing undocumented threats to public safety.
It is important to note that there were a few thousand asylum seekers in
Lebanon when it passed its responsibility for managing refugees’ registration,
healthcare, education, and livelihood assistance to the UNHCR. The MoU was only
considered as a first step, a basis in defining Lebanon’s limited obligations
concerning asylum seekers, with no solid national response strategy that could
manage a large influx of refugees. The MoU’s failure worsened the UNHCR’s
position where, as of 2014, the heavy Syrian presence in Lebanon forced the
Lebanese government to shift its policy practices to reduce the number of Syrians
within its territory. This move profoundly affected UNHCR’s ability to implement
its already compromised international protection mandate and placed its
jurisdiction under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs—(MoSA)
whose justification was;
“What has been missing before is the absence of the state and the absence of
true leadership from the part of the government as well from the lead ministry
which is the ministry of social affairs. Now we have a totally different approach;
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:

the government has a unified approach toward the Syrian refugee crisis. The
ministry of social affairs is the lead within the LCRP, and we are assuming our
role and duties; All NGOs, all organizations, whether international regional or
local partners, have to communicate with the Ministry of Social Affairs and get
its approval before proceeding [with any action on Lebanese ground].”319
2.3 The Syrian Refugee Case
In 2014, with the Syrian crisis underway, the connotations of the word refugee
worsened even more. When almost 30% of Lebanon’s population is made up of
Syrian refugees, it is only normal that Lebanese constituents get concerned that the
large Syrian presence within the country threatens its security and stability. This
sudden overpopulation severely strained the country’s stability, affecting nearly all
Lebanese sectors: the security, infrastructure, economy, health, education, labor,
and environment, ultimately endangering the already delicate Lebanese social
fabric.320Accordingly, refugee movements to Lebanon have been referred to by the
Lebanese government as crises of displacement not to be governed by law, but by
ad hoc security practices.321 These decisions were attempts to emphasize the fact
that Syrian refugees are not recognized as such but rather as “temporary displaced
persons” (a legally loaded term that is vaguely defined) who are expected either to
resettle in third countries or return to their homeland as soon as the security and
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political conditions there settle down.322 Even though the UNHCR experts were
optimistic stating that:
“It is just semantics at this point. The applications’ piece of paper and
registration paper are the same, […] There is a new minister created for
displacement affairs. Well you know those are positive signs to see the language
in general shifting to statements such as; before we could hear perhaps refugees
were considered a burden, now we hear more they are an economic opportunity.
So you know those are positive signs.”323
Still, in practice, nothing tangible changed; Lebanese domestic attitudes and
laws do not help displaced Syrians, let alone undocumented illegal residents, who
are left with few legal recourses. 324 The Lebanese public feared the creation of
another space for Syrians that would engender a state within the state.325 Shared
concerns of Syrian refugees exacerbating the deteriorating Lebanese economic,
security, infrastructural, and social structures brought public outcry over residing
Syrians being directly implicated in security threats in Lebanon. For example,
numerous attacks against the Lebanese army and the bombings of several Lebanese
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regions were planned and executed by radical Syrians posing as refugees. 326
Accordingly, the attention and care the international organizations, especially the
UNHCR, provided to Syrians generated local resentment towards perceived Syrian
opportunists who are “living in better conditions than we do.”327 The feeling of
anti-Syrian resentment was reinforced by earlier perceptions of who the incoming
Syrians previously represented (the Assad regime). As former members of the
Syrian regime, incoming Syrians could not escape the Lebanese collective
bitterness towards them, dating back to the Syrian occupation with boots on the
ground, came to life. 328 Therefore, more problems, uncertainties, and dangers
became correlated with the term “refugee,” silencing most Syrians who have lost
homes, jobs, and personal assets.
Moreover, different political actors in Lebanon have also focused on
demonizing the Syrian refugee population, marginalizing them further in the
pretext that these “Sunni” refugee masses pose a threat to Lebanese sectarian
(im)balance.329 Therefore, hostile sentiments and aggressive attitudes towards the
now unwanted displaced Syrians is no more than a symptom of the much deeper
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geopolitical sectarian relationship between the two countries.330 Moreover, with the
appointment of President Michel Aoun in 2016, his tenure began by promising that
“displaced Syrians would quickly return to their homeland and abstain from turning
refugee camps into security hubs.” 331332 A recent statement made by Lebanon’s
Prime Minister Mr. Saad Hariri further exemplifies this argument. He stated:
“Today if you go around most of the host communities, there is a huge tension
between the Lebanese and the Syrians…I fear civil unrest.”333 In effect, a study
shows that a 60% increase in crime in Beirut is directly related to the refugee
population whereas, while as of 2016, 26% of the prison population is of Syrian
nationality.334 These growing negative perceptions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon
facilitated Lebanon’s General Security Officers’ (GSO)—with questionable
capacities and training in knowing how and when to identify justifiable
humanitarian cases—abuse of power in vilifying Syrian refugees. Their mandate
tends to focus on combating crimes and potential cases of terrorism, giving them
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room to verbally abuse potential refugee victims while interrogating,
discriminating, and putting them in harm’s way.335
3. Sovereignty Through Exclusion
Lebanon initially welcomed Syrian refugees without regulating their entry into the
country, especially women and children. However, the increase in the number of
refugees, and the subsequent challenges that arose led to a “re-ordering of national
politics and relations visà-vis Syrians.”336 As a result, the country securitized the
influx of Syrians coming into Lebanon through the porous borders.337 The ‘thin’
boundaries that once separated these two neighboring countries eventually
thickened by a series of border restrictions. These measures marked, for the first
time in Lebanon’s history, an extensive filtering system for Syrians entering
Lebanese territories. With the Syrian regime busy fighting internal resistance, its
influence on Lebanese policies diminished rapidly.
This situation led the Lebanese government to shift from a policy of “No
Policy” to one of total control.338 Accordingly, Lebanese authorities and security
agencies would ad hoc-ly legitimize their securitized practices under the guise of
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fighting terrorism and preserving the Lebanese sectarian identity balance. They
would use what would be seen as standard bureaucratic practices of approving
which Syrian asylum requests are complete and feminized enough to be accepted
and which requests are to be rejected under the pretext of them being insufficient
and potentially violent, opportunists, aggressive threats. The previously
commended lenient Lebanese open-door-policy approach was completely reversed,
negatively affecting the functioning of the UNHCR to register future Syrian
refugees in Lebanon and channel appropriate aid across the country. 339, 340
In fact, Lebanon’s strong reservations about acceding to the 1951 Refugee
Convention already challenged the UNHCR’s ability to execute its mandate.341 The
UNHCR had to constantly adjust its international protection mandate to new forms
of cooperation mechanisms that were difficult to maintain due to fluctuating
complications unfavorable for refugee protection in the country.342 Since Lebanon
does not extend automatic asylum to de facto Syrian refugees, many Syrian children
and their families become objects of discriminatory domestic laws and (in)security
practices for illegal entry and stay. Accordingly, international organizations, the
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UNHCR particularly, are not capable of thereby easing their risk of harassment,
xenophobic violence, detention, and forced deportation. These reactionary
approaches, complemented by the UNHCR’s limited role in crisis management of
the Syrian refugee case, only worsened the already tragic situation of International
aid, assistance, and refugee protection programs, aimed at alleviating refugees’
insecurities in general, Syrians’ in Lebanon specifically.
Despite the massive presence of foreigners within the country, Lebanese
integration rhetoric religiously nationalized citizenship by privileging those who
are perceived to belong to specific sects (such as Christians) for not threatening the
overall sectarian balance that keeps Lebanon (dis)functional.343 The unparalleled
refugee burden faced by hosting Lebanese communities rendered it impossible for
the Lebanese government agencies to provide necessary services and aid assistance,
which are subject to sectarian intra-Lebanese calculations and corruption, thus
serving personal and partisan agendas.344 Accordingly, bargaining for aiding the
vulnerable Lebanese communities and reforming Lebanon’s infrastructure became
paramount for Lebanon’s outcries for the global community’s participation in
refugee burden-sharing efforts.
Consequently, ad hoc Lebanese securitized policies left the majority of
Syrian refugees subject to discrimination and exploitation, while, at the same time
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pressuring the international community to take on the protection responsibilities in
expanding aid assistance and community services across the country. 345 As a
matter of fact, UNHCR’s Lebanon budget decupled between the beginning of the
crisis and 2015, seeing an unprecedented increase, in which the agency found itself
supporting public institutions and stuck negotiating the assistance terms with semifunctional government agencies and competing interests. In other words,
international aid was no longer limited to UNHCR nor its operation to assist and
protect Syrian de facto refugees. Instead, most of the international support went to
finance Lebanese government spending— “budget support”—and a plethora of
competing for issue-oriented non-governmental organizations whose missions
came with the risk of corruption and fraud.346 This expansion led to a change in the
refugee protection approach. Incremental protection tasks and social services were
subcontracted to NGOs, competing with the UNHCR almost entirely for, voluntary
contributions from member states, and international and regional organizations, as
well as pooled funding mechanisms that include the self-interested private sector.
The main characteristics of the LCRP’s budget support’s section as a
financing modality are threefold, focusing on the assigned country’s development
and poverty reduction, while, also working with the Lebanese government to tackle
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security and counter-terrorism inside the country, shoring up millions of dollars for
border management. First, the majority of funds approved would be channeled
directly to the Lebanese government. Second, those funds are to finance the
government budget, not necessarily linked to specific refugee project activities.
Finally, most funds donated need to be approved by the semi-functioning Lebanese
authorities to make sure that the disbursement and procurement of funds do not
jeopardize the country’s security and interests. On the one hand, Lebanese public
institutions were unwilling and not sufficiently trained to sensitively target the
diverse groups that make up the Syrian refugee population. On the other hand, these
male-controlled institutions would prioritize gender-blind projects deemed vital for
their securitized interests of controlling Syrian presence within their communities
over vital gender-related political or socio-economic projects. Accordingly,
research shows that the Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perceptions
Index scored Lebanon with 28 over 100, labeling it as “plagued, untrustworthy and
badly functioning.”347
Not having a clear, systematic channel of operation with lack of oversight over
different

non-governmental

organizations’

operations

and

institutional

responsibilities, led to deepening the harmful aggressive behavior towards Syrian
refugees, further engendering tensions between all members of society. As a
sovereign state, a state has the legal right to secure its borders and control its
territory. Thus, ad-hoc policies popped out across the country, tightening its border
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policies towards Syrians, rejecting formal refugee settlements for Syrians, and
limiting their mobility within the country—three sectors that will be developed in
the following subsections.348
3.1 Visa Restrictions and Border Control
Lebanon’s focus on reinforcing territorial boundaries, to uphold the fragile
domestic status quo, shifted its border procedures with Syria. 349 The Lebanese
government started implementing a series of restrictions on Syrian entrance and
residency in the country, making the acquisition of a visa increasingly challenging
to obtain, and the time frame even shorter—ranging from one day to a year at
most. 350 Also, Lebanon’s visa entry requirements and practices filtered the
relatively financially privileged ‘displaced’ Syrians into Lebanon over the
repudiated disadvantaged ones, depicting them as depoliticized, immobile, and
passive.
The situation continued to deteriorate until 2015 when the Lebanese
government took extreme measures when it comes to applying for or renewing
residency permits. As such, on May 6, 2015, the male-dominated Lebanese
government issued a ministerial policy paper demanding the suspension of official
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registration of Syrian refugees. 351 This decree hindered the majority of Syrian
nationals, women, and children, from successfully applying for or renewing their
residency permits, thus limiting their access to legal status, housing, employment,
and protection. As stated by the MoSA, the policy established three primary
objectives for managing the Syrian displacement into Lebanon, dictated by security
concerns:352
1) Reduce the number of Syrians registered with the UNHCR as de facto refugees
through border control.
2) Bolster security in the country to keep the displaced population under control.
3) Reinforce local stability by prioritizing Lebanese industries, vulnerable
communities, and infrastructure.
According to the expert interviewee of MoSA this was an erroneous governmental
approach;
“In January 2015 the [Lebanese government’s] decision was made to stop the
registration of Syrian refugees and close the [Lebanese–Syrian] borders except for
humanitarian cases […] This was the worst decision ever made; it was only about
stopping the numbers at a certain exact number.”353
Surprisingly, the expert interviewee’s opinion, highlighted above, echoed the
humanitarian criticism towards the malfunctioning of the new refugee policies
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introduced by the Lebanese government, imposing significant restrictions on the
UNHCR’s ability to properly manage Syrian refugees in Lebanon let alone
successful integration. In fact, according to new rules, all Syrians registered with
UNHCR have to sign a pledge that revokes their right to work in the country.354
Some refugees have even declared that they were asked to sign other legal
documents stating that they are obliged to return to Syria as soon as their residency
papers expire.355
Enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, the principle of nonrefoulement is binding on state parties, constituting the cornerstone of international
refugee protection;
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion.”356

What should ostensibly be geared towards refugee protection measures—such
as nonrefoulment—turned Lebanon, a nonsignatory state hosting large numbers of
refugees, to gendered (re)production of refugee (in)securities through arbitrary
arrests, torture, mass eviction, and de facto refoulment of perceived Syrian refugee
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threats.357 We find that in a patriarchal system that perpetuates a male-dominated,
clan-based political order, the majority of the Syrian permits and the right to work
permits granted by the Lebanese government excluded Syrian refugees from any
genuine participation.
A good illustration of aggressive governmental rhetoric justifying the
exploitation of the Syrian refugee ‘burden’ came with the announcement of the
Lebanese Minister of Social Affairs, Rashid Derbas, who stated that “the cessation
of asylum is final because Lebanon can no longer bear anymore. […] Lebanon does
not deserve more burdens, and there are countries closer to them [Syrian refugees]
to which they can resort to.”358 In that respect, the Lebanese government assured
that the existing million or so displaced Syrians would regularly be examined by
the concerned agencies to verify that their de facto refugee status criteria with the
UNHCR are continuously met. If not, Syrian nationals would thus be subject to
removal from the UNHCR’s list and, consequently be liable to deportation. These
bureaucratic procedures introduced were so “onerous and expensive that it became
challenging for people to meet the requirements.”359 For the first time in Lebanese–
Syrian relations, different entities dealing with refugees, whether the central state
or local authorities, would be charged to take appropriate measures against any
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Syrian entering Lebanon without valid reasons or supporting documents, under the
guise of law and order preservation.
Within the Lebanese structure, the Directorate for General Security (GS) is
an intelligence agency that falls under the Ministry of Interior Affairs. The
directorate has diverse functions, mainly including intelligence work and visa
issuance, as well as managing state security regarding Syrian displacement. In fact,
Article 17 of the 1962 law on the entry and exit of foreign nationals gives the
General Security virtually unrestricted judicial police power to arrest, detain, and
deport suspicious foreigners.360 This gendered law implies that immigration status
within Lebanon gets processed through self-interested security personnel, with
military uniforms, who seek to securitize the Syrian presence within the country
rather than civil immigration employees. The General Security is responsible for
controlling foreigners’ legal status in the country, including Syrians’ residency.
Following a governmental decision,361 the GS issued several types of visas that
allowed Syrians to lawfully acquire residency permits upon submission of official
documents, such as passports, marriage and birth certificates. In other words, to be
granted entry and residence in the country, Syrians must apply to one of the seven
category visas: tourist, business, real estate ownership, student, transit, medical
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23,

2014):

treatment, or legal sponsorship better known as Kafala.362 From all the previously
mentioned reasons, two types of visas qualify most forcibly displaced Syrians to
reside in Lebanon up to six months, eligible for renewal; these include the
sponsorship—better known as the Kafala system and registration as de facto
refugees with the UNHCR. Syrians over the age of 15 were thus obliged to renew
their residency permit for 200 USD per person bi-annually.
Concurrently, these steps guaranteed GS officers control of Lebanese borders,
identify Syrians’ legal status, and make arbitrary decisions of revoking the
residency of any Syrian that (re)enters Syria, thus disallowing them of any
protective “privilege.”363 Issues such as increasing mobility restrictions imposed
upon Syrians wishing to return for a quick visit could result in terminating their
legal right to go back to Lebanon or preventing family reunions. 364 Meanwhile,
most Syrians fear filing any complaint against a Lebanese citizen, police officer, or
security personnel for fear of losing their already limited legal status, which will be
discussed in the following sub-sections, through vengeful threat measures such as
pre-trial detention and biased interrogation practices.365

362

Robert Rabil, The Syrian Refugee Crisis In Lebanon: The Double Tragedy of Refugees and Impacted Host
Communities. Lexington Books, (2016), 20.
363

Lebanon News, “UNHCR To Cross 5,500 Syrian Refugees: Derbas,” The Daily Star, (August 29, 2015):

https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/LebanonNews/2015/Apr-29/296164-unhcr-to-cross-off-5500syrianrefugeesderbas.ashx.
Rola Yasmine and Catherine Moughalian, “Systemic Violence Against Syrian Refugee Women And The
Myth Of Effective Intrapersonal Interventions,” Reproductive Health Matters, (2016).
364

365

A 2015 Assessment By The Lebanese Institute For Democracy And Human Rights (LIFE).

155

3.1.1 Kafala System
One dominant pathway for Syrians to reside in Lebanon is the Kafala
system, constructed around the model of employer sponsorship of foreign labor.
Like the Gulf countries, each foreigner who wishes to make a living in Lebanon
must be guaranteed by a sponsor, who maintains the right to exert significant
control over their employee’s legal status, freedom of movement, as well as
employment mobility. The makfoul—migrant worker—would become totally
dependent on their kafeel—sponsor—to renew their residency and provide them
income. This system is often criticized for being a disguised form of modern-day
slavery, putting asylum seekers in a vulnerable position for all sorts of exploitation
and abuse. The legal relationship that binds the employee to their employer appears
most analogous to a modern-day slavery relationship.” 366 The employee is
dependent on their employer in their entry and residency rights in the country,
giving them space to confiscate their passports as a way to limit their freedom of
movement.367
Even though the confiscation of employees’ passports arguably violates
Article 36 of the Lebanese Foreigner’s Law, which stipulates that any foreigner
found on Lebanese ground without valid proof of identity be subject to fines and
imprisonment, the law itself encourages confiscation, as immigrants are the only
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party to suffer from consequences in case the law was violated. Police, army, and
General Security officers thus have the right to detain any foreigner who cannot
prove that they are in the country legally, even if employers are the ones responsible
for the missing documents. Detained non-citizens are systematically discriminated
within over-crowded prison facilities with limited chances to not be deported.368
Consequently, under the Kafala system, a person becomes legally bound to an
individual employer—kafeel—who would thus undertake all financial and legal
responsibility for the migrant they sponsor. The migrant worker, thus, “cannot enter
the country, transfer employment nor leave the country for any reason without first
obtaining explicit written permission from the kafeel, who must report to the
immigration authorities if the migrant worker leaves their employment, ensuring
that their employee leaves the country after the contract ends.”369
One could argue that, in the Lebanese context, such a system effectively
became a status sought after by Syrians as the alternatives are much worse.
Consequently, a new type of informal dynamics emerged, in which most Syrians
would have to compensate Lebanese citizens to sponsor them and take them under
their protection. 370 In this case, the relatively privileged upper-class Syrian
nationals that have Lebanese private citizens’ connection and support, with
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personal funds and (or) real estate in Lebanon, were often able to live a relatively
decent life under the kafala system. Still, Syrians under this type of sponsorship
face the same exploitative insecurities on a quid-pro-quo basis like any individual
from any other nationality. 371 In case their privilege went sour, the Lebanese
sponsor has the power to confiscate or not renew a Syrian’s kafala papers and,
hence, deport them. However, this is not the case of most displaced Syrians who
come from the middle to low class, work in low-skilled industries, and can barely
afford the issuing and (or) renewal of their permits to remain lawfully employed in
the country.372
3.1.2 Syrian Refugees Registered Through the UNHCR
Another form of a misused residency system that the majority of “displaced
Syrians” undergo is the registration under the UNHCR, which provides them with
a distinct set of rights and duties in Lebanon. Unlike the sponsored Syrians, those
registered with the UNHCR can only have access to basic aid and health care,
without being allowed to work legally. In fact, refugees can only register with the
UNHCR and qualify for aid if they provide legal documentations confirming their
residence and pledging not to take any job.373 Syrian refugees who wish to work
can relinquish their registration with the UNHCR, not eligible then to receive
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humanitarian aid, and acquire one of the three work visa permits; solid waste
management, construction, and agribusiness sectors.374 In reality, most of these job
types Syrians acquire are outside the formal job market, and most Lebanese
employers do not register employees for visas nor report any legal transaction for
fees evasion. It is important to note that the majority of displaced Syrians have
always worked and resided in Lebanon under informal agreements, meaning that
they were not required to provide any official documentation as proof of work or
residency. With the relatively cheaper labor cost, unfair competition characterized
the Lebanese job market, and many regular jobs were taken away from Lebanese
and given to informal Syrian workers, thus jeopardizing the Lebanese labor force
and further affecting working conditions of Syrians and increasing exploitation.375
Now, with the hardened Lebanese security measures, Syrians who fail to
provide the required legal documentation are given a moratorium of up to ten days
to secure it, after which their stay becomes illegal. It is crucial to note that all
mandatory documents undergo lengthy bureaucratic processes, requiring municipal
notarization and signatures from Lebanese officials, both of which are often
challenging to acquire. The latter results in a time-consuming and expensive
process that, based on UNHCR calculations, costs an average family around a
thousand dollars per year. These costs are realistically unaffordable for most Syrian
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refugees, as a

result, they are unable to meet registration requirements. 376

Meanwhile, filing protracted lawsuits with legal and material assistance costs
would drain the already limited financial ability of displaced Syrians to seek redress
through Lebanese courts. Consequently, after seven years of displacement and
without any significant income, many Syrians were forced to prioritize their basic
needs over asserting legal rights through Lebanese courts.
Finally, the UNHCR’s registration documents do not necessarily grant
automatic residency permits but are subject to state approval through the GS.
Consequently, refugees registered with the UNHCR before 2015 only obtain
temporary legal status, depending on the GS’s discretion, awaiting their final
resettlement in a third country of destination. 377 As for Syrians registered after
2015, The UNHCR does not share their information with the Lebanese government,
barely guaranteeing them protection under the UNHCR with little legal aid or
assistance. 378 This lack of information-sharing increased hostilities between the
Lebanese government and the UNHCR agencies operating within the country,
resulting in increased restrictions from the Lebanese government upon UN
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operations within the state. 379 As a consequence, Syrian refugees are left in an
ambiguous state of constant fear of arrest, apprehension or forced deportation.
3.1.3 Undocumented Syrian Refugees
A third category of relevance that the majority of Syrians fall under is illegal
residency. Due to their sudden flight after the bombing and burning of their homes,
the lack of identity proof or legal documents hinders many Syrians in Lebanon from
obtaining official registration with the UNHCR, adding to the overall number of
Syrians present in Lebanon.380 As for the ones who are fortunate to possess such
documents, their registration as de facto refugees with the UNHCR is
complemented with a pledge not to work, entirely reliant on the frequent
interruption of humanitarian assistance to the affected populations due to lack of
funding.381 As a matter of fact, due to a shortfall in funding, the UNHCR and other
NGOs’ assistance efforts are barely sufficient for immediate refugee needs, leaving
them increasingly vulnerable to debt and poverty. Consequently, Syrian refugees
become constrained from renewing their residency papers and are, thus, left without
valid legal residency documents. The UNCHR estimated that the percentage of
Syrian refugee households without valid residence permits rose from “9% in
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January 2015 to 61% in July 2015.”382 In fact, this number increased to 70%, and
approximately

700,000

Syrians

are

now

undocumented

and

socially

marginalized.383
Moreover, following the government’s hyper-regulative decision of visa
renewal, most Syrian refugees were unable to fulfill sufficient registration
requirements. Accordingly, most newborn Syrian children also cannot be registered
as the UNHCR only enrolls Syrian children if they are born in Lebanon having at
least one of the parents already registered, and, most importantly, possessing a
Lebanese birth certificate—a document that is bureaucratically almost impossible
to acquire.384 Retrospectively, the nature of the Syrian Nationality Law is not far
from the Lebanese one for it also presents enormous discriminatory obstacles for
Syrian mothers. Syrian nationality regulations are predominately paternalistic—jus
sanguinis for “anyone born inside or outside the country to a Syrian Arab father . .
. shall be considered as Syrian Arabs ipso facto.”385 The latter means that a child’s
citizenship can either be passed through a citizen father or if a citizen mother gives
birth in Syria with no father establishing affiliation to the child.386 Therefore, most
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Syrian children end up thus stateless—lacking a fundamental legal recognition of
nationality387—violating the Convention of the Rights of the Child, that Lebanon
endorses.388
Even though Lebanese officials continuously reassure their commitment to
the principle of “safe” returns of Syrians in Lebanon, the precarious Syrian
refugees’ legal status in the country is further complicated by the fact that different
governmental agencies apply the rules at their discretion—not under a unified rule
of law but rather following sporadic governmental decisions.389 Such actions allow
the different local security agencies to revoke the expired residency documents and
strip the now undocumented Syrian nationals of their fundamental rights. This latter
leads to further marginalizing and facilitating refugee exploitation, under the
pretext that their presence threatens national security.390
3.2 A No-Camp Policy
Another form of sovereignty through exclusion is the ban on formal refugee
settlements. Through securitization measures, Syrian refugees were labeled as
“displaced victims” who acquired limited governmental protection so they could

John Davison, “Redrawing The Middle East: A Generation Of Syrian Children Who Don’t Count,”
Thompson
Reuters,
(May
3,
2016):
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/syriarefugeesstateless/.
387

“Trapped in Lebanon: The Alarming Human Rights and Human Security Situation of Syrian Refugees in
Lebanon.” ALEF. (May 2016), 18, https://alefliban.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Trapped-In-Lebanon_ALEF_ PAX_ May2016.pdf.
388

“Lebanon: New Entry Requirements For Syrians Likely To Block Would-Be Refugees,” Amnesty
International,
(January
6,
2015),
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=mde24%2F002%2F2015&language=en.
389

Maja Janmyr and Lama Mourad, “Modes Of Ordering: Labelling, Classification And Categorization In
Lebanon’s Refugee Response,” Journal of Refugee Studies (2017).
390

163

become an existential threat to national security. Historically, Palestinian refugees
were blamed for playing a primary role in igniting the devastating Lebanese Civil
War that brought the country to the fragile state it finds itself in today. As a lesson
from previous experiences with Palestinian refugees, the Lebanese government
thus refused to build new refugee camps as primary settlements for the now
“displaced” Syrians. One example was in 2013, where the Ikea Foundation’s
project “Better Shelters” donated easily transportable shelters that could be put up
in four hours and had solar panels on the roof.391 However, the project was directly
shut down by the Lebanese government authorities, and permanent shelters were
banned, as local communities were worried that such initiatives might encourage
Syrians to settle in their area indefinitely.
As a consequence, as of 2011 Informal Tented Settlements (ITS) started to
emerge in Northern Lebanon and in the Bekaa Valley to accommodate the evergrowing number of Syrian refugees settling in Lebanon. As housing possibilities
within the country were very limited, and the hosting government objected to the
construction of official camps, refugees were scattered all over the country in all
kinds of vacant facilities, thus occupying spaces such as rental apartments, garages,
unfinished buildings, as well as living on the streets.392 Lebanese owners consider

Richard Hall, “Lebanon Doesn’t Want Syrian Refugees Getting Too Comfortable, Even in Winter,” Agence
FrancePresse, (February 15, 2016), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-02-15/lebanon-doesnt-want-syrianrefugees-getting-toocomfortable-even-winter.
391

“VASyR 2017: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,” World Food Program, United
Nations
Children’s
Fund
(UNICEF),
and
UNHCR,
(2016):
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/ wfp289533.pdf.
392

164

most Syrian refugee living on their private properties in Lebanon as essentially
lesser private tenants, where contracts are based on informal negotiations and
private agreements without any real governmental supervision.
Even though Lebanon has the sole authority to manage its constituents, the
daily government practices of control, containment, and exclusion over displaced
Syrians are done by property owners and local institutions, (re)producing new types
of refugee insecurities. Instead of being supported by the government, any external
assistance provided to refugees is in no way related to the government and comes
mainly from humanitarian organizations or private enterprises, varying from being
sufficient to severely limited and fragmented. Even though the condition of Syrian
refugees living on private properties is, clearly, not enviable, it is considerably
better than that of Syrian refugees living in ITS. According to the Lebanon Shelter
Sector’s Strategy, an ITS is defined as an:
“Unofficial group of temporary residential structures, often comprising of plasticsheeting and timber structures and can be of any size from one to several hundred
tents.” 393 Based on this definition, one could only imagine the unsafe and
exploitative conditions in which those Syrian refugees live in, creating predictable
inconveniences that would result from such a lifestyle.
Nevertheless, the ITS phenomenon existed even before the Syrian crisis, in
most agricultural, rural, mountainous areas in Lebanon. In fact, several seasonal
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tribal migrant workers and their extended families—locally known as “Bedouin el
Arab” and to which the UNHCR refer to as “nomadic and border
populations”394have always migrated from Syria to Lebanon every spring season
until the end of the summer, residing at the outskirts of privately owned agricultural
land. “Bedouin el Arab” linguistically relates to Badiya— desert.395 Historically,
Bedouins are tribes’ descendants of ancient Arab tribes of the Arabian Peninsula.
Nowadays, Bedouin men cultivate the land and work on construction sites, whereas
women and children from the age of five clean Lebanese households as well as
collect fruit and vegetables during the week.396 Women and children would then,
on weekends, roam different villages’ plazas—“Midan”—and restaurants selling
toys, gum, and even reading people’s fortune. At the end of the agribusiness season,
most migrants would eventually go back to their respective towns across state
borders, having collected enough money to move to a warmer, economically viable
place, with work and school opportunities.
However, with the crisis dynamics unfolding in Syria, increasing numbers
of Bedouins and their extended families were copelled to permanently reside in
Lebanon out of fear of being persecuted or recruited for a war they do not want to
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partake in. In effect, the bedouins main sources of employment—construction and
agricultural work—are mostly seasonal and unavailable in Lebanon during the
winter season.397 Aside from being susceptible to extreme weather variations in the
mountainous and arid open spaces during fall and winter times, Syrians now living
in longer-term informal camps must live off their savings for part of the year,
maintaining very low standards of living during the harsh winters of rural Lebanon.
Their dependency on humanitarian aid and basic supplies of food and water was
exacerbated with a lack of privacy and terrible sanitary conditions, among many
other misfortunes, increasing social harassment and stigma for refugees.
With their presence becoming very noticeable to the host populace and
municipalities, these informal spaces became “confining not only physically but
also at the level of cognition, emotions, and temporality.”398 The Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) and other intelligence officers systematically raided several ITS with
the aim of apprehending terrorist suspects and deterring potential threats.
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Accordingly, reports state that the LAF arrested Syrians for “alleged national
security offenses, with human rights risks during pretrial detention and
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interrogation.” 400 Military detention centers, including those that potentially house
terrorists and other criminal suspects, are merged with other small crimes detainees
in overcrowded spaces. Meanwhile, if any complaint against military conduct were
to be voiced, the military penchant and court judgement trump civilian appeals. As
a matter of fact, civilian victims, let alone Syrians, are not allowed to file a law suit
nor produce evidence, let alone appeal, threatening any access to petition the
judge’s decision. This process is a clear violation of Article 13.3 of the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).401 We find cases where military
courts do not announce the justifications behind their declared judgements, giving
space thus for unlawful military trials, ad hoc detention and negligent care.402
Consequently, the fear of being evicted, detained, and deported reinforces
the fear of Syrian refugees and insecurity.403 As an effect, camps that were once
part of the Bedouin culture ended up reproducing long-term physical restrictions on
the now Syrian refugees disregarding them into a “state of anonymity and
marginality that in itself is also confining.” 404 We find different interdependent
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privileged bodies, such as municipalities, landowners, as well as the Syrian
shawish—a masculine word used to refer to one man supervising an ITS— take the
role of gatekeepers, controlling residing Syrian families with little to no security
guarantees. In fact, the degrees of control in which “refugees are profiled,
monitored, and disciplined, [mirrors] in many ways the conditionality of informal
refugee camps.”405
3.3 Curfews and Checkpoints
Most Syrian refugees who are coming to Lebanon experience a difficult process of
assimilation due to conflicting socio-cultural attitude towards their presence within
their country. While Sunni Muslims in Lebanon have been more tolerant toward
the majority of Syrian refugees, other Lebanese sectarian communities especially
the Shiites and the Christians do not share the same enthusiasm towards the
majority of Syrian incomers (Sunnis).406 Due to the fragmented political deadlock,
a lack of a coherent national strategy for addressing the Syrian influx has left
different local bodies to take matters in their own hands. Municipalities were
entrusted with managing and monitoring the refugee status quo by the Ministry of
Interior and Municipalities (MoIM), counting refugees and managing both
communities, a duty that played a key role in expanding the strategies of different
municipalities in controlling the sudden refugee influx into their areas. As a direct
result, most municipalities increased their municipal police taskforce, a body that
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is not recognized by the central government as an “official” security service
provider, to enforce curfews to control and supervise Syrian refugees. In fact, there
are no standard operational policies for the Lebanese municipal police. Their
accountability measures, and recruitment standards such as proof of clean criminal
records are not certified nor based on professional police training before assuming
duty and carrying firearms.407
Meanwhile, coordination with the central government security forces varies
according to temporal and spatial dynamics. In fact, varying and contradictory
responses implemented across the different municipalities led to different policies
for Syrians, depending on specific areas of residence. Most of these policies were
the fruits of not only local decision-makers but, also that of popular stances towards
Syrian refugees, where some areas were more welcoming and others more hostile.
The most antagonistic decision that is still, up to this date, condemned by the
international community for its unethical element, was the decision of 252 out of
1108 municipalities to impose curfews as guidelines on Syrian de facto refugees
after nightfall.408 It is crucial to note that under Article 12 of the ICCPR there is no
legal basis for municipalities to impose curfews on a specific community while
exempting others. 409 In that respect, the biased policies of illegal curfews and
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evictions that certain Lebanese municipalities imposed on Syrian residents,
reinforced the hostilities between both communities.410
4. Systemic Discrimination of Syrian Women: A Double Tragedy
Syrian women refugees are not isolated from the various types of insecurities
mentioned in the previous section as they form most of the officially registered
refugees in Lebanon.411

Figure 5. Registered Syrian refugees with the UNHCR by September 2018
412

According to the figure above, as of September 2018, of the 952,562 Syrian
refugees registered with the UNHCR in Lebanon, 52.3% are female, with the
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largest age group aged between 18 and 59, representing 23.8% of all registered
Syrians. The UN reports that females head 19% of Syrian refugee households.413
In fact, Syrian women heads of household live in Lebanon without a husband or
other adult male relatives. Some of these women are either widows, divorced, ones
whose husbands are missing, or whose husband is not registered, remained in Syria,
died, vanished, or even sought asylum in other countries.414
Additionally, most registered Syrian males in Lebanon are children, with only
18.2% of registered males falling in the age group of 18–59 and 1.2% over the age
of 60. Therefore, around 80% of refugees are either female or male dependents,
most probably fall under the protection of their adults, thus adding new legal
burdens upon their guardians. Therefore, it becomes evident that women’s and
children’s legal stay in Lebanon and visa renewals fall upon the shoulders of their
adult male guardians or adult female Syrian refugees heading their household.
Given the context where women have less social and legal status, they often
also have insufficient capital, limited support, and bare legal backing to protect
themselves. This alone implies that women are more likely than any other group to
suffer the consequences of restrictive Lebanese policies. The Vulnerability
Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) report jointly produced
between the UNHCR, World Food Program, and UNICEF states that “female-
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headed households were less food secure, had worse diets, adopted severe coping
strategies more often and had higher poverty levels […] femaleheaded households
were almost twice as likely as male-headed households to live in informal
settlements, and were less likely to have legal residency.” ”415 The report adds that
a good amount of female-headed households do not work with stringent support.416
This alone implies that Syrian women are more likely than any other group to suffer
the consequences of restrictive policies imposed by the Lebanese government, even
if those policies were gender-neutral and did not specifically target women.417 On
the other hand, a news report made by Al Jazzera stated that Syrian women refugees
who identify as widowed are not only fighting for survival, but they are also in
constant conflict with their new communities. One Syrian widow named Fatima
told the news agency that "Every time I voice my opinion on how to improve the
aid distribution in the camp, the Syrian men in the village shut me up. Because I
am a woman, I am being told my opinions are worthless even though I am more
educated than most of them,[…] They say I am too open and too manly because I
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leave the house and speak out, even though my clothing has nothing to do with
openness."418
Therefore, with so much attention going towards national security concerns to
assure state stability, the plight of Syrian women does not receive the necessary
protection that they so desperately need. Reflecting on the context of the situation
of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, gender and refugee status play a major role in
contributing to the multiple forms of discrimination inflicted upon Syrian women
refugees by both members of the host community as well as within their own
communities. Traditionally stigmatized, Syrian women who leave their homes with
their children in search of security get paradoxically subjected to double
discrimination: one as refugees and another because of their gender. Accordingly,
a deeper examination of the gendered Lebanese institutions that restrict women’s
access to justice, rights, and empowerment opportunities is important to highlight
some of the forms of discrimination that Syrian women endure in association to
their gender. When Lebanese women citizens endure such inequalities, it is natural
to expect that Syrian women’s agency and decision-making authority over their life
choices would be similarly undermined, if not worse.
4.1 Draconian Personal Status Laws
The discriminatory Lebanese nationality law and penal code over the numerous
personal status laws engender the long-standing sectarian patriarchal social norms
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that generally hinder women’s rights. Lebanon does not have a civil code to
regulate issues such as divorce, property rights, or the care of children. Instead,
different religious courts administer distinct personal status laws that often issue
rulings that violate women’s rights with little government oversight. Accordingly,
on November 3, 2015, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women expressed serious concerns in its concluding observations on Lebanon
about Lebanon’s delay in adopting relevant amendments. The Committee
commented that the numerous different personal status laws could lead to various
discriminations against women twice; within their respective religious sects and
between the different religious denominations.419
Without a modern set of civil laws, social customs and the religious courts
that rule on family matters treat women as inferior to men. As family guardians,
men are in a position of power and rights over his wife—or wives in some
instances—and children.420 They are responsible to care for children financially,
health wise, travel, and consent for marriage. 421 Lebanon has seen a consistent
decline in the Global Gender Gap Index, ranking 135th out of 144, as of 2017.422
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After all, different sects possess different rights and duties, while influencing
Lebanon’s ranking position as a third to last in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, with only Syria and Yemen behind.423
In Sunni Muslim gendered practice—which makes up most of the Syrian
population residing in Lebanon—"guardianship in the absence of a child’s father
does not pass to its mother. Instead, custody is granted to another male member of
the father’s family.”424 Meanwhile, all the unchecked patriarchal religious courts
discriminate against Lebanese women, treating them as second-class citizens with
insufficient oversight and accountability from the Lebanese government. Genderbased discrimination in inheritance, job opportunities, and education, are a few of
the unfortunate events that Lebanese men would never have to deal with.
Meanwhile, the issue of state accountability is pivotal to a woman’s
freedom. Knowing the different legal institutions’ responsibilities, and to whom
these institutions answer, affect the way women’s rights get translated into practice.
Accordingly, Lebanese court procedures can have discriminatory effects, where a
woman’s case can be dismissed as a dubious emotional claim with a lack of
evidence.425 Added to the fact, is that most women cannot afford legal or material
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assistance during protracted legal proceedings, which makes them vulnerable to
cases of child custody assured to the father, or, even worse, arrest without bail as
punishment for defending themselves

against

their abusive

husbands.

Consequently, depending on their sect, officially registered Syrian women would
have to abide by their respective discriminatory personal laws, making them
particularly vulnerable to inadequate protection measures from all sorts of abuse,
harassment, and exploitation due to their gender status of being second-class
residents. The fact is that preserving the family’s honor, and reputation is perceived
as the responsibility of the head of the household, typically a man. In Arab culture,
most men work the public space while women occupy the private sphere. 426
Therefore, it is only natural that Arab men consider that it is in their right to control
any public access of their female members of their family.
Meanwhile, landlords, security agents, faith-based officials, and community
members, among many others, have opportunities to take advantage of Syrian
women’s position of being either widowed or unmarried with no male guardians to
protect them.427 As for the ones who crossed the borders illegally, their status in the
country is compromised. Consequently, their insecurities are far worse. Without a
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residency permit, undocumented Syrians are threatened, potentially arrested with
no consideration of their gendered insecurities. According to the expert from Justice
without Borders, the Lebanese government’s social service providers and the police
do not provide immunity to illegal residents for immigration law violations. In that
respect, Syrian refugee women who attempt to file a complaint and prosecute those
accused of gender-based violence are subject to further abuse, harassment,
detention, and potential deportation.428
4.2 Citizenship Law
The newly established Ministry of Women’s Affairs, headed by a man named Jean
Ogasapian, announced that November 4 would become the National Women’s Day
in Lebanon.429 This date was chosen because on November 4th, 1952, Lebanese
women got the right to vote and give citizenship to their children, while their
legislative rights in Lebanon barely existed.430 However, as of 1960, Lebanon’s
xenophobic and misogynistic laws stripped women’s rights to give citizenship to
their children in the case they were married to a “Palestinian” foreigner. In fact, the
Lebanese Citizenship and Naturalization Law (1960) does not allow Lebanese
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women married to non-nationals to pass their citizenship to neither spouses nor
children. 431 Meanwhile, ad hoc official Lebanese executive orders scrambled to
provide the very same passports to non-disclosed male foreigners who have enough
status or funds to become Lebanese citizens. 432 Article 7 of the Lebanese
Constitution affirms gender equality and, in 1996, Lebanon also ratified the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW).433 Thus, on paper, Lebanon appears to be in a much more liberal and
progressive position than any other Arab country.
In December 2012, Lebanon’s Parliamentary Human Rights Committee
published a National Plan for Human Rights 2013–2019, which aims to reform its
laws and procedural measures to strengthen women’s rights and gender equality in
all fields and sectors.434 However, till this date, the plan is pending approval and
adoption by the majority of the Lebanese Parliament. 435 When looking closely,
Lebanon has registered reservations towards specific articles within CEDAW, such
as Article 9 regarding nationality, and Article 16 regarding marriage and family
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life, that are among others central to the object and purpose of the Convention. By
holding these reservations, Lebanon’s contestation of these provisions negatively
impacts CEDAW’s mission in advocating women’s basic rights “to ensure that
women and men have equal ability to acquire, change, and retain their nationality
and to confer their nationality to children and spouses.” 436 According to an
interview conducted with a representative of Justice Without Borders, a Lebanese
NGO that provides services to protect vulnerable women, including Syrian women
refugees; “early marriage in Lebanon is not a crime because it is not mentioned in
[Lebanon’s] personal status law; but early marriage is an indicator of trafficking.”
Additionally, “when we refer to the national laws, there is no clear definition about
what sexual violence is [...] There is no definition of what rape is […] Moreover,
when we talk about sexual violence in conflict, sexual violence could be
investigated as genocide or a crime against humanity, but most of it is not
mentioned [in Lebanese laws].”437
Moreover, the Lebanese government insisted that all disputes over the
interpretation or application of the Convention required prior approval of all
involved parties before any referrals to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).438
Accordingly, the concept of sovereignty remains essential, entitling a sovereign
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state such as Lebanon to exercise prima facie exclusive jurisdiction over its territory
and co-opt specific humanitarian measures and leave others behind. In that respect,
Syrian women residing in Lebanon face many challenges as a consequence of their
limited legal status. According to the official Lebanese birth registration procedures
for non-Lebanese, Syrian women with limited to illegal status cannot complete the
process of registering the births of their newborn babies without adopting a range
of risky coping mechanisms such as bribery, forgery, and identity theft. 442
According to the MoSA expert interviewee, “That is another big issue. […]There
is a sixstep process for them to be registered to have a paper from the UNHCR that
says that these children practically exist. Most of them are not registered yet, you
have many newborns that are not being added to the list we have, and this will
create a huge problem in the long term.”439 The interviewee’s statement echoed the
“Good Practice Paper” published by the UNHCR, according to which the process
usually involves several legal steps that usually involve paying fees, such as
hospital birth notification letter, an official state’s civil registry, or fines in case of
any delinquency or late registration. 440 Referring to the “Good Practice Paper,”
many Syrian parents are not well-informed or not capable of undergoing the whole
six-steps process, affecting in the long term their child’s eligibility to enroll in
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school or try to access other state services.441 Consequently, it would be extremely
challenging for any Syrian family to prove the identity of their newly born children
and provide accredited parental links when eventually returning to Syria through
official borders. Moreover, the MoSA expert reiterated that: “Unless the crisis ends.
People [Syrians] will not go back there, and these people [non-registered Syrian
children] do not exist,” making it a double tragedy.
4.3 Political Participation
Structural hierarchies exclude women have from the top and sensitive political and
judicial positions, such as the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Judicial
Council.442 Men occupy the highest positions of public administration. At the level
of the executive branch, there is a total absence of women ministers in Lebanon.443
One comprehensive strategy to address gender discrimination and promote gender
equality is to increase women’s political participation not because they can and
should have the opportunity to do whatever male politicians do, but because
excluding the voices outside of the gendered structural frameworks will produce
limited knowledge and harmful practices. 444 Research shows that only 3% of
Lebanon’s parliament members are female, most of whom are either the daughters,
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wives, or sisters of a renowned male politician. Their presence is the mere reflection
of the political parties of their male counterparts who are either dead, assassinated,
or cannot run for office themselves, the women legislators having little to no agency
in the decision-making process. In fact, none of the female politicians actively
ameliorated women’s legal position in Lebanon while serving on parliamentary
committees. The latest vow by the male Minister of Women’s Affairs was to
include a 30% quota for the last parliamentary election, a vow that tanked when
only six women out of the 128 members won the 2017 parliamentary elections.445
The slight increase in female political officials does not reveal a positive change in
the view of women’s role, abilities, and status within Lebanese society. In fact,
these female elites’ arrival to parliamentary seats can be considered consecration
of patriarchal electoral tradition rather than an indicator of transformation.446 The
six female voices elected are not only part of the existing patriarchal institutions,
but they also come from an elitist upper class, distinct from the vast majority of
Lebanese women whose experiences and insecurities differ in practice.
Consequently, their attention to fellow Syrian women residing in Lebanon can only
project their fellow male politicians’ homogenized stand towards the gendered
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burden that all Syrians pose, objectifying Syrian women refugees with
discriminatory practices.
5. Analytical Implications
This chapter provided the background of geopolitical and social attitudes toward
Syrian refugees by highlighting important critical junctures (the end of Lebanese
Civil War in 1990; the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005; the
start of the Syrian civil war in 2011; the Syrian refugee drastic influx in Lebanon
in 2014) in the Lebanese–Syrian relationship. This method builds from Lene
Hansen’s theoretical framework of exploring how and why specific issues,
refugeeism, and subjects, Syrians, are constructed as a security threat to Lebanon’s
survival, paving the way for local governmental agencies to prioritize exclusionary
ad hoc refugee policy practices that silence or even aggravate alternative threats
being faced. While exploring the official Lebanese sensitivities toward the term
“refugee,” and published attitudes toward Syrians residing in Lebanon, this section
analyzed the influence of Lebanese collective memory on the subjectivity of official
Lebanese statements and practices of constructing perceived Syrian security
threats. Even though several Sunni communities within Lebanon asymmetrically
welcomed fellow Syrians Sunnis within, this chapter highlighted the (en)gendered
concept of security through state sovereignty, where exclusionary practices—such
as visa restrictions and border control, no camp policy, and curfews and
checkpoints— explicitly and/or implicitly homogenize diverse groups of Syrians
as another form of occupying threat. Accordingly, the hostile sentiments and
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attitudes towards Syrian refugee (in)security, translated into a range of ad hoc
security mechanisms reproducing gender hierarchies and hegemonies between the
Syrian refugees and Lebanese communities asymmetrically.
It is imperative for this study to take into consideration the intersectional
power hierarchies and the way they asymmetrically (re)shape most Lebanese
sectarian communities' political, cultural, religious, socioeconomic, attitudes to
hosting Syrian refugees. The study finds that the predominantly Syrian refugees are
homogenized, perceived as one masculine sectarian and/or economic threat to a big
part of Lebanon’s public, troubling the confessional consociationalism system of
power-sharing that already breeds a lack of trust in the patriarchal relations that
persist in both Lebanese societies and the political realm.447 With the Sunni ISIS
faction threatening the northern Lebanese– Syrian border, the prospects of a
spillover effect across Lebanon increased, especially in Christian and Shiite areas.
In that respect, sectarianism plays an important role when exploring communities’
struggle with socio-economic degradation. The study finds that the densely
populated Sunni areas in Lebanon are subject to economic devastation and acute
radicalization and extremism.448 Most notably, in the heavily Sunni-populated Ain
el Helweh refugee camp in Sidon, terrorist cells mobilized and run by Bilal Badr,
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engaged in sporadic clashes with the Lebanese army and were involved in several
terrorist activities across the country.449 As a reaction to terrorist Sunni turbulence,
Lebanese Army Forces and General Security began issuing laws to evict and
relocate some informal settlements, prohibiting any camp formation without prior
official written consent.450
These types of practices, in turn, explain Lebanese measures leading to
justified

exceptional

mechanisms

of

Syrian

refugee

deterrence

with

counterproductive consequences. We find cases when Lebanese government
officials provided certain antagonistic non-Sunni Lebanese villages with buses to
gather the unwelcome Syrian illegal threats there, sending the “unwanted” back to
Syrian villages near the border to secure and preserve their communities’ sectarian
identity. 451 The Lebanese invisibility of the majority of the “unwanted” Syrians
women would generalize them all as a security threat requesting to send them all
back to the same country that they, not long ago, suffered from his prolonged
occupation of thirty years.
At the same time, gendered insecurities often involve an intimate interlinkage between the subject’s intersectional identity, which rarely (re)produces
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collective, selfcontained referential objects. 452 Even though Syrian women and
children’s identities and agencies disappear in public discourses under one abstract
number of a million and some Syrian intruders, posing a burden and threat to
Lebanon’s stability, Syrian women refugees are not isolated from all types of
structural and relational insecurities. In fact, systemic discrimination against
women in general within Lebanese polity create a double tragedy for the majority
of Syrian refugees (women). Those domestic regulations and security practices
possess a co-constitutive structural power of silencing and structurally objectifying
Syrian women’s insecurities. Due to the general perception that women hold a
peripheral role in crisis situations, legal and economic strife, gender-based violence
(GBV), and psychosocial scarring are some of the many insecurities that Syrian
refugee women endure and brave to survive their new realities, which will be
examined in Chapter V.
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V.

(EN)GENDERING LEBANON CRISIS RESPONSE PLAN(S)

This section explores the Lebanese government and UNHCR’s level of
coordination and cooperation in assessing and mediating the translation of refugee
(in)security norms within the country. Contextual dynamics, tension, and resistance
shape and are shaped by specific response plans between collaborating political
institutions with distinct visions and goals of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon.
According to Dennis Wiedman, culture is a changing dynamic process that
emanates from the various norms and values of interacting groups within a strategic
plan.453 When interactions are initiated, a management culture surfaces, stimulating
predictable practices that (in)directly impact stakeholders’ interests and
interactions. 454 Accordingly, a longitudinal cultural theme analysis

method

highlights the norms and values that shape interacting agencies with varying
interests competing over which policies are to be prioritized and how. A closer look
into the evolution of the crisis response plans broadens our knowledge of how
refugee management plans learn, adapt or adjust to new challenges and rapidly
changing

circumstances

that

force

the

incorporation,

translation,

and

transformation of response strategies and target populations. Based on this line of
thought, the cultural theme longitudinal analysis of the Lebanon Crisis Response
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Plan (LCRP) offers an empirical way of analyzing thematic changes within crisis
response plans that (in)directly affect refugee management practices in Lebanon.
Therefore, the chapter first looks at the general background of the creation and
evolution of the Syrian crisis response plans. Secondly, the chapter provides a
thematic qualitative analysis of the cultural themes and patterns of the LCRP
documents. It also highlights the evolution of specific cultural themes of the
deteriorating situation, while underlining response strategies for how to manage the
refugee crisis in Lebanon. Thirdly, the chapter analyzes the results of the
longitudinal changes, highlighting the various sites of norm constructions,
(re)definitions, and contestations.

455

Finally, the chapter evaluates the

“Operational,” “Continuous,” “Elaborated,” “Transforming,” “Diminishing,” and
“New” themes that emerged via the analysis. The cultural theme longitudinal
analysis of the LCRP thus demonstrates the centrality of power politics and cultural
influences in (re)shaping organizational culture change and crisis response plans.
1. General Background:
As elaborated in Chapter IV, 2014 saw a critical shift in the Lebanese paradigm, in
which an extreme form of politicization of what became a Syrian refugee crisis
enabled the Lebanese government and its organizations to push for specific
policies, prioritizing security programs over others. In the name of national security
and refugee protection, customized strategic plans emerged, setting a direction for
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crisis management. By theoretically devising shared objectives and responsibilities,
a Crisis Response Plan was first published on December 19, 2014 between the
Lebanese government and its international and national partners, providing a
general guide for the response to the Syrian refugee influx into Lebanon. However,
in practice, as one expert from the UNHCR stated, it is done with the government;
“ it is their plan.”456 The initial two-year plan—2015–2016 aimed at identifying a
range of short-term strategie and aid assistance to specific groups with targeted
approaches, while boosting stabilization in Lebanon. Due to the temporal and
spatial expansion of the Syrian crisis, rapid changes within the national and
international context pushed for a revised plan aiming to adapt and (en)gender new
local realities. Therefore, based on lessons learned, the initial LCRP laid the
groundwork of a new elaborated version in 2017.457
Both response plans aim to tackle challenges holistically by delivering
various intervention measures for reinforcing a humanitarian response and
stabilizing the refugee crisis. However, as the UNHCR expert stated:
“Initially, there was a plan devised that was a pure refugee response plan.
Obviously, [the] UN [was] taking the lead because of our mandate for
refugees[…]as the crisis unfolded or the impact of Lebanon unfolded, and that
numbers swelled, then the plan also became broader in scope, and it became the
LCRP in 2014 if I am not mistaken. So we have been really involved, you know,
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from the beginning, in the setup of it, in the conceptualization of it. From a refugee
response plan to a broader plan that tries to assist vulnerable Lebanese and tries to
build the institution and look at long term[..] Later on, as I said, it shifted. So, it
went from pure humanitarian, to also integrated components of resilience[..] So this
is why this year the LCRP is a four-year plan as well, to have a longer term in mind
you know?”458
According to this statement, when looking closely at the two versions of the
“same” crisis response plan, one would notice that the first was a short-phased twoyear plan (2015–2016), while the subsequent one is a medium four-year version
(2017–2020). In fact, the second edition articulates an expanded long-term
framework for assistance and partnerships that seek to ensure stabilization and
progress towards sustainable development strategies, while maintaining an
integrated humanitarian response through what is defined as “targeted assistance.”
Analyzing the major themes longitudinally in both LCRP documents yields
further insights into how strategic plans emerge, are elaborated, change, and are
transformed based on their original intentions, thus reflecting contextual
variances.459 It is crucial to note that both LCRPs constitute Lebanon’s part of a
greater 2015 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, better known as the “3RP” a
coherent regional strategy developed under the leadership of state authorities with
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support from the UN and NGOs with the aim of providing an effective and
coordinated response to the Syrian refugee crisis in the region. The 3RP process
produced an overarching plan for the coordination, monitoring, and evaluation
framework at a regional level of the immediate vulnerabilities and the mechanisms
to tackle humanitarian aid, protection, and assistance throughout the MENA region.
It focused primarily on Syria’s neighboring host countries affected by the
increasing refugee influx such as Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.
The Lebanese chapter of the 3RP grounded Lebanon’s levels of
commitment to the refugee protection regime. It determined, under the leadership
of the national government, all aspects of humanitarian assistance provided to the
most vulnerable groups who have been (in)directly affected by the plight of the
Syrian war in Lebanon. Moreover, it is set to support all forms of progress towards
sustainable long-term development plans and strategies, to alleviate human
suffering and improve the overall quality of life of the plan’s “beneficiaries.”460
Numerous cooperation agreements complement the LCRP, such as the UN
Strategic Framework, the World Bank Country Partnership, and the EU–Lebanon
Partnership among many. The LCRP is also aligned with the strategies of the
Lebanese government to be “neither a country of asylum nor a final destination for
refugees, let alone a country of resettlement.”461 At the same time, the LCRP seems
to also be in compliance with the United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF),
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which provides the overall vision of the UN’s engagement within Lebanese
territories.462
Both LCRP versions delineate the interplay and limbo between state-centric
policy interests and international humanitarian values and principles. This latter
could be best illustrated by looking into the LCRP vocabulary, as according to the
UN, the forced migrants from Syria, characterized as “refugees,” are eligible to
enjoy international protective measures. However, the Lebanese government
identifies all Syrian citizens who entered Lebanon after March 2011 as temporarily
“displaced” individuals who must be subjected to Lebanese sovereign laws and
jurisdiction. As a result, the LCRP has identified all people who have fled Syria
and are unable to return as either “displaced Syrians,” “persons displaced from
Syria” or “persons registered as de facto refugees by UNHCR.”463
The fact that the LCRP does not recognize these masses as refugees with
universally acknowledged rights exposes the gendered power struggle between the
national government and the UNHCR in the clash of interests in deciding on legal
status terminologies. Lebanese authorities discriminatorily label Syrians as
“displaced” in an attempt to shield Lebanon from any potential obligations and
responsibilities towards these homogenized refugee communities. In contrast, the
UNHCR, with limited authority over domestic decisions, kept the categorical label
of a “person registered as a refugee” in order to fit its humanitarian programs.
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LCRP 2015–2016

LCRP 2017–2020

Figure 6. Comparative Figure of Both LCRPs’ Response Strategies

According to the comparative figure above, the tension is also apparent in LCRP’s
strategy as it encompasses diverse local vulnerable groups apart from the Syrian
refugee communities. In fact, the first LCRP version included both 1.5 million
“vulnerable Lebanese” and 1.5 million “displaced Syrians”, attempting to expand
the targeted vulnerable population in a 50–50 approach to burden sharing. 464
However, as highlighted in the figure above, the Lebanese decision-making
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authorities imposed an organizational change to the original UNHCR mandate by
including a wider range of “vulnerable populations” in the second version. This
vague grouping of vulnerable population could cover other vulnerable groups of
Iraqis, Somalis, and most importantly, the poor government estimate of 300,000
pre-existing Palestine refugees residing in Lebanon. 465 Still, a recent “National
Population and Housing Census of Palestinian Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon
2017” estimates the real number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is less of half
of what Lebanese authorities claim.466 This vagueness of aid policy requests creates
room for opportunistic divergent political groups to emphasize specific agendas and
numbers of people, having no direct connection with the Syrian refugee crisis,
making the most of the gendered “vulnerable populations” under the umbrella of
humanitarian aid.
The 2015 version of the LCRP was a comprehensive response plan
comprised of 77 various national and international organizations set to “respond to
the specific needs of Lebanon and vulnerable populations” while the conflict in
Syria continues.467 Based on Figure above, the 2015–16 LCRP’s objective can be
summarized into three main objectives: firstly, “ensure humanitarian assistance and
protection” for displaced Syrians and vulnerable Lebanese constituents. Secondly,

465

Ibid, 11, 48.

Monika Borgmann and Lokman Slim, “Fewer Refugees More Refugeeism,” UMAM D&R Documentation
and Research. (2018), https://umam-dr.org/en/home/projects/14/advance-contents/188/fewer-refugees-morerefugeeism.
466

467

Government of Lebanon and UNHCR, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015–2016 (2015), 5.

195

“strengthen the capacities of national and local delivering systems.” 468 Thirdly,
reinforce national socio-economic, institutional stability.
By the end of 2016, the gradual worsening of opportunities for livelihood,
the increased indebtedness and exacerbated negative coping mechanisms, as well
as the continuation of the humanitarian situation for the refugee population,
demanded the LCRP proposal in 2017 to further elaborate refugee security
measures into four strategic objectives with the partnership of now 104 UN and
NGO partners.469 First, the second plan’s goal became to ensure the protection of
the now “vulnerable populations’” access to laws and regulations, while
anticipating the displaced from Syria’s repatriation as a durable solution once the
conditions allow for a safe return. Second, the LCRP 2017–2020 targeted
immediate aid assistance to vulnerable populations living in substandard dwellings.
Third, it aimed to support service provision by empowering national systems to
provide adequate water, hygiene, health care, energy, and child education among
many.470 Fourth, it planned for the reinforcement of Lebanon’s economic, social,
and environmental stability that would expand livelihood opportunities and local
resilience. These changes, even if subtle, show the complex dynamics between
different agentic norm-entrepreneurs who were able to elaborate a short-term plan
that had a relatively limited role and objectives to a more mature version with a
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broader and more sustainable focus. It is this change that the following section
focuses on, as it happened throughout two years and was affected by many dynamic
factors.
2. Longitudinal Cultural Theme Analysis Results
For discussion purposes, the results of this research are displayed in two
consecutive and interrelated sections. The content longitudinal theme analysis
constitutes the first part of this section to reflect and compare the frequently used
themes in the two time periods. However, producing a quantitative analysis of
qualitative data, coded into explicit categories, tends to rely upon reductionism as
it reduces the irreducibly complex constitutive mechanisms and their relationships.
Subsequently, the second part of this chapter goes more in-depth by triangulating
the findings within both plans with complementing evidence from primary news
sources and expert interviews in order to develop a deeper understanding of the
longitudinal theme analysis and situate relevant changes within contextual
dynamics.
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2.1 Content Analysis.

Figure 7. Cover images of Lebanon Crisis Response Plans

At first sight, the LCRP versions seem similar, tightly focused on proposing
humanitarian assistance and protection to vulnerable populations, while at the same
time targeting support for the Lebanese government in order to mitigate the effects
of the Syria crisis. From the above cover images of the Lebanese Crisis Response
Plans, we find both images of hope and resilience with no Syrian man present.
Interestingly, these visual techniques do not portray the typical powerless,
voiceless, helpless Syrian women and children as objects of humanitarian
compassion that counterintuitively humiliate refugees but mobilize public support
and gather more funds. Still, both feminization of women and children plays a vital
role in the dialogical representation of Syrian refugees, where women and children
are perceived as a lesser threat than the absent men, who are still under the scrutiny
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of being an imminent menace and less likely to entice funds. Both images seem to
silence the diversity within the “vulnerable populations” they aim to target.
Moreover, the images that both plans portray do not help the targeted
audience to understand the Syrian refugee crisis situation to respond closely. The
Syrian situation in Lebanon is far from one child opening his arms in what looks
like a classroom, nor two stereotyped women who seem to be comfortable, depicted
as doctor and patient in what seems to be an safe indoor setting. The million and
some Syrians residing in Lebanon challenge this view of a helpless child requesting
a hug, or an optimistic woman working on a fellow woman in the field of medicine.
In reality, most Syrians present in Lebanon and “vulnerable populations” are far
from these portrayals. We find that the majority of Syrian children do not attend
school, forced either to beg on the street or work in fields not by choice but to help
their families pay rent and make ends meet. In addition, Syrian women are still
legally unable to practice work, perhaps braving the huge risks of escaping Syria
and oppressions in a neighboring country that come in every way, shape, or form.
This visual construction contributes to the myth of a refugee identity, in which
female refugees and children are portrayed as innocent, whereas men are absent,
losing their identity status as productive members of the Lebanese community.
On another note, the exploratory coding phase, which focused on a word
frequency query, enriches the study, through recording recurrent terms in both
documents separately, highlighting the main common themes. This exploratory
approach provides a visual comparison of the two texts. Such coding produced
word clouds that portray, through quantitative ranking, the major themes within the
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treated document. In this respect, Figure 8 shows the word-cloud comparison of the
2015–2016 and 2017–2020 LCRP documents, in which the most frequent words
are highlighted in the middle of the figure with larger fonts. From the first read, one
notices that there is no considerable change in the organizational themes of both
LCRPs. In both plans, the most frequent word was “Lebanon” with one hundred
and seventy-two occurrences in the 2015–2016 plan versus ninety-three in 2017–
2020. Nevertheless, when looking closely, the major secondary themes within each
cloud seem to differ in context slightly.
2015–2016

2017–2020

Figure 8. Word cloud comparison of most frequent words

In general, the top ten most frequent words in the 2015–2016 plan were “Lebanon,”
“Lebanese,” “Response,” “Government,” “LCRP,” “Support,” “Syria,” “Crisis,”
“National,” and “Vulnerable.” In the 2017–2020 LCRP document, the top ten most
frequent words were “Lebanon,” “LCRP,” “Displaced,” “Vulnerable,” “Response,”
“Lebanese,” “Needs,” “Syria,” “Crisis,” and “Humanitarian.” A meaningful phrase
from the top mentioned words would be “Lebanon Crisis Response Plan”
mentioned in both documents.
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Meanwhile, the word “refugee” diminished in count in the second version
of the LCRP from fifty-four occurrences to thirty-three in the 2017–2020 crisis
response plan. This decrease could be explained by the shift in the local perception
of Syrians residing in Lebanon from “displaced”471 individuals who would soon go
back to Syria—to long-term burden of “temporarily displaced individuals” 472
whose residence remains unclear— pressuring local emphasis on Syrians being
“temporary displaced” in the second plan rather than long-term de facto refugees.
The domestic wariness of Syrians becoming permanently resettled in Lebanon,
fully integrated into Lebanese communities as potentially naturalized Lebanese
citizens, pushed Lebanese authorities to increase its call for the viability of Syrians
residents to return to “safe zones” within their homeland.473 The general resentment
towards the Syrian presence in Lebanon would thus explain the official Lebanese
calls for returning Syrian refugees to “safe zones” in Syria, even before a final
political settlement is reached to end the civil war there. 474 These official calls
would justify a critical shift within the unequal power dynamics between both
organizations.
Accordingly, the qualitative comparison of both crisis response plans
provided subtle but interesting variations that highlighted the shift in response
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prioritizations. In the case below, Lebanon made a slight but major change between
both plans that would tremendously diminish its commitment to international
refugee law. Instead, this small change boosted its sovereign right to regulate the
Syrian presence within the country according to its domestic laws and regulations.
The qualitative comparison shows that in the 2015 LCRP document Lebanon
“considers that it is being subject to a situation of mass influx and reserves the right
to take measures aligning with international law and practice in such situations.”475
On the other hand, the 2017 LCRP document bears no mention of any alignment
with international law nor its practice. Instead, Lebanon reinforced its sovereign
right to (en)gender the legal status of Syrians residing within the country by
considering that “it is subject to a situation of mass influx. It refers to individuals
who fled from Syria into its territory after March 2011 as temporarily displaced
individuals and reserves its sovereign right to determine their status according to
Lebanese laws and regulations.”476 This small but impactful claim increases the
Lebanese government’s upper hand in controlling the major issues in crisis
response plan having legal impunity in discriminating the status of residing Syrian.
Subsequently, this claim would further complicate the UNHCR’s mandate to
adequately protecting and assisting what they see as an obvious case of de facto
refugees. Also, the volatile nature of international and regional politics enticed this
unreceptive Lebanese handling to the now magnified Syrian presence, making
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room for aggressive gendered behavior towards any unlawful incident that would
involve Syrians residing in the country.477 As mentioned in the previous chapter,
legal status is of the utmost importance to Syrians residing in Lebanon. Having their
legal status stripped Syrian de facto refugees are subject to harassment, arrest, and
potential deportation amongst many other issues.
Meanwhile, during the expert interview with the UNHCR, one of the two
interviewees explained the LCRP funding mechanism stating that:
“Once the 2.75-billion-dollar appeal is made, there is no centralized bank
account where that money comes in. We do not have a separate bank account that
then gets it dispersed to sectors are partners. We say this is the amount we are asking
for, that is broken down per sector of course, but then it is up to the agencies who
have expressed an interest in being part of the implementation phase, they have to
fundraise to donors, so that is also different. So there is no pool funding mechanism
that gears the money, and then a centralized money system that then gets dispersed
into sectors. So that is also the difference with other operations.”478 That same
expert added that:
“the 104 partners that this year said they want to be a part of the LCRP have to go
with what they can.[..] They go and fundraise for whatever part they can contribute
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according to the strategy they made together [..] But not controlled by us, because
they go bilaterally to donors.”
According to this expert, the lack of fund oversight and pledge enforcement
measures are not monitored by the UNHCR, fueling a massive funding gap and
engendering limited commitment from the Lebanese government’s side. 479 The
lack of coordination and local efforts in alleviating Syrian refugees’ suffering
within the country hindered international financial commitment towards Lebanon’s
crisis, creating a serious case of donor fatigue.480 Also, the minimal transnational
efforts of relocating Syrian refugees out of Lebanon further increased local
suffering with billions of dollars in funding shortfall occurring. 481 The MoSA
expert interviewee reiterated that:
“Now that you have donor fatigue, we know all the resources are scarce so
practically we will not be expecting to receive more funds than we have ever
received so far, it is all going in totally different directions, so we have to manage
in a better way which will allow us to have more resilience towards the response of
the crisis and to shift from the mindset of crisis response towards more of a
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developmental response in order to have longterm approach not just acting based
on the crisis.”482
Obviously, the Ministry expert’s call for a shift in approach is premature. For a
country facing socio-economic collapse with an ongoing refugee crisis, donors not
honoring their pledges toward the LCRP would provoke severe instability to the
continually vulnerable targets who are still in need of the necessary assistance.
Consequently, increasing local hostility towards most Syrians residing there would
(re)produce a vicious cycle of socio-economic unrest.483 Thus, the study shows that
the second version of the LCRP incorporated increasing calls for international
support and aid appeals, which can be seen in the table below, in order to manage
the new realities. As such, the table bellow summarizes the published figures and
numbers by both LCRP documents, per sector—of the appealing partners, the
financial requirements, the target population, as well as the gender markers— in
order to better trace the changes between both plans.
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Table 2. Comparative Table of the 2015–2016 & 2017–2020 Appealing Partners in
Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 484

According to above table, there are two trends: the first one is the overall increase
in aid appeals and appealing partners, while the second is the slight decrease oin
people targeted. Still, when looking closely, there are certain sectors in which the
aid requirements and targeted groups diminished. The fields of protection and
shelter mostly decreased in both funding required and people in need, due to the
decrease in the overall number of Syrians legally registered as de facto refugees.
Consequently, policy plans about terrorist-threat prevention, mainly due to
geopolitics and lack of border control, shifted to sustainable initiatives, such as
increasing assistance, livelihood, health, and education for residing Syrians post2015. Meanwhile, even though funding and the number of targeted people
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decreased, we find that the protection sector witnessed a dramatic increase from 33
in the LCRP 2015–2016 to 61 appealing agencies in the LCRP 2017–2020.
Interestingly, even though the targeted population and investment requirements
do not reflect that increase, the protection sector gained attention and diversified,
doubling the number of partner agencies and becoming one of the main four
response strategies within the LCRP 2017–2020. Meanwhile, surprisingly, the
appeals decreased from 183 million USD to 163.8 million USD. The amount
needed to provide basic rights and access to services in the 2015–2016 plan was
54.4 million USD, while, in the 2017–2020 LCRP document, the number decreased
to 31 million USD. Likewise, child protection from violence also witnessed a
decrease in aid requirements from 43.4 million USD to 32.1 million USD.485 In the
meantime, the social stability sector dramatically rose from 27 appealing agencies
to 51. Also, the livelihood sector went up from 27 agencies to 47, reflecting the
long-term investment in sustainable development programs. The health sector
witnessed a rise in aid appeal, reflecting an increase in partner organizations from
24 to 43, even when the targeted groups decreased from 2,040,00 to 1,535,297
people. Lastly, basic assistance went up from 29 to 42, doubling the aid
requirements from 288.60 to 571.50 million USD.
In one interview conducted with a GBV expert at the UNHCR, the interviewee
stated that:
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“Each sector has as a gender marker. So, any code that is attributed to the sector
is based on the international gender marker scoring that indicates to which level
the sector is integrating gender analysis and responses that are gender oriented
in the plan. So, there is a process, not just aesthetics or cosmetics either way.
What happens is that in the planning process, we normally establish a pool of
experts, normally this pool is mostly composed of people that are part of the
GBV task force and have a gender background.”486
According to this expert, the alterations of gender markers within the LCRP
documents are the material interpretation, cultural expression, and written evidence
of change in guiding future crisis response. With a gender marker included in both
plans, it is crucial to note that this critical tool does not only score humanitarian
projects on whether they provide enough aid and suport to different groups of men,
women, girls, and boys with sustainable outcomes. 487 It also tracks the level of
funding they are getting allocated and if they actually promote greater reflection on
gender issues and projects. Generally, during any project design, gender specialists
from the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) support each sector team to
code their cluster’s projects.488 They would then “explore and gain an appreciation
of how to integrate gender issues well in their projects.” 489 Theoretically, this
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technique would, therefore, benefit from all the feedback they can use to improve
each sector’s operational plan, implementation and monitoring system. Usually, the
IASC provides three markers as a way to strengthen gender-sensitive humanitarian
assistance.490 However, according to the UNHCR’s SGBV coordinator:
“We do not have like in Jordan a gender expert in Lebanon, but we have [an]
SGBV task force which is acting for this role […] What we currently have is
partially related to gender but more focusing on the GBV. So, Lebanon is one of
the countries that is being prioritized for the IASC, the role out of the interagency
study committee GBV guidance released back in 2015 which will further enhance
the inclusion of risk mitigation measures when it comes to GBV. So, it is a part of
the overall gender coverage. It is not fully in terms of gender equality yet, but it
covers one aspect of this.”
This latter could be seen as one example of how the gender mainstreaming effort,
beyond Sexual Gender Based Violence, is not a priority in all ten response sectors
of the humanitarian crisis management mission in Lebanon. For the sake of a
practical solution, there seems to be a tendency to dismiss or underestimate gender
discrimination and inequality, deprioritizing them as secondary issues that do not
require urgent attention but instead fall under future development or socialempowerment projects.
As for the gender marking process, the interviewee followed up by saying:
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“What we do is that we work closely with the sectors and the sector-leads. We first
discuss with them what are some of the components that they need to reflect their
own strategy to make sure that assessments’ design, implementation, and reporting
are gender oriented and reflect the different dimensions when it comes to women,
girls, men, and boys. So, there is the first phase of support and revision of the
chapters of the LCRP; including strategy indicators reporting everything. So, we
do a thorough revision and then based on that we assign a score. Now what happens
is that clearly gender is mainstreamed through the sectors. Sectors differ in nature;
in the way they apply their targeting and in the way they apply criteria. There is a
difference between basic assistance and shelter. However, all of those have
included some gender mainstreaming. So, each sector, in addition to being revised,
the strategy gets evaluated from a gender perspective. There are also components,
mentioned explicitly in the different mainstreaming efforts, we apply for gender
visibility, where they have to explain how concretely they will proceed. We do try
to have it not as a standard policy to say. We will look at the different needs, but
we do try to reflect that concretely into their own strategies. So, if we know they
are selecting a beneficiary through a certain process we would refer to this process
and see how it would integrate[..] Establishing the gender marker in the plan
formulation phase would be utmost efficient for all parties to question and learn
what each initiative comprises of. Also, when all parties review the operations per
sectors at the end of each year, the gender marker tool would provide further
insights into how to better manage each sector in the next cycle.”
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This detailed account of how gender markers come to be established within
each sector helps this study understand how and why each marker was given. In
that respect, the first marker “0” does not reflect any component of the sector
response plan. This would mean that the plan risks the unintentional deepening of
existing gender inequalities. As for the second marker “1,” it includes a gender
analysis of identifying the targeted beneficiaries. This would lead to the third
marker “2a” of creating gender-responsive activities, which paves the way to the
fourth marker “2b” of gender-sensitive outcomes that address diverse needs of
vulnerable groups while advancing gender equality. 491 What was coded in the
LCRP 2015–2016 as the gender marker “1” meant that only one of the three
components was met, making a limited contribution to gender equality.
Meanwhile, the “2a” gender marker signifies that a significant step forward was
made in including gender analysis in the project’s design and some of its activities,
creating one or more gender mainstreamed outcomes. Still, the third gender marker
“2b” was absent from both plans’ evaluations, concluded by the relevant
authorities’ examination, which means that neither plan advances gender equality
nor build gender‐specific services. In fact, according to the codes assigned in the
gender marker, none of the LCRP policies involved reaches the gender inclusivity
required for their successful implementation.
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The comparative table above shows that some improvements were evident
in the gender marker analysis or design within most sectors, considering the specific
needs of women, girls, boys, and men, especially in SGBV prevention and response
services. Positively enough, we find that most response efforts slightly increased
their gender marker, showing improvement in including gender-sensitive response
initiatives, except in one important sector: “Shelter.” Looking closely, the LCRP
2015–2016 document had the shelter sector rated at “2a”, while in the 2017–2020
plan, it dropped to 0. This sharp drop should cause serious alarm for an external
viewer who is contemplating funding the crisis response plan in general, and the
shelter sector specifically. The only reasonable justification that could be given here
is that the collaborating agencies did not properly assess this sector or “shelter” was
not a priority that was sought anymore. Still, the LCRP document clearly states in
the need assessment section for this sector that only 40% of the targeted funds were
allocated to the shelter assistance, where “only 27 percent of the sector targets
outside informal settlements were disproportionately reached.” 492 Accordingly,
almost 30% of female-headed households, compared to 15% of male-headed
households, are forced to live in “non-residential spaces, such as garages or
workshops, or in temporary, makeshift shelters” that are below standard,
structurally dangerous, not appropriate for living conditions, and “inadequate
especially for women and girls.”493 This critical example shows the complexity of
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the sector’s response approach in which some sectors gain more attention to
improving the needs and capacities of women, girls, men, and boys, than others
deemed as necessary, such as shelter.
All in all, even with the few improvements that have been made, the study
still shows that a gender-based analysis was not a priority feature to determine the
needs of the different vulnerable groups that the LCRP 2017–2020 document
sought to identify. Both plans fell short when prescribing adequate solutions, while
continuously stereotyping women as victims, denying their agency. Recognizing
the diversity among the vulnerable populations is imperative and needs further
exploration. However, it seems that the plans’ primary crisis response is still
discriminatory, for neither plans seem to focus on advancing gender equality nor
target women, girls, boys, and men according to their specific needs.
Still, one should not disregard the sporadic moments when gender
differences were clearly acknowledged and targeted groups were clearly described,
such as in the case of the protection sector that gained more attention than the
shelter sector. Not surprisingly, both sectors’ lead at that time in the government’s
Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) was
Dr. Aimee Karam, who holds a doctorate specialized in criminal justice from
Walden University, and is currently working as a Child Protection Specialist at
UNICEF Beirut.494 Still, even if having a leader in the ministry knowledgeable in
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gender inclusive urban planning or other related fields, the level of commitment to
enhancing gender inclusive response plans could not threaten preexisting system of
oppressions established within
Lebanon’s confessional system. As seen in the previous chapter, women in
Lebanon are expected to have a lesser status than their male counterparts. These
women are objectified, heavily marginalized due to intersectional structural
inequalities and a discriminatory legal system. That is why genuine gender
mainstreaming efforts would take the back seat, depoliticized as administrative,
long-term development goals that do not require imminent efforts.
On the one hand, the benevolent state’s sole responsibility is to tolerate the
problematic “temporary displaced individuals” and grant them securitized
conditional asylum. On the other hand, non-governmental partners and altruistic
aid-workers reinforce a false gender identity, in their “Needs Overview” section.
The study shows that this latter’ depiction of a feminized de facto refugee
population as oppressed victims with no agency in “need of rescue, protection,
assistance, activation, and reform”495 through humanitarian protection, assistance,
and aid are mostly aimed at acquiring more funds rather than considering these
individuals’ complex dilemmas as serious issues that need to be tackled instantly
through a crisis response plan.
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While the LCRP commends the amelioration of the policy initiatives within
its sustainable development programs, this enhancement is valued but still
considered insufficient, not prioritizing enough the need to address gender
inequality with clear-cut synergies. While a reasonable goal is to protect most
Syrians residing in Lebanon, women, and girls are still disproportionately burdened
by restricted access to legal, adequate, and affordable services. In many instances,
the LCRP mechanisms that seek to promote de facto Syrian refugees’ livelihood
goals seem to undermine the gendered barriers to women’s employment within the
legally approved fields of construction, agribusiness, and sanitation. Consequently,
using such approach without tackling the system gender hierarchies within
Lebanese polities ends up (in)directly denying Syrian women refugees the
fundamental right to find a decent job to procure food, water, and most importantly
safety to live in a safe house and feel relatively protected. Given the Lebanese
context, the cultural and legal discrimination against women working in mostly
remote far from any form of palpable security or highly dense public spaces, high
interaction with hostile Lebanese communities impedes their safety from any type
of violence, such as sexual abuse, harassment, and exploitation. Most construction
work and agribusiness jobs happen in inaccessible areas with a large number of
men working in the fields. While cultural barriers impede women from working in
sanitation labor, the traditionally all-male staff occupies this line of work that deals
with corrupt waste management personnel and harmful and irritated Lebanese
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residents. 496 In the meantime, the UNHCR practices seem stuck between the
tendencies of developing and modernizing the perceived “backward” refugee
society by calling for more livelihood initiatives, while, at the same time, no
tangible initiative has been shown from their part to redress the harmful state laws
and practices that challenge Syrian women’s fundamental rights. Accordingly,
Syrian female heads of households were forced to adapt and work, mostly
informally, in domestic service (22%) and agricultural labor (55%), while many
others ventured to work in small service businesses, such as clothing stores and
restaurants, to provide for their families. 497 These types of jobs are typically
informal, leaving the majority of Syrian female-headed households economically
challenged.
Consequently, without a gender-sensitive approach, these Syrian women
are further marginalized, vulnerable to all types of violence due to a gendered crisis
response plan that only allows three male-dominated low-income industries—
construction, sanitation, and agribusiness and are destined to fail the majority of
Syrian refugees women in providing sustainable refugee protection and livelihood.
In effect, how both policy plans addressed the Syrian crisis in Lebanon had
profound implications for who benefits from the livelihood programs and who
suffers from the lack of gender commitment.
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Meanwhile, the study’s gender marker analysis demonstrates how gender
equality initiatives were mostly used as lip service in a “Needs Overview” section
with no power or concrete measures included to address the gendered asymmetries
in Syrian refugee situations, (re)producing global hierarchies. As what the Abaad
expert stated, the LCRP at the end is a funding appeal. The main target is donors.
Accordingly,
“Gender is mainly addressed through the protection sector, but whenever we are
doing the plan, like when we are doing each sector, we always have a gender
marker. We have what we call the cross-cutting issues, and among those crosscutting issues you have visibility, gender, and I think, maybe, there was
environment or another one.”498
The portrayal of a vulnerable de facto refugee community narrowly focuses on
the utility perspective of gender mainstreaming in garnering international support
and funds.499 The study shows that the LCRP efforts to empower Syrian women
and eradicate genderbased violence get complicated under the tradition of the
feminized long-term development of women’s issues. Without an all-encompassing
gender-sensitive livelihood approach these Syrian women are silenced, part of a
category of “male” job-seeking Syrian “temporary displaced individuals” who can
legally work in only one of three fields: construction, agribusiness, and sanitation.
So, the humanitarian crisis response plan failed to address the majority of the
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Syrian refugee women’s insecurities, disregarding the discriminations of the
Lebanese patriarchal culture that isolates gender violence under the
traditions of feminized “women’s issues.” 500
For instance, one case, in April 2016, that caught my attention when
proposing this dissertation topic to my committee and shocked Lebanon with an
unprecedented scandal, highlighting one of many realities of GBV, was the mediaexposed major prostitution and human trafficking rings operating in the country.501
In fact, one of these rings was found to have enslaved hundreds of Syrian women
for periods of months, and even years, since the onset of the refugee crisis in
2011. 502 What initially seemed to be a single prostitution ring turned out to be
multiple rings, involving hundreds of helpless female victims that had been lured,
captured and held against their will at several touristi locations.503 Within weeks,
several arrests took place, and traffickers and brothel owners, such as in the case of
Maurice Geagea, were placed in custody, just to be discharged a few months later.504
Despite allegations to the contrary, these human trafficking and prostitution rings
enjoyed protection from corrupt politicians and security officers, which allowed
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them to escape extreme punitive measures they deserve under the rule of law. When
Chez Maurice nightclub was raided, the owner Maurice Haddad already had
criminal charges for trafficking women into forced prostitution. The police knew
of his criminal background but left him free. 505 The investigations and media
coverage even stopped with the arrest of significant ring operators, failing to
address the structural, legal and cultural factors that had permitted the perpetuation
of such crimes in the first place.
Several observations are highly relevant in this context. First, all the female
victims enslaved and exploited by these rings were Syrian girls and women, with a
considerable number of them being under the age of 18 when they were first
subjected to this systemic exploitation. 506 Second, these women fell for human
trafficking and prostitution rings in the context of an armed conflict in their country,
but the humanitarian regime failed to protect them adequately. They were, in fact,
victimized in a neighboring country where they were supposed to enjoy a minimal
degree of protection in accordance with international and domestic laws. Third,
several hundred of the women who were exploited by these rings were reluctant to
seek protection from any state agent or humanitarian agency, even though the
mechanisms that protect women against these atrocities were widely publicized.507
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According to The Guardian interview with Rama, a 24-year-old Syrian sex
trafficked woman who escaped with other captives from a local Lebanese brothel
where they were held hostage, the deficiencies in Lebanon’s human trafficking law
co-exist with an already discriminatory prostitution law in the penal code, which
treats female victims in prostitution rings as equivalent to their traffickers. Rama, a
Syrian woman and a survivor of GBV, initially lost faith in her country when she
crossed over to Lebanon. Once in the host country, she then claims to have lost
faith in everyone, as she was forced to “have sex on average ten times a day and
[was] imprisoned in a decrepit house without even a glimpse of sunlight.” 508 The
case of Rama is a good example of how resilient Syrian women survivors were
pushed to seek protection under informal networks as they had to go to local offices
such as Hezbollah’s , a Lebanese paramilitary, and dubious political organizations,
rather than reaching out to the police or a renown humanitarian agency.509
Still, the shocking exposure of the prostitution rings did not significantly
result to alleviating the insecurities that the majority of Syrian women residing in
Lebanon face daily. On the contrary, official and non-official statements in the
mainstream media and social media mainly focused on condemning the criminal
acts, sometimes even faulting the victims for being in that position. Various
statements highlighted the fact that Lebanon, as a state and as a nation, was treating
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Syrian refugees in accordance with international standards despite the great burden
of hosting a massive population of Syrian refugees.510 The entire issue of women’s
refugee rights and suffering was almost forgotten within weeks after exposing the
prostitution rings. In the meantime, the UNHCR condemned such actions, stated
that the LCRP plans provide a mechanism for Syrian women survivors to seek posttrauma emergency and life-saving services including medical services, as well as
psychosocial, legal, shelter and livelihood support services.
On another note, two visual representations of project maps of the major
themes within the LCRP 2015–2016 and 2017–2020 generated by the study are
featured below, representing the thematic connections between the different
initiatives, targeted groups, and designated targeted approaches in managing the
Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon.

“The 2015–16 Lebanon Crisis
http://www.alnap.org/resource/20702,
510
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Plan.”

UNHCR,

(December

15,

2014),

Figure 9. Crisis Response Plan Project Map

In the above Figure, the visual description of Code Mapping provides an overall
image of thematical labels that emerged from comparing and sorting the main
themes that I discovered within both LCRP documents. The figure documents how
a list of selected codes get categorized and interconnect with each other throughout
both documents, conceptualizing throughout the content analysis a complex web of
interconnected networks. The simple nodes that are not encircled in the center
represent the decreed LCRP response strategies to the current refugee crisis that
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Lebanon is facing. The nodes streaked and encircled in red represent the targeted
groups that the response plans mentioned across the documents and focus on when
proposing ways to respond to the refugee crisis in Lebanon. The nodes encircled in
blue represent the type of approaches that the plans stated that they concentrated
their efforts on. As for the arrows that flow from one node to another, they represent
the thematic connections drawn between different response strategies towards the
mentioned targeted groups and approaches. Those connections provide a visual
understanding of both plans’ focus when strategizing Syrian refugee management.
In fact, the arrows provide a visualization of the degree of attention each targeted
group got from the sectoral strategies that are supposed to materialize within the
respective humanitarian assistance period.
Meanwhile, the below Figure depicts the refugee insecurities project map
that both LCRP documents highlight in order to solicit support.
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Figure 10. Refugee Insecurities Project Map

Based on both crisis response plans, the nodes in the map above visualize a network
diagram of the overall refugee insecurities experienced in Lebanon. The automated
network mapping illustrates performance degradation of deep insecurities and
declared anxieties, creating a complex image of co-constructing local experiences
that Syrian forced migration seems to have exacerbated in the Lebanese context.
For the sake of a clearer visualization, the arrows do not represent a linear causeeffect type of image. As in practice, the different nodes are interconnected and
affect each other in an interplay of self-reinforcing and co-dependent insecurities
that the underprivileged but resilient people in Lebanon are facing through mostly
negative coping strategies.
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2.2 Cultural Theme Longitudinal Analysis
The 2015–16 LCRP was formulated to tackle the sudden influx of Syrians that
Lebanon witnessed after five years of the Syrian crisis. According to LCRP
estimates, as of October 2015, Lebanon was hosting over 1.5 million Syrian
refugees, from which approximately 1.07 million were recognized and registered
by the UNHCR. The plan also declared that it hosted around 42,000 Palestinian
refugees from Syria, 270,000 pre-existing Palestinian refugees, and 35,000
Lebanese returning from Syria.511 This latter implies that by 2015, the population
of Lebanon rose by 37 percent thereby resulting in one out of every three people in
Lebanon being a Syrian.518 For that reason, the 2015–2016 LCRP aimed at
controlling the refugee crisis by coming up with ways to eliminate challenges
facing both the local population and refugees. In the meantime, the increasing
number of displaced individuals from Syria to Lebanon amplified local
vulnerabilities. 512 While the international contributions were not sustainable
enough—given that they only met half of the required funding—Lebanon
witnessed an increase in Syrian refugees reliant on humanitarian assistance.513
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3. Triangulation of Themes with Additional Evidence
The following is a table that outlines the continuation, diminishment,
transformation, and change of themes between both LCRP documents.
Table 3. Longitudinal Analysis of Major Cultural Themes From 2015 to 2017
Operational Themes: Structures and personnel required for proper functioning of Plan
National leadership: Supporting national leadership and ownership of the response
Partnership & Coordination: Mechanisms to coordinate and help systematize assessment processes
between different humanitarian partners and also to harmonize data collection and visualization tools.
Transparency and Accountability: Promote transparency and accountability
Monitoring & Evaluation: Reinforced and objective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is critical to
improving effectiveness and accountability
Track Funding: Improve tracking of funds
Energy: Increasing the level and quality of electricity supply
Continuous Themes: Clearly and consistently articulated
International Support & Financing the LCRP: Initiatives funded by the wider international community
& donors
Refugee (In)securities: Deteriorating environmental, socio-economic, health, water, sanitation, and
electric capacities
Negative coping Strategies: Resorting to unsustainable and damaging coping mechanisms
Public services: Equitable access to and quality of sustainable public services
Elaborated Themes: Detailed and specific with similar words and meanings
Protection: Aims to strengthen protection services and interventions
Vulnerable communities: The most vulnerable and deprived parts of the country
Livelihood Opportunities: Improve living conditions through job creation, increase market-based skills
training and employability, apprenticeships, income-generation opportunities
Agribusiness: Promote sustainable farming and animal management practices
Food insecurity: Malnutrition due to inadequate diets and insanitary conditions
Targeted Assistance: Persons with Disabilities, Youth, Gender
Child Marriage, Labor & Trafficking: Human rights violation
Violence against Women and Children: Human rights violation
Education: Expanding formal and non-formal education
Shelter: Promote affordable shelter and support for rental-related tenure security
Legal Status: Regularize residency in Lebanon and access to civil registration processes
UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator:
Resilience: Resources and capacities that are needed to absorb, adapt and transform in the face risks
Transforming Themes: Contemporary words and phrases with similar meanings
Poor Urban Neighborhoods: Urban cadasters in concentrated poverty
Resettlement to Third countries.: Provide persons displaced from Syria humanitarian access to third
countries
Diminishing Themes: De-emphasized, or absent
Institutional stability: Strengthening government, municipal, civic and community capacities to
promote dialogue
Cash Assistance: Aid program targeting the poorest with cash transfers.
Beneficiaries: Persons who gain or benefit in some way from something
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Terrorist Threat: & LAF: Militancy menace spreading from Syria provoking LAF and security
personnel working to address multiple challenges
Law Enforcement: Enhancing the capacity of Lebanese law enforcement and justice systems
New Themes: Outside of the original themes, meanings, and intentions
Elderly: The accepted minimum chronological age of 65 years
Persons with disabilities: Any person who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities

When explored through “Second Cycle Coding Methods,” various considerable
changes were introduced in the 2017–20 LCRP.514 One such change was the one
related to the proposed budget and manner of spending between two plans with the
same vision towards almost the same or a less targeted group of people. This change
aimed at ensuring there is peace, stability, and security in Lebanon while ensuring
that the most vulnerable communities are protected. In fact, the 2015–16 LCRP
document proposed a US$2.14 billion appeal plan that would be used to offer
humanitarian assistance as well as protect a highly vulnerable population of over
3.3 million.515 The appeal plan targeted investment in services, institutions, and the
general economy in order to reach the most vulnerable populations. On the other
hand, the 2017–20 LCRP document proposed a US$2.8 billion for providing
humanitarian assistance to the same number of people in need, 3.3 million, divided
into four categories.516 The first category is to offer protection to highly vulnerable
individuals who are estimated to number over 1.9 million. The second category is
to offer immediate assistance to the affected population of over 2.2 million
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individuals. The third category supports service provision through national
systems, while the last one focuses on Lebanon’s economy, infrastructure, and
public institutions.517
The 10 percent difference in total budget between the 2015–16 LCRP
and 2017–20 LCRP is not a consequence of an increase in the targeted
population, but rather an outcome of the longer response period of, now, four
years suggested for the lingering vulnerabilities across the population due to the
protracted Syrian refugee crisis. It is important to note that as the Syrian crisis
worsens, the repercussions in Lebanon become more profound. Subsequently,
the 2017–20 strategic plan strengthens the ideals of the 2015 plan. It also
highlights the challenges faced by refugees more holistically. After all, the 2015–
16 LCRP is a transitional plan to the 2017–20 LCRP one, which expands on the
stabilization and development efforts by enabling a transition from emergency
immediate relief efforts to empowering local bodies, sustaining their livelihood,
and empowering their resilience
efforts.
3.1 Operational Themes
The later 2017–2020 Response Plan is more of an operational plan than 2015– 2016
LCRP as it offers greater details in the implementation schemes of the following
areas: Lebanon holds the ultimate authority over the Lebanese crisis response plan’s
sectors. Through LCRP, all activities need to abide by Lebanese laws and
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regulations as well as applicable international laws.518 MoSA is mandated by the
Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) to monitor the LCRP dynamics in Lebanon.
According to one expert interview with UNHCR representatives, the Minister at
MoSA and the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator co-chair the LCRP steering
committee, whose position is further elaborated in the 2017–2020 version of the
LCRP compared to the previous one.519 The following plan also expands on the
role of the interconnected bodies that are invested in managing Syrians in Lebanon.
Each sector steering committee communicate and facilitate the operation of
partnering agencies’ project implementations.520
The “Promotion of National Leadership” provides “an opportunity for
the Lebanese government to strengthen its domestic control and stabilize its
management of aid and protection.” 521 As a first step, the LCRP steering
committee oversees the “un-earmarked funding” and other resources within each
sector.” 522 The 2017–2020 LCRP proposed better planning and coordination
with its international partners to expand aid coordination to promote
transparency and effectiveness.523
This loosely used, broadly defined term of coordination is politicized by
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different partners with perceivably different interests. One instance of this can be
seen in the condemnation by the Lebanese government of the UNHCR for
concealing the actual number of Syrians registered with the UNHCR after 2015.524
While Lebanon ordered the cessation of Syrian registrations, the values of the
agencies regarding the management of Syrian residents were not shared. In
contestation, the UNHCR practice of recording Syrians, informally registering
them, continued without official Lebanese oversight over the new registrations or
updated number of Syrians residing in the country.525 These dayto-day response
arrangements exposed a lack of strategic refugee crisis policy coordination between
the Lebanese government and the UNHCR. Due to competing power relations and
different political agendas sought by a wide range of actors within the humanitarian
field, the broad conception of coordination in delivering a cohesive and effective
response plan did not fully materialize. In practice, reports show a lack of
transparency in sharing information about the different agencies’ projects, funding,
and timing.526 Another example of lack of adequate coordination can be examined
under the education sector, where reports show the inconsistencies in targets and
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goals between donors and Lebanese government.527 One critical example of lack of
common vision and coordination between LCRP partners is found in a particular
case dealing with the sector of education: one donor conference hosted in London
announced that all participating agencies will “enroll all Syrian children by
2017.”528 In parallel, the Lebanon publicly announced another plan that would go
for five years at that same conference, leaving more than “156,000 Syrian children
out of public schools by 2021.”529
Alongside “Transparency and Accountability,” established systems lack
consistency, detail, and timely reporting, hindering genuine oversight over funded
multiyear commitments towards all “vulnerable populations” they seem to
target.530 The LCRP 2017–2020 did dwell on theoretically detailing the
procedures on how implementing partners should engage and, in principle, report
monthly to the relevant sector steering committee on their progress.531 Afterward,
the sector steering committees would then pass all the collected information to the
LCRP steering committee.532533 Still, as the Abaad expert interviewee stated:
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“Those people who are basically coordinating in each sector are not real public
servants, so sometimes the decision-making process is not always that easy within
the sector for the government because, for instance, their general directors have
many other things to do so sometimes it can delay the process, again to the fact that
it is very time-consuming.”534
According to the Abaad’s expert statement, conflict of interest plays a huge role in
shaping decision-making processes, where some policy plans are (mis)appropriated
faster than others due to general directors’ personal benefit from those actions when
made in their official capacity. The Abaad NGO expert interviewee detailed that
“the plan [LCRP] in itself is theoretically more or less good, the problem is more
with its implementation because you are never able to fully implement it given the
fact that you do not have all the necessary funds to implement it.”535
On another note, according to the interview with the UNHCR experts, from
the beginning of the crisis response implementation period, all members of the
steering committees agreed upon a certain type of format, content, and frequency
of reports. We do find serious attempts by the major parties—the Lebanese
government and UNHCR—to demand such mechanisms. Accordingly, the 2015–
2016 LCRP original idea of information sharing and tracking through ActivityInfo
increasingly developed in the 2017–2020 version as the latter reinforced objective
monitoring and evaluations (M&E) in order to “provide a multi-year framework for
measuring progress in implementation, ensuring transparency, and facilitating
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strategic and programmatic adjustments.”542 Theoretically then, the appealing
partners are thus supposed to do a full report on funding through coordination and
systematic and transparent reporting mechanisms. Still, in practice, the Abaad
expert reiterated that:
“Every three months, if I am not mistaken, we are receiving an email from the intersector coordination asking us how much we received, for which period and from
which donor. But it's self-reporting so that could be one of the weak issues as well
of this financial reporting it all depends on the extent to which, organizations are
committed, so we know that this reporting does not capture all the funding which
is being received, but it gives you a good idea because it captures quite well what
is being received by the UN agencies, by the big INGO's and by the national
NGO'S.”
The expert’s statement recapped how financial self-reporting is not compulsory.
Therefore, these measures are not prioritized as they should be for there are no
enforcement mechanisms that would force aid agencies to report fully and on time.
Funding and other resources received are left at the discretion of the appealing
partners to handle benevolently, and their willingness to generate positive reports
that are genuinely helping all groups of targeted vulnerable individuals inclusively
without objectification make it harder for the LCRP steering committee to monitor
their tasks, change, and hold them accountable.
Meanwhile, geopolitically, the high level of politicization of the Syrian
crisis in Lebanon created space for non-traditional donors such as the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and faith-based organizations to play a
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central role in refugee management. Reportedly, an increasing number of nontraditional donors make up to 12% of official humanitarian funds. 536 Neither
sharing the same values nor goals that the international community strives for, the
politically, and ideologically motivated agencies would, consequently, undermine
the need-driven aid policies,

politicizing specific interests while excluding

vulnerable non-member groups from accessing their support. In most Arab
countries, women’s dire legal status exacerbates gender stereotyping with a heavy
emphasis on patriarchal norms of “who truly belongs to the nation and who does
not.”537 Consequently, a substantial block of non-traditional Arab states’ assistance
(in)directly marginalize and silence the most vulnerable groups of refugees—
undervaluing women-specific needs—for the sake of their gendered agendas.
Ultimately, these donors (en)gender asymmetrical types of humanitarian aid
systems, where funding is given directly to unchecked local charities.
Meanwhile, it becomes difficult to oversee the non-traditional donors’
work, let alone draw a clear picture of the type of funds, assistance, and aid
distributions that target specific groups. One example shown in Sarah Hasselbarth’s
book Islamic charities states that:
“Dar al-Fatwa [a supreme religious authority in Lebanon responsible for all Islamic
relief and humanitarian aid charities within the country] has no proper control over
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the expenditure of this money. This is a phenomenon taking place in Tripoli:
decreasing Dar al-Fatwa’s control of local charities in Tripoli makes those charities
independent. In Tripoli, this increases the risk of advances by the Salafists or the
Muslim Brotherhood.[…] not able to keep track with actual developments.”538539
Sarah Hasselbarth states that the UNHCR views that independent, politically
affiliated, extremist Islamic groups in Tripoli with hidden agendas, do not report
their activities, becoming “stronger during the refugee crisis and might have taken
over internal control or at least influence internal structures and procedures.”540
This type of selective engagement in crises can be significant without being forced
to report, let alone coordinate, their detailed activities with other agencies. Many
political and patriarchically motivated religious groups are likely to allocate their
funding directly to their constituents without further documentation within the
ActivityInfo tracking system, leading to a poor exchange of gender-sensitive
information. As one of the many impact translations, an investigation report
recorded another case where hundreds of Syrian Muslims are converting to
Christianity to either be better received by certain communities, benefit from aid
distributed by Christian charities, that might also facilitate their approval to move
to wealthy Western (Christian) countries.541

538

Sarah Hasselbarth. Islamic Charities In The Syrian Context In Jordan And Lebanon. Friedrich-EbertStiftung (2014),
539

. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/beirut/10620.pdf

540

Ibid.

Josie Ensor, “The Muslim Refugees Converting To Christianity To Find Safety,” The Telegraph, (January
30, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/30/muslim-refugees-converting-christianity-findsafety.
541

235

Figure 11. LCRP Sectors 2015–2016
542543
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Figure 12. LCRP Sectors 2017–2020

On another note, the two figures above are taken from both LCRP documents,
which the expert from UNHCR portrayed as “quite a layered process.” 544
According to the Abaad expert interviewee, their [Abaad] involvement basically
was to revise the sector chapters, discuss the accountability framework through core
groups meetings to agree on everything. Afterward, “at the national level, there are
[sector chapters] finalizing the plan within the core groups. So, for each working
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group, there is also a core group, which is a little more restricted to enable a little
bit more effective work.” 545 As the chain moves upward, different groups get
respectively filtered, until it reaches the LCRP governing steering committee that
is made up of an official representing the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs, a
UNHCR representative, and a UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator—
(RC/HC) guiding the overall humanitarian response efforts in Lebanon.
In that respect, a comparison between Figure 11 and Figure 12, representing
the targeted sectors of collaborating national organizations within both LCRP
plans, provides an interesting find. Problematic issues such as “Energy” increased
in importance, forcing changes within the multi-sector response plans, becoming a
stand-alone segment in the LCRP 2017–2020. According to the Lebanese Minister
of Energy and Water, Cesar Abi Khalil, Syrian residents in Lebanon cause an
additional burden on the already deteriorated electricity network as a result of
increased demand.546 The severe electricity rationing forced Lebanese residents to
take to the streets and publicly blame Syrians for engendering the shortages and
straining the already limited government reserves.
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officials admit that there was a severe electricity shortage, tax evasions, and unpaid
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electricity bills even before the Syrian crisis affected the total government revenues
and that the “overburdened” government has still not agreed on any concrete
resolutions for the near future.548 While problems such as lack of electricity are
gender-neutral and provide equal impairment, they do not always result in equal
outcomes due to the inherent need differences between both genders. Electricity
rationing greatly hinders the domestic chores primarily managed by women. As
patriarchal structures limit women’s labor to the domestic sphere, the majority of
Syrian women’s labor "in-house chores such as cooking and washing clothes and
dishes”549 depends on having electricity within the household.
The non-recognition of the essential impact electricity could have on Syrian
women’s livelihood leads to the LCRP’s relative de-prioritization of the imminent
provision of essential services for women’s domestic work. Consequently,
increasing electricity cuts restrict Syrian women from finding some sense of
security.
3.2 Continuous Themes
There are no considerable changes regarding the planning principles of the two
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LCRPs. After all, both plans built a case to donors in the “Needs Overview” section,
requesting from the international community “international support” and
“financing.” As one interviewee from the UNHCR stated, “It is a needs-driven
process. However, donors are an important part of the process. So, we also try to
get that component covered.
Moreover, again, of course, the government is leading it. So it has very much to do
with the approval.”550
In fact, the 2017–2020 version “reaffirms the international community’s
commitment to support and reinforce the response capacity of national/local
institutions and national/local humanitarian actors. […] The calls for burden
sharing continue through the development of a four-year plan that asks for an
investment in Lebanon and supports to the population that Lebanon hosts.” 551
These repeated calls stem from the constant outcries over the shortfall of pledged
funding which countries have yet to provide. 552 According to Emirates News
Agency, only 18% of the 4.6 billion USD of the 2017 interagency appeal were met,
barely providing “targeted vulnerable groups” immediate humanitarian needs of
Syrian refugees across the Middle East region.553
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The 2015–2016 document previously mentioned, emphasizes most of those
humanitarian needs. Both plans call for innovative responses that could address the
deteriorating refugee crisis within the country.”554 Alas, the crisis has continued to
deteriorate significantly ever since. The four-year plan that was put in place in 2017
continued its request for burden sharing, mostly through investment and local
support for the vulnerable populations residing within the country. While warning
of “increasing negative coping strategies” and “dependence on external aid,” both
plans seem to be appealing for further aid and collaboration in easing the chronic
problems due to perceived lack of funding without recognizing the targeted
vulnerable people’s potential of being strategic partners in finding the right
solutions. Accordingly, many grassroots initiatives were initiated outside the LCRP
spectrum, while some of them still engender Syrian women’s empowerment as
strategic partners for non-gender sensitive goals that would counter-intuitively
reinforce in the long run their limited status within the gendered hierarchical system
in Lebanon. As such, the following Photovoice section provides more examples of
these type of scenarios in which most of these humanitarian initiatives would
correspondingly enable and empower the majority of “vulnerable targeted groups.”
Instead, most humanitarian initiatives tend to specifically exploit Syrian women’s
cultural place in the domestic sphere and their roles as free domestic laborers in
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their own homes in order to garner their participation in aid programs that do not
address specifically the problematic gendered (in)security structures.
Both LCRP documents highlight how Lebanon could undergo civil unrest
and economic collapse if not enough funds are received. However, according to an
Al Jazeera news article, the reality on the ground is much more complicated,
emphasizing that the populist protectionist rhetoric and the ad hoc restrictions that
Syrians are facing in Lebanon do not only affect the livelihood and resiliency of
residing Syrians but they also diminish the chances of Lebanon adequately
benifiting from potential Syrian contributions to the amelioration of their
country.555 An average of $1.5bn every year has been allocated to Lebanon in aid
funds. Still, these funds mainly target short term humanitarian projects that do not
sustain.556 Counter-intuitively, a considerable ratio of those cash assistance funds
neither support Syrian refugees’ livelihood nor the host state’s stability, nor
generate gender sensitive jobs, nor promote social solidarity in the areas where
displaced Syrians are living. Instead, due to the severity of refugee living
conditions, most funds are limited to direct aid such as food, housing, education,
and health services. According to the World Bank estimates, this phenomenon is
costing Lebanon’s economy 7.5 billion USD annually, in addition to a significant
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decline in trade and tourism, which is blamed on the ongoing Syrian crisis.557 In the
meantime, according to Annahar newspaper, the consequences of Syrian poor
living conditions are visible in the increase in chronic diseases, suicides, use of
violence, and involvement in hard labor.558
Socio-economic, health, water, sanitation, and hygiene problems seem to be
continuously at stake. In fact, studies show that the health care system in Lebanon
is overwhelmed by the sudden spike in patients, mainly caused by the increase of
population, affecting all groups of people residing in the area. 559 Additionally, most
registered Syrian refugees receive assistance from the UNHCR for payment of
“basic” health services. However, the report states that Syrians would still need to
cover the remaining 25% of “advanced” medical checkups and much needed health
services that most pregnant women and nursing mothers undergo, which reflect
conditions of gender discrimination.560 Most efforts to include measures to control
disease outbreaks, hunger, and childbirth were not prioritized as part of the health
sector initiatives, even though these are the most endemic types of health hazards
that the majority of Syrian refugees women and children endure. Accordingly, the
health sector’s needs analysis was divided into two objectives objectifying the
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majority of Syrian de facto refugees in Lebanon: increase access to healthcare and
strengthen health-care services to cater to the growing population in Lebanon.561
Meanwhile, except primary health care and life-threatening emergencies,
genderspecific medical requirements are almost absent within both plans, even
when 80% of vulnerable targets differ in health risks, conditions, and needs from
those concerning men. 562 On the one hand, different structural hierarchies and
social barriers hinder Syrian women and girls from seeking adequate health
assistance due to “stigma, fear of mistreatment or discrimination, lack of awareness,
fear of reporting violence, and difficulties obtaining legal status.”563 On the other
hand, the availability and cost for seeking the already strained health services
prevents most Syrian women and girls from accessing the needed reproductive
diagnosis, and treatment, putting them at serious risk of avoidable mortality
hazards.564 While the humanitarian response-needs prioritize essential items such
as food, protection, water, and shelter to fulfill the Syrian refugees’ related needs,
the study shows that their provision of services related to reproductive, maternal
and child health services are barely provided. One of the main reasons stated by
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health experts is the ill-equipped Lebanese health care system, already established
before the crisis, that does not provide gender inclusively subsidized or discounted
health services to women in Lebanon.565 Even if the well-intentioned international
agencies would want to provide these essential services to the majority of the Syrian
refugee population Syrian women and children, they end up failing to empower and
protect them.
Economically, in the last couple of years, the volume of products exported
from Lebanon has been on the decline for the simple reason that the only land route
used for export crosses through Syria. 566 One study reported that Lebanese
exporters who use Syria as a transit country suffered more than Jordanian exporter,
meaning that Syria is more critical to Lebanon than to Jordan. 567 Lebanese
households are also experiencing a decrease in income and an increase in debts,
forcing them to search for loans to meet their basic needs. According to the LCRP
“Needs Overview” section, “public services are overwhelmed, economic growth
has faltered, and unemployment is rising at record rates.”568 There is a continuous
need to enhance “service delivery and reduce the fiscal burden that the sector places
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on public resources.” 569 The decrease in income and savings has been closely
connected to increasing unemployment and high dependency on international aid.
The plan states that “Syrian insecurities have been increasing, as savings are rapidly
depleting, and the use of negative coping strategies is on the rise.”570
In turn, both plans call for the enhancement of “resilience” and
“livelihoods” techniques to alleviate the suffering of the most vulnerable Lebanese
and displaced persons from Syria, requiring individualized sector steering
committees that would ensure there is proper alignment of funding to various
initiatives. In both plans, the steering committees are responsible for guiding the
allocation of resource funding among various sectors after conducting consultations
with relevant stakeholders. According to the UNHCR, the 2015– 2016 LCRP
shifted its mandate from pure humanitarian to long-term sustainable integrated
components of refugee resilience. One example is the creation of “Livelihoods
Sector Steering Committee” in the 2017–2020 LCRP plan, which was a step
towards coordinated engagement in restoring and expanding economic and
livelihood opportunities for refugees. Still, the government limitation of Syrian jobs
within three permissible low skilled sectors—agriculture, construction, and
sanitation—clearly limit the degree of how much these resilience plans can achieve,
and which groups are to be excluded—women.
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The continuous call to “strengthen government ownership of investments
made by supporting national planning and implementation, monitoring and
management processes” highlight the scenario of power politics and agenda-based
competition between the international community and the Lebanese government,
among other actors.571 Even though all parties call for government oversight and a
leadership role, in practice, most available humanitarian aid is not channeled
through the Lebanese government but is given mostly to non-governmental
organizations working on the ground, with no tangible means to control their
operations. 572 Accordingly, what initially seems like a similar schema what the
international community and Lebanese government share, evidenced by their use
of common appropriation of agenda initiatives and goals, a closer inspection
highlights a more complex gendered story of both harmony and tension between
both sides. While both parties genuinely aim for socio-economic stability and
increase of government services and aid, the specific monitoring mechanisms and
prioritization of targeted approaches seem to alter in practice, creating room for
tension.
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3.3 Elaborated Themes
Both plans aim to provide “direct and targeted aid” to the “most vulnerable people”
while ensuring complementarity across various sectors.573 Through a longitudinal
analysis, we find the “protection” theme to be more elaborated in the 2017–2020
plan than the previous version. Local dynamics and the long-term nature of the
second version pushed the planning partners to adapt to the multiple local
adversities by splitting the 2015–2016’s first strategy into two separate ones. When
reading both strategic response plans, the targeted group also seems to have
changed from the “most vulnerable among the displaced from Syria and poorest
Lebanese” to an expanded group of “vulnerable populations” that would encompass
Palestinians and Iraqi groups as well.574 That change aims to “reduce exposure to
hunger, homelessness, health complications, disease outbreaks, violence, abuse,
exploitation, as well as the worst effects of poverty.” 575 Both plans request the
continued “immediate and temporary service delivery in informal settlements,
collective shelters, substandard dwellings, and gatherings,” all while continuing to
respond to emergency humanitarian needs as they arise from these interventions.582
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Due to the influx of refugees, there has been a competition over informal
menial jobs, which caters to around 56% of employment positions in Lebanon.576
A majority of workers in such jobs are poor. A combination of words increased in
intensity from one plan to the other when describing how vulnerable people are
sinking deeper into debt and adopting “negative coping mechanisms.” 577 Issues
such as “legal status,” “resilience” and “substandard shelters” are also elaborated
as intersectional and mutually dependent. 578 Legal protection is an essential
prerequisite for improving the lives of refugees, especially women, as mentioned
in the previous chapter. Having an ambiguous status could only lead to the
detriment of refugee assistance and protection in accessing essential services.
Meanwhile, the categories that label the complex groups of people that
came from Syria fail to provide adequate legal protection mechanisms due to
multifaceted bureaucratic mechanisms at prohibitive costs. The vulnerability
assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon estimates that the “level of illiteracy
among female heads of households was more than double that of male heads of
household (28% and 12% respectively).”579 Adding to that, Syrian women’s limited
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financial means, due to gendered policy plans and discriminatory government
practices, would suffer the most. Most refugee (in)security approaches tend to
homogenize all Syrian individuals’ needs and objectify the agency of the
marginalized majority of Syrian women, where justified ad hoc policies of
exclusion would (en)gender counterintuitive negative coping strategies. This latter
includes a reduction of food intake and expenditure on gaining education and
health, coupled with an increase in debt, informal work, street begging, and
prostitution, all potential conditions manifesting as part of their resilience efforts to
overcome their inequitable experiences.
Not having legal access to work increases poverty and pushes marginalized
populations away from proper resilience efforts. Consequently, “informal
settlements,

collective

shelters,

substandard

dwellings

and

gatherings,”

“homelessness, hunger, disease outbreaks, violence, abuse, and exploitation are few
of the many consequences that arise.”580 The 2017 plan elaborates on these issues,
discussing how the “resilience of the country’s vulnerable communities is eroding
as they run out of savings and struggle to access income,” and emphasizing the dire
need to facilitate access to legal documentation so that all registered refugees can
access essential public services. 581 Still, both plans do not tackle the double
discrimination that Syrian women, specifically, undergo due to their residency
status and gender.
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Another theme worth mentioning is “agribusiness.” What seemed, at first,
as a new theme in the 2017–2020 plan, was later viewed as an elaboration of the
previous 20152016 plan. “Agribusiness” was introduced in the second plan as a
sign of increasing knowledge of the local situation. According to the International
Labor Organization (ILO), Syrians tend to maintain the same kind of jobs they used
to have before the crisis: “92% [of Syrians] have no work contract and over half
work on a seasonal, weekly or daily basis.”582 As workers, Syrians mainly engaged
in agricultural work, domestic services, and construction. Due to their informal
nature, in the case of Lebanon, these jobs provide little to no income protection and
do not offer any social security benefits. Accordingly, the 2017–2020 plan
promoted sustainable agriculture production through supporting vulnerable food
producers and communities in the hopes of addressing Lebanon’s preexisting labor
market challenges, taking on a holistic and comprehensive approach to balance
refugee assistance with the tacking the needs of vulnerable Lebanese
communities. 583 The elaborated plan also called for enhancing agricultural
livelihood activities and social tension prevention within stressed communities. The
document proposed strengthening the Lebanese institutional capacities and
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agribusiness owners in the hopes of promoting a legal labor market, in which
working Syrians could enjoy some legal protection while residing in the country.584
Since most Syrian refugees lack legal status, access to housing became
difficult. The increase of rent in most cities pushed the establishment of informal
camps in agricultural areas. Most Syrian refugees are either working informally in
Lebanese farms and factories, or on the streets. Higher rates of child labor are seen
on the main highways and streets, where children sell tissue paper, beg, or shine
shoes. According to an Al Jazeera news report, the Beqaa area, east of Lebanon,
witnessed an increase in child labor. 585 The report estimated that child labor is
becoming increasingly common with an average of 65% of Syrian children put to
work for little to no pay. 586 Most of the jobs are coordinated through the shawish—
a man who takes charge of managing the informal camps that are set on a leased
plot of land from a Lebanese owner. He then becomes the middleman between the
refugee population and the local community and businesses, recruiting workers and
making commissions. There, he supervises and supposedly protects the “most
vulnerable, especially children and women, older persons and persons with
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disabilities,” taking the rent from them. 587 The expert interviewee from MoSA
stated:
“You have the structure within the Syrian refugees’ committee where you have a
Shawish that has access to all the people and households within a specific informal
settlement that could communicate with them, communicate their needs, etc.,
coordinate with the rest of the NGO’s, international NGOs and agencies to provide
for their needs.”
As such, the expert’s assertion that a Syrian, most probably male, shawish can
exercise power over other Syrian refugees residing in his informal settlements
under some conditions does not signify that he does not suffer discrimination from
other groups, such as the local authorities and NGOs. This signifies that the Syrian
refugees’ (en)gendered relations at the heart of our study are mutable and dynamic,
socially and politically constructed.
On another note, one of the most considerable changes between the 2015–16
LCRP and the 2017–20 LCRP is about various cross-cutting issues concerning
“gender,” “youth,” the “environment,” “gender violence,” and “legal” insecurities.
The 2017–2020 plan further elaborates on the “vulnerable populations” by splitting
and maximizing the variances between its members, with more emphasis on
“elderly,” “children,” “persons with disability” and “youth,” regarding work and
education. Unlike the 2015–16 LCRP, the 2017–20 LCRP emphasizes and
prioritizes youth programming as one of its major components within its various
sectoral plans. In fact, the youth component in this LCRP plays a great role in
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fostering youth resilience by empowering them socially, economically, and
personally thereby increasing education, entrepreneurship, and civic engagement
as well as other forms of participation. 588 The 2015–16 LCRP built the youth
agenda whereby various partners have expanded their focus to assist the targeted
youth, considered as one of the most vulnerable and marginalized groups. The
LCRP initiative aimed at motivating young refugees so that they could positively
influence their communities. It focuses on expanding youth capacity through job
creation, skills training, improving employability, and entrepreneurship programs
as well as other income generating activities. The 2017–20 LCRP also focused on
the education sector whereby it tackles various challenges by increasing access to
education programs, and vocational training activities.589 Finally, this plan focuses
on the protection sector by targeting youth who are likely to engage in risky
behaviors and therefore ensuring that they are provided with proper psychosocial
support.

This section also covers the main place to tackle women and gender

issues.
According to the Abaad expert, these types of topics are “mainly done through
the protection sector; this discussion happens mainly through the protection sector.
For ourselves, we would report it in a way, but this is really happening through the
protection sector.”590 Since the protection sector is more focused on gender-based
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violence problems and developing response mechanisms for girls and boys who are
at risk, other types of inequalities and insecurities that are important for the success
of the response plan seem to be non-existent.
Also, in practice, studies hsow that the targeted support to adolescents and
youth aged 14 to 25 has been minimal in both plans.591 It is important to note that,
while the 2017–2020 LCRP prioritizes “youth programming” within most sectors,
gender seems to be absent in their formula.592 The primary goal of the 2017–20
LCRP youth engagement is to foster socio-economically youth resilience to
“increase education, entrepreneurship, empowerment, participation and civic
engagement of this generalized population.”593 Expanding the LCRP 2015–2016
agenda, the new initiatives aimed to motivate youth to and their respective
communities fall short when girls are, still, being targeted for child marriages and
sexual harassment, limiting their mobility in the public sphere.594 As such, youth
programs proliferated mostly under the “livelihood sector” with an increase in
education, income-generation opportunities, innovation, and entrepreneurship
programs. Still, a recent study conducted with a group of 10–12 and 13– 14-year-
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old Syrian refugee adolescents in Barelias and Qabelias, Lebanon, called for much
needed special attention to “gender differentials in factors encouraging enrolment
and leading to drop-out, such as security concerns for girls.” 595 The LCRP
“education” sector increased youth access to “formal education, vocational
training, and regulated non-formal education programs.” 596 Basic education is a
right that should be enjoyed by all children between the age of 3 and 18 in Lebanon.
However, 58% of displaced Syrian children are not attending school. Meanwhile,
economically vulnerable Syrians attend public schools.597 The number of Syrians
students surpassed the Lebanese counterparts in public schools, where they have to
pay a relatively smaller fee to attend. 598 Still many other barriers hinder Syrian
children from attending school, such as unaffordable cost of transportation,
unfamiliar language of instruction (such as French or English), lack of residency
papers to properly enroll, early marriages and child labor to support families,
insecurity concerns, and psychosocial concerns, such as harassment, bullying and,
corporal punishment, amongst many other issues.599
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On the one hand, no Lebanese law entirely prohibits ten-year-old and up
children from child labor, particularly in the agricultural sector. On the other hand,
Syrian parents cannot afford to prioritize education over having their children bring
income to support their family.600 As a result, “93 percent of refugee families resort
to child labor since adults are restricted from accessing the labor market.”601 In a
Human Rights Watch interview with a Syrian refugee family, an interviewee stated,
“We cannot afford to put them in school here. All my children were studying in
Syria, but if I would put them in school here how would I live? We would have to
buy them clothes and pay for transportation. Even if everything was free, the
children could not go to school for they are the only ones that can work.”602 Based
on these facts, both LCRPs’ goal is to ensure that both Syrian and Lebanese children
have access to a good school environment by investing in the amelioration and
expansion of schools premises. The reports advocate rehabilitation, expansion of
existing premises and constructing new ones. That way, the education system
becomes strengthened and able to cater to most children.
An elaboration on “targeted assistance” was necessary to include in the
2017 crisis response plan. We find a decent shift in “targeted approach” and
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“targeted groups,” which provide adequate strategies that would not aggravate the
social tensions between both populations. The 2017–20 LCRP tackles the issue of
“gender” by denoting that one of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) is the
achievement of gender equality and the elimination of gender-based violence.
In this regard, the efficient mainstreaming of gender requires an adequate
assessment of how any planned action is likely to affect women, girls, men, and
boys. Gender concerns need to be the integral dimension when designing,
implementing, monitoring, and evaluating various programs and policies across
different spheres. The 2017–18 LCRP recognizes that gender-based violence
(GBV) is particularly challenging about various humanitarian contexts.
Responding to GBV is a collective effort. Thus, the LCRP should ensure there is
risk mitigation across all the intervention sectors.
When looking at the evolution of the LCRP plan from 2015 to 2017, from the
first read, one notices that the texts barely mentions “women,” homogenizing them
as part of a growing list of vulnerable groups, with no clear plans to address their
specific gendered insecurities. When mentioned, women are loosely associated
with vulnerable groups in general, and no clear plans are addressing their specific
gendered (in)securities. Forming the majority of registered refugees, Syrian
“women” are mostly portrayed in both plans among the different “targeted groups”
whose troubles get mentioned in a couple of paragraphs of a 186-page crisis
response plan. Consequently, the gendering securitized crisis response plans
marginalize the “78 percent of Syrians registered as refugees with UNHCR [that]
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are women and children.” 603 When a plan mentions “the estimated 1.5 million
displaced Syrians, half of whom are women and children,” one would expect that
the responses suggested and the funds received would target them accordingly. 604
Still, the study finds major anomalies within problematizing the whole
humanitarian approach for conflating statistics of one single “vulnerable group”
that would strip both women and children from any type of productive agency.
Consequently, as the previous chapters show, Syrian women refugees get subjected
to various types of intersectional discriminations .605 According to the International
Labor Organization (ILO), Syrian women residing in Lebanon are particularly
vulnerable to unemployment: “over two-thirds of women looking for work in
Lebanon were unable to find a job. Only two out of 10 working refugees were
female, earning about 40 percent less on average than their male counterparts.”606
The 2017–2020 plan elaborates the emphasis on increasing communal and
institutional responsiveness to support the elaborated targeted groups, especially
children and women, from armed violence, abuse, exploitation, and neglect.607 The
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plan also theoretically provides referrals and support to GBV survivors through
robust interweaving mechanisms. Still, the 2017–2020 plan does not tackle in depth
the unemployment predicament that the majority of the working-age refugee
population suffers from. Existing socio-political gender hierarchies manipulate
Syrian women’s legal status and force them to adopt negative coping skills by
working either informally under exploitative environments or remain free-ofcharge domestic laborers in the private sphere.
The study shows aid programs recognize women’s issues as important to
highlight but not enough to include them as reliable partners nor ensure adequate
measures to deliver aid and protection, constructing an inferior identity for Syrian
refugees in a power hierarchy vis-à-vis the relief providers, while at the same time
preventing women refugees from seeking true empowerment. Even though there is
an increased elaboration of the various targeted vulnerable groups, the constant
marginalization of women as mere victims of abuse and violence is particularly
seen in the case of unemployment noted in LCRP documents, furthering Syrian
women refugees’ daily (in)securities. Gender-specific policies for women are
practically nonexistent outside of “eliminating sexual exploitation and sexual and
gender-based violence.”608 There is additionally a noticeable difference between
the girls and boys in the “children” group. In fact, girls in refugee camps are at a
higher risk of being subjected to “child marriage” because their parents are unable
to cater their needs. According to the Women’s Refugee Commission, armed
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conflicts have made young girls more vulnerable because they have no one to
defend them. According to one study, their parents tend to marry them off
immediately when they start menstruating.

609
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perceive child marriage as a negative coping response for parents who are
struggling with poverty. Accordingly, their married daughters move to live with
their husbands and inlaws, while in some cases parents also think that their
daughters would be in a safer environment.610
The “environment” is also a priority sector where the second version of the
LCRP made considerable changes from the previous 2015–16 LCRP. In the 2017–
20 LCRP, the Ministry of Health, the government of Lebanon and other UN
agencies including the UNDP, UNHCR, and OCHA formulated an environmental
task force. 611 The priority of this task force is to address major environmental
impacts. To achieve this, the Ministry of Environment (MoE) is required to ensure
there is mainstreaming environmental efforts mostly within emergency relief and
stabilization projects. In turn, it would have the capacity to monitor the
environmental impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon and guide plausible
means for interventions. The MoE would also cooperate with the various sectors in
the LCRP in order to identify and implement environmental interventions while
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exclusively focusing on the 2017 priority sectors including food security, social
stability, water, and energy. The 2017–2020 LCRP aim is to expand its
management of the deteriorating Lebanese environment through sustainable longterm development programs, with attention to water and waste management, use of
energy-efficient products, and conservation of land use ecosystems.
Another notable change in the 2017–20 LCRP is on conflict sensitivity,
which arises as a result of the complex social fabric of Lebanon as well as how the
Syrian conflict has politically impacted the domestic scene. This LCRP fully
incorporates the need for “social stability” by analyzing the potential adverse
effects of maximizing the sector’s contribution. There is no doubt that the “poor
urban neighborhoods” were highly affected by the Syrian crisis given the challenge
of hosting a big number of displaced Syrians. Therefore, the 2017–20 LCRP
expanded on the 2015–16 neighborhood profiles by increasing its coverage of urban
areas, while addressing the gaps by using a comprehensive and coordinated
approach within a highlighted “Cross-Cutting Issues” section.612
3.4 Transforming Themes
Lebanon already suffers from “high levels of deprivation, inadequate access to
basic services and social stability challenges.” 613 Subsequently, the Lebanese
government required some transformations within the updated version of the LCRP
to adapt and better control the refugee crisis at hand. The term “vulnerable
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localities” used in the 2015–2016 LCRP version became particularized to “Poor
Urban Neighborhoods,” a shift that had an important impact on the level of aid and
assistance targeting displaced Syrians. The 2017–2020 LCRP elaborated on newly
discovered situations where “vulnerable people are increasingly migrating towards
poor urban areas where living conditions have significantly deteriorated.”614 The
plan calls for targeting its assistance efforts to “poor urban neighborhoods” through
a coordinated and comprehensive approach.
As for the issue of “resettlement to third countries,” the 2017–2020 plan
changed the approach from stating that resettlement is a preferred solution to
advocating for an actual mechanism to be put in place and provide “persons
displaced from Syria humanitarian access to third countries.”615 Still, to this date,
with less than one percent of the global refugee population so far resettled, no thirdcountry has shown any interest in accommodating enough Syrian refugees to make
a viable contribution to this plan.616 Therefore, stressing the need to resettle Syrians
in third counties furthers unrealistic expectations about the degree to which
resettlement measures can reach enough Syrian refugees in Lebanon, constituting
a major setback for any durable solution proposed.
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3.5 Diminishing Themes

Figure 13. Diminishing Themes

As for the interrelated diminishing themes of

“Law enforcement”,

“Lebanese armed forces”, and “Terrorist threats”, mentioned in the figure above,
the study can shows that they are less visible in the 2017–2020 Plan. This latter
could be due to the drastic weakening of ISIS and its retreat in the region and
consequently the decrease of terrorist threats that were menacing Lebanon’s
stability during the creation of the 2015–2016 version of the plan. In fact, we find
that during the terrorist attack/surge of ISIS in 2014, the 2015–2016 LCRP
emphasized more on supporting the Lebanese armed forces in fighting the constant
terrorist attack threatening the country’s stability as Lebanon witnessed around 30
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terrorist attacks between 2013 and 2015 as seen in the table below.617 That number
tremendously decreased to almost no successful attack in 2017.

On another note, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the hostility,
violence, and hate crimes against Syrians have sharply risen. The negative impacts
of Syrian refugees portrayed by most Lebanese outlets get exaggerated and
misplaced, calling for their return.

Table 4. Summary of Attacks in Lebanon Post-Syrian Conflict
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to their country. The cessation of new Syrian registrations and the impeding
mechanisms to renew previous ones to obtain “Legal Status”, required the
diminishing of the theme to be mentioned less in the updated plan.
As for the last theme, when I first saw how the 2017–2020 plan evaded the
mistake of portraying the receiving ends as “beneficiaries” I expected to find
literature on what that means. Alas, to no surprise, not many justifications were
made. In fact, when looking further into subsequent LCRP reports, the word
“beneficiaries” popped out again. Still, to my “benefit” dwelling on what looks like
a small anomaly helps this research highlight the needs for analyzing not only
critically systemic changes but also language. Referring to refugees as
“beneficiaries,” language sensitivity becomes important for it matters how one
chooses words. Labeling a Syrian “beneficiary” silences that person’s agency of
actively adapting, manipulating, and (re)defining complex humanitarian processes,
attempting to access and gain the donors’ “bene.” When aid discourses inform aid
practices across different institutions about Syrian refugees being part of a
“beneficiaries” group, one would think that this creates an gendered discourse
between the “benevolent” aid workers— benefactors—and “disempowered”
refugees—beneficiaries—seeking assistance, where power dynamics, gendered
inequalities, and structural violence are reinforced. In this case, by labeling targeted
groups as “beneficiaries,” Syrian refugees get automatically stripped from being a
distinct group that has international rights to seek aid and protection. Suddenly,
these rights become benefits to certain Syrian who need to qualify to “gain” them.
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When the majority of Syrian refugees—women and children—can not renew or
register, what would happen to their “beneficiary” status? Would they be viewed
negatively by policy practitioners and involved aid workers as non-qualifying
opportunists who might falsely claim assistance, taking advantage of the aid
provided and/or trying to steal jobs away from residents? Also, this negative
portrayal of the different vulnerable groups as beneficiaries due to the refugee crisis
at hand increases local vindications of exclusionary practices that would worsen the
mechanism of refugee aid and protection.
618

New Themes

New Themes
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Figure 14. New Themes

As seen in the above figure, new terminologies such as “elderly” and “persons with
disabilities” appeared in the 2017–2020 version of the crisis response plan. As a
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matter of fact, with the increased collaboration and humanitarian aid partners and
the slight increase in gender marker, it becomes only predictable to find that the
previously marginalized groups, whose (in)securities were mostly silenced in the
earlier LCRP document, are now included in the 2017-2020 version. This latter
should portray a positive move for the LCRP plans in elaborating on previously
homogenized groups, while their agencies are still objectified. Instead, the study
finds that the 2017–2020 LCRP document only expanded the crisis response needs
assessment as part of a four-year term development plan that justifies the need for
greater funding from potential donors. After all, most Syrian refugees are still in
legal limbo, potentially deported, with limited mobility, unable to access basic
safety nor emergency needs, among many other problems. Having all these
elaborations within the newer LCRP version does not mean that their translation
into concrete domestic policies with sensible response strategies that advance
gender-equal treatment would be conceivable.
4. Analytical Implications
The purpose of this study was to highlight and compare the dominant cultural
themes represented in the 2015–2016 and the 2017–2020 crisis response plans. This
study showed how both crisis response plans are social constructions tied to the
social fabric affected and affecting local realities. Adapting Dennis Wiedman’s
original work of organizational cultural theme longitudinal analysis to Susanne
Zwingel’s concept of norm internalization—the phase where the norm is
implemented in domestic settings, this study helped the dissertation understand the
dynamics between the main contributors—the Lebanese government and the
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UNHCR—better through the Continuous, Elaborated, New, Diminishing, and
Transforming Themes that are dominant within both plans.
The study highlighted the organizational theme change from 2015 to 2017,
broadly connecting it to the complex dynamics of norm translation practices that
engage with their fluid environment. The study finds that many nodes and themes
diminished such as
“terrorist threats,” “Lebanese armed forces” and security. This would mean that the
specific security problems that are related to those themes were either successfully
controlled or seized to be a major problem. At the same time, only two new
themes—elderly and disabled persons—emerged in the 2017–2020 plan, which can
be considered more of an expansion of targeted groups and protection techniques
than utterly new approaches brought into the 2017-2020 crisis response plan,
reflecting the host society’s expanding its adoption of humanitarian norms within
its crisis policy plans. Meanwhile, most cultural themes identified in the 2015–2016
LCRP are also recurring in the 2017–2020 LCRP through mundane bureaucratic
practices and refugee management efforts that reinforce Bigo’s concept of
securitization and Sara Gibson’s conditional hospitality. 619620 Most challenges
facing Syrian refugees in Lebanon addressed in 2015 are still mentioned in the 2017
plan, reflecting the host society’s feeling of unease.
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Still, the discussed changes between both LCRPs create room for hope in
the refugee crisis management approach, drawn from the setbacks of the first
version, thereby coming up with innovative responses that could empower both
Lebanese citizens as well as Syrian refugees. The second LCRP version seems more
focused and inclusive to previously invisible and new realities—“energy” and
persons with specific needs such as “elderly” and “persons with disabilities” and
“youth.” It builds on the 2015–16 LCRP version, generating various programming
activities for eliminating issues such as genderbased violence. Other changes also
imply that youths are now seen, hence motivated through job creation; The second
version of the LCRP plan calls for enhanced employability and the youth access to
both formal and informal education. The fact that the 2017–2020 LCRP has made
more efforts in wanting to safeguard the environment also implies that its
stabilization efforts in various sectors including water, energy, social welfare, and
food security are desired. After all, there was a 10 percent increase in the budget
from 2.48 billion USD in 2015–2016 to a longer-term project of 2.8 billion USD
for 2017–2020 LCRP.
Still, in practice the second plan’s development project for social stability
did not match up to the continuing insecurities on the ground for the refugee crisis
is still on emergency mode, not controlled yet, where Lebanese national interest
measures justify exceptional mechanisms of refugee deterrence and exclusion. In
all the interviews that I conducted, the experts’ stated that the main weakness of the
LCRP 2017 program is lack of funding and disproportionate deterioration of the
refugee crisis situation. Even though the expert interviewees raised many
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continuing serious issue—such as limited participation, lack of transparency, and
Legal discriminations that hinder most of their daily operations among many—
funding was the main theme of their complaints and not the root causes for the
unsustainable status quo.
Although this analysis showed some improvement in addressing the
challenges facing refugees in a sustainable contextual manner, still the stereotyped
perception of Syrian refugees as both dependent and problematic, which both
Lebanon and the international community buy into, mostly remains. Despite
official declarations in favor of refugee protection in general, both states and
international organizations have not accurately addressed Syrian women’s
insecurities, and in turn, their human rights, livelihoods, and resilience were often
objectified and not prioritized. Other than momentarily mentioning women within
specific refugees’ protection measures such as sexual and gender-based violence or
targets of psychological support and monitoring systems, within both crisis
response plans, women have been absent from major response approaches with no
gender-specific empowerment measures.
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Subsequently, limited refugee

emergency relief can neither offer refugees’ gender comprehensive aid protection,
nor real prospects in the long term, especially in the context of a protracted crisis.622
This latter was highlighted in the gender marker change within both documents,
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where gendered security concerns are still often prioritized, commonly leading to a
gap between stated gender empowerment intentions and the local refugee
management practices that objectify the majority of Syrian refugee women’s
insecurities. According to both LCRP documents, Syrian women are still viewed
as lacking both the legal status and local support within their gendered environment
to have their concerns prioritized, including those that are directly linked to their
personal security and survival.
While Syrian women residing in Lebanon are forced to engage the public
sphere to secure their livelihood, the study finds that both LCRP plans do not
provide them with the necessary tools to successfully navigate the public sphere as
productive members. In effect, one of the most problematic issues within both
plans’ design is that they are both based on the assumption that the top managers
of the crisis response plans have the moral capacity and exclusive role to save those
de facto refugees along with the vulnerable Lebanese communities by doing for
them rather than working with them to empower their selfreliance efforts. 623
Consequently, the response strategies offered would hardly work in empowering
Syrian women without involving them in the process. It is particularly important
that these doubly discriminated women need to have a say in the LCRP for it is
imperative to recognize their essential role as active agents and potential
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humanitarian actors who would want to be productive within their host
communities.
On another note, the study shows that most alterations made between both
plans do not seem to ease the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Dealing with such a
critical humanitarian situation with an increasing collection of competing nongovernmental partners—104 appealing UN and NGO partners—brings up many
challenges and criticisms from all parties. This latter creates room for
misperception, where numbers have become essential to monitoring and evaluating
the now feminized Syrian population as a burden: backward and dependent on aid
assistance. The inaccurate statistics and numbers become necessary to convey as
much human misery as possible as scientific truths and mobilize sufficient donor
funds for one of the competing sustainable solutions offered within the crisis
response plans. Consequently, as subjects of intense refugee protection practices,
various groups of Syrian refugees become heavily dependent on sporadic protection
measures and diminishing aid assistance. Standard operating procedures, regarding
who gets what, when, and how, are spread among thousands of interested NGOs
that do not necessarily partner with the LCRP plans and whose accountability is
poorly managed by both the Lebanese government and UNHCR.624 Accordingly,
resilience intervention programs through these agencies hardly empower refugees’
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livelihood without the government’s blessing, counterintuitively discriminating
against the same refugees they are trying to protect.
In that respect, using a longitudinal organizational cultural theme analysis,
this chapter was able to shed light on the dynamics of refugee management, aid
assistance, and prevention of violence in an already fragile country. This study
filled an empirical void on exploring the gendered power relations between a
developing host country like Lebanon, which has a long history with the population
seeking asylum, and a seasoned international humanitarian agency, such as the
UNHCR. Both institutions had to adapt to a case of a protracted Syrian refugee
crisis and cooperate in refugee management practices, showing elements of
resistance, compromise, and (re)construction of gendered crisis response plans for
the sake of refugee protection and national stability. As such, the altruistic crisis
response plans assume that the providers and administrators of relief possess a
mandate to save those who are oppressed and in need. These discourses emphasized
the politicization of the refugee crisis while, at the same time, depoliticized the
Syrian refugees, excluding them from the crisis response strategy formulation and
practice. Simultaneously, the vulnerable otherness that the Syrian refugee represent
is contested within Lebanese public discourse with the assumption that Syrian
refugees are opportunistically what Elizabeth Olivius highlights; needy, helpless,
and dependent on those who will help, save and modernize them.625 Consequently,
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these strategies would then objectify their insecurities, reinforcing and
(re)producing local insecurities, where the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon is no
longer sustainable.
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VI. ALTERNATIVE REFUGEE INSECURITY NARRATIVES
This chapter explores how gender (in)security norms are applied on the ground with
local repercussions. Through photovoice methodology, the goal was to enable local
Lebanese volunteers to give visibility to Syrian refugees by recording and reflecting
the volunteers’ views of Syrian refugee insecurities through pictures and voice to
reach normative policy change. In effect, the participants became co-researchers:
collecting pictures, analyzing data in group form, discussing, elaborating, and
sharing their findings, while, at the same time, recognizing their own anxieties as
Lebanese citizens towards the Syrian refugee presence within their communities.
This grounded approach enriched the contextual analysis of the gendered impact
translation by highlighting the intersectionality of Syrian refugees’ insecurities and
resilience efforts, specifically those of Syrian women. Whereas keeping in mind,
this relatively small sampled project is by no means representative of, nor
appropriate to generalize all the Lebanese individuals’—with a plethora of
intersecting gendered identities—views of Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon.
Therefore, this chapter, first, discusses the motives behind this participatory
action-oriented method by describing its novel approach and contributions to
understanding the (en)gendering of Syrian refugee insecurities. It, then, highlights
the views of local Lebanese volunteers when addressing the issue of Syrian refugee
(in)security in the case of Lebanon. These participants discussed and analyzed the
Syrian refugees’ insecurities, which the study incorporates into three major themes
titled as: Extreme Impoverishment and Devastating Living Conditions; Identity and
Security; and Labor and Gender Roles.
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Thirdly, this chapter explores the research findings and implications of using the
Photovoice method. The final section evaluates the (en)gendered local implications
and discusses the deterioration of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon.

1.

Motives

As mentioned, the main purpose of PAR is to formulate alternative knowledge,
produced by individuals closest to the problem that is under investigation.626 By
enabling local Lebanese volunteers to record through pictures Syrian refugees’
realities within specific contexts, the research participants became co-researchers,
reflecting on what they perceive as refugee insecurities in their local communities.
This qualitative participatory action-oriented research facilitated increased insight
into the volunteers’ perceptions of the Syrian refugees’ complex lived experiences
and perceived (in)securities. The representation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon
becomes a key component of how refugee policies—such as the LCRP—are
written, interpreted, contested, and applied. PAR also acts as a conduit to look
deeper into the research participants’ position in the Syrian refugee crisis within
Lebanon. The timing of taking pictures and accompanying narratives can only
reflect their author’s subjective “beliefs, feelings, and cultural experiences.”627 By
voicing out their own insecurities, the research participants (re)examine how
refugees are represented and situated within Lebanese communities. Accordingly,
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the participants (in)directly discussed the projected Lebanese anxieties of the
(in)visible Syrian refugees’ agency and complex (in)securities they (re)produce
within their host communities. By elaborating on the visuals during the photoelicitation session, the co-researchers contributed to alternative visual narratives
expanding and deepening our understanding of the co-constructed community
discourses that (en)gender Syrian refugee (in)security in the case of Lebanon.
2. Thematic Analysis
The participant-oriented analysis process—known as photo-elicitation—brought
all participants to share their findings while acknowledging that each image might
generate different meanings and critiques. The main purpose of photo-elicitation
sessions was to record the participants’ views of each picture. The co-researchers
and I engaged in a group discussion and reflected on what was deemed important
to contextualize within the pictures based on the discussants’ background,
professional knowledge, and field experiences. Together, we selected the pictures
to be chosen for the project, created a caption for the selected ones, and elaborated
on the inferences behind each image according to the SHOWeD model, which the
study is keen to follow in the coming section. 628 This process guaranteed both
individual storytelling and group dialogue of each picture positioning their
arguments within the greater refugee (in)security context. Even when there was no
group consensus, the multiple inputs on each photograph discussed in the photo-
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elicitation process enriched this project. Participants ended up personalizing each
picture, attributing their knowledge, social, and personal values to it when
explaining their respective views of each photograph. Correspondingly,
participants reflected on their individual interactions with different Syrian refugee
groups, provided field knowledge of Syrian refugee (in)security practices and
highlighted local repercussions.
The photo-elicitation process involved the co-identification of major themes
among participants with deliberative, ongoing discussions about the meaning
behind each summarized photograph finding. As a result, the general themes for
this project depicted the scarcity of Syrian refugees’ basic needs and the
(re)production of (in)securities within the informal camps due to harmful policy
practices. Accordingly, this exercise helps this study showcase how negotiated
refugee (in)security norms and practice resonate in different contexts (re)producing
sights of Syrian refugee adoptions, (re)constructions, (re)definitions, and
contestations. In the meantime, those themes also revealed the relationality of
Lebanese coworkers involved in refugee assistance efforts and knowledgeable of
the refugee crisis situation. From the way they saw Syrian refugee (in)securities,
the co-researchers would highlight a specific agency of Syrian refugees— such as
child labor and working women—within Lebanese communities and elaborate on
the background of certain aspects that might not be, obviously, portrayed within the
chosen pictures. To that matter, each one of the three themes I created was an
outcome of a collection of the subthemes captions that the participants collectively
produced.
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Theme 1: Extreme Impoverishment and Devastating Living Conditions
Twelve photos addressed the issues of extreme impoverishment and devastating
living conditions that Syrian refugees in Lebanon endure in some of the
approximately 2,000 informal settlements scattered in rural areas all over the
country. These twelve photos were divided into the following four sub-themes,
followed by a summary of the main points.
It is important to note that the captions, photos, and analysis provided below
are based on the discussions that took place during the photo-elicitation process
between the main researcher and all five participants. The following literature
neither represents my sole observations nor each participant’s individual opinion.
Instead, it is a collection of a variety of opinions, highlighted during the process.
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Figure 15. I am Thirsty!

In the photo above, two young children are trying to get water from a dirty puddle
of water near the highway to fill two large empty plastic containers. According to
one participant, these are not children playing in the mud. Instead, they were tasked
to collect water for the household, and the muddy water is probably the nearest and
only available source of water they can reach. According to all participants, this
photo reflects a reality that is supposed to be shocking to the concept of the modern
280

way of life in a developed country, the lowest acceptable standards of living, and
human dignity. Not only are these children not supposed to be in this situation in
the first place, but it was also ordinary to most participants to think of the unsanitary
water, its lack of hygiene, and deadly bacteria and viruses present in it. According
to most participants, this photo sums up the current situation of hundreds of
thousands of Syrian refugee children, uprooted from their villages and towns, and
forced to adapt to a neighboring country that already suffers a weak infrastructure,
limited resources, and dwindling support from the international community.
All participants agreed that this problem has been a major issue in Lebanon
before the refugee crisis and cannot be solved without understanding the political,
social and cultural dynamics within the region. Some participants referred to
accredited programs, such as Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) that
implemented specific projects to improve access to safe drinking. In that respect,
the study concluded from an annual WASH result report that UNICEF provided
that only 65% of 150,000 Syrians living in ITS receive a basic aid assistance and
support, such as water, sanitation, and infrastructure.629Knowing the inhospitable
poor conditions of the informal settlements— makeshift tents lacking doors, proper
toilets, electricity, and hygiene services—these children could die from preventable
diseases.
Still, all participants acknowledged that the exponential increase in
population and the poor measures for managing water made it more difficult to
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enhance hygiene practices in most Lebanese communities, where women and
children are adversely affected. As such, several participants distrusted the shortterm initiatives that are, currently, introducing clean water, basic toilets, and good
hygiene practices, claiming they were either corrupt or insufficient. In their view,
there is a need to develop adequate infrastructure or contingent solutions for both—
local communities and Syrians residing in them—while ensuring financial
transparency of resources acquired from the international community. Most
participants agreed that a bulk of this problem could not be solved without a
political arrangement—the ending of violence in Syria, and, consequently, Syrians’
safe return to their homes.
The participants’ portrayal of Syrian children getting water from a dirty
puddle of water is an inherently demonstrative case of their agency. The above
photo-elicitation brought to light how Syrian children seem to play a crucial part in
household maintenance increasing their role within the domestic sphere that is
typically framed as women’s domain. Accordingly, the co-researchers’ illustrations
and analysis of the above image reinforce the research’s aim in highlighting the fact
that, Syrian residents are not passive recipients of the local humanitarian aid
system. Instead, these Syrians appropriate, negotiate and modify their surroundings
any way they can to survive. Therefore, the traditional relief model implemented in
refugee crisis response plans fails, for it discounts these dimensions of normalcy
and resilience that inherent in a people. Consequently, the dyadic linear depiction
of Syrian refugees as passive recipients of aid assistance gets further complicated.
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Figure 16. I Am Disinfecting Bread

In the photos above, Syrian children are seen drying up bread in the sun on a
UNHCR-branded recycled tent. At first, this practice may seem to be part of
preparing a traditional food of sorts. In reality, this is a process by which Syrian
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refugees disinfect and preserve bread in the sun for later consumption, mainly
because bread, food supplies, and donations reach refugee populations on an
irregular basis. Hence, some participants claimed that Syrian refugee women are
forced to take unusual measures to prevent or disinfect stale bread to secure food
availability for their families whenever supplies do not arrive on time.
This sub-theme was recurrent during the photo-elicitation discussion,
illustrating the degradation of the quality of life for many Syrian refugees to the
extent that it can no longer be compared to standard everyday life in Lebanon. Most
participants associated this scenery with misery, usually depicted in films and
novels, talking about the way of life during times of desperation. This image
generated divisions between two main group perceptions. One group justified such
a scenario as a natural result of forceful displacement, while the other normalized
this behavior of unsanitary diets frequently performed by rural families as part of
the Syrian-Bedouin tribal customs and practices. Accordingly, such photoelicitation produces the typical gendered case where Syrian women resiliently adapt
new measures to curb hunger.630 In that respect, their views seem to complement
one report of the gender situation and vulnerability of Syrian refugees. This report
stated that Syrian women resort to harmful health cultural practices of cutting down
on their own food intake so that “children and men in the household can
eat….certain types of aid (specifically food vouchers) are insufficient; some
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respondents reported selling their [Syrian women] vouchers at lower than face
value to get cash to pay rent or other expenses.”631
All participants agreed that humanitarian aid and refugee relief systems that
are set in place are inadequate and still suffer from underfunding, poor
management, and corruption. Some participants discussed the available electronic
food voucher (E-card system) that allows registered Syrian refugees to purchase
food from hundreds of the World Food Program (WFP) contracted shops. Still,
most participants believe that the E-card system creates a hierarchical space for
opportunism, where often privileged men, more knowledgeable and adequate to
handle transactions, take advantage of the unified system for cash transfers and
control their extended family members’ income. Accordingly, their photoelicitation provide a case of the masculinized impact of refugee insecurity. Where
women are doubly discriminated; once by the availability of the aids and funds
provided within through the E-card system, another by the gendered cultural norms
and the aid mechanisms that limit them from avoiding or even accessing unpleasant
and undignified shopping experiences at the scarce partner stores available in their
area. On the one hand, the male-headed households are generally controlled by
primary cash recipients—Syrian refugee men—who generally decide how money
should be spent. On the other hand, female-headed Syrian refugees’ households are
according to one study excluded from receiving aid as cultural norms often prevent
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most Syrian women from being able to register and follow up by themselves with
the UNHCR’s partner agencies.632
Some of the suggested solutions that the participants elaborated on were to
find ways to ensure that food donations reach all targeted refugee populations
immediately rather than subcontracting them through large organizations, often
corrupted and too slow to deliver. Another suggestion made by all participants was
to push the international community to be more involved in providing direct aid
and awareness to refugees, not only by increasing support to the Lebanese
government but also by improving the management, supervision, and efficiency of
the one-on-one donation programs.

632

Ibid, 14.
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Figure 17. Scavengers

The above collection of photos depicts the exteriors of the tents and
makeshift shelters that are typically seen in Syrian refugee shelter camps across
Lebanese territories. One of the photos shows a collection of materials scavenged,
outsourced, and even possibly stolen from everywhere, including tarps, cloth,
cardboard, barrels, plastic containers, and metal sheets, among other accessible
material—all to build a tent-like structure to shelter Syrian families. All participants
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agreed that these photos are perfect depictions of the common sites of desperation
for survival by most Syrian informal campsite communities, deprived of adequate
resources for resettlement. With no concrete plan to host the million and some
Syrians, who, according to a few participants, “swarmed” into Lebanon between
the year 2011 and 2015, illicit forms of Syrian refugee resilience were adapted;
what the participants captioned as scavenging. This negative connotation, during
the photo elicitation, on the Syrian presence provides one example of how some
participants’ perception is still affected by the hostile Lebanese attitude towards the
inflow of Syrian refugees to Lebanon. Still, participants were keen to project their
blame towards the Lebanese government’s refusal to accommodate Syrians and
provide viable shelters.
Even though most participants do not agree with creating official camps like
the ones provided to the Palestinians, ensuring viable shelters would be a small
effort in the right direction. Another part of the problem blamed by all participants
is the failure of the international community, especially the United Nations, to take
the necessary measures to manage the refugee crisis in Lebanon. As a result, some
participants highlighted that much of the international organization’s donations
went to food, while very little went to shelter, which is considered by the
participants to be the most pressing concern for most Syrian refugees, especially in
areas of the country that know extreme weather conditions.
Accordingly, the participants viewed these tents as a sharp contrast to the
most basic standards of living that one would expect in a village or a city. According
to one participant, these shelters provide no privacy and no protection from
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intrusion or attacks, where Syrian women and children are vulnerable to any type
of harassment, assault, or abduction.
Accordingly, the participants’ statement that women and children are more
vulnerable to assaults and attacks indirectly reinforces a justified dyadic view of
refugees’ identities and practices, where Syrian women and children are the
weakest links having little to no agency in thwarting or even initiating such
discriminatory attempts. One challenging question to the caption of the above
picture is: if Syrian women and children comprise almost 80 % of registered Syrian
refugees in Lebanon, what is the probability of them being the scavengers? This is
not to point fingers on their resilience efforts. As an alternative, it is an attempt to
contest the gendered image of Syrian refugee women and children; passive victims.
Instead, this “scavenger” image would represent one of the many ways refugee
women brave through the worst humanitarian crisis by “shifting, changing,
building, learning and moving on.” 633
On another note, it is also important to point out that some participants
correlated the scavenging situation with many Syrian experiences on the outskirts
of urban areas, where a couple of participants criticized specific humanitarian
programs. One example mentioned was the UN-Habitat that focused its effort on
mostly liaising with landlords as focal points in their endeavor to identify new
shelter units and rehabilitate existing ones. In their view, the informality of a renting
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agreement between a landlord and Syrian tenants further complicates the modality
of what is called as “cash-per-task” basis programs, restraining direct access and
assistance to refugee sites, having limited knowledge and monitoring mechanisms
of distributed materials. There was unanimity on the issue of tackling corruption,
especially when talking about aid programs that do not reach the people in need.
Many participants echoed Syrian women’s outcries towards the low quality of
materials being provided if provided at all. All participants agreed that there are no
immediate solutions to this problem without the inconceivable political decision of
either accepting the build-up of formal refugee camps or guaranteeing the safe
return of Syrian refugees to safe zones in Syria. Some participants’ negative
reaction to the formation of formal settlements brought to light their fear as
Lebanese citizens of the great number of Syrians presents in Lebanon. In their view,
formal Syrian refugee spaces could only lead to more Syrian concentration,
(re)producing another dire threat to Lebanon’s political stability, such as what
previously happened with the Palestinian refugees’ case.
Overall, the participants’ depiction of Syrian refugees as scavengers is a
great example of how Syrian refugees’ resilience is a dynamic process relevant to
the setting they are in. In effect, these contextualized actors—Syrian refugees—
seem to be contesting the imposed gendered policies and harmful securitization
practices to bounce back, (re)producing refugee (in)securities and creating
disturbances within the status quo. As a result, this type of resilience efforts
showcases how Syrian refugees retaliate to oppressive management by adopting
negative coping strategies to overcome their experiences.
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Ultimately, these reactions would reinforce the contestation, resistance, and
(re)construction of gendered inequalities, (re)producing an (in)security
vicious cycle within the informal camps and respective host communities.

Figure 18. W.A.S.H.
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The above collection of photos shows the impact of refugee life on the
Litany Riverside. Many refugee camps were erected near rivers simply because of
the proximity to water sources. The first photo shows two young girls standing at
the gate of a tin cottage watching a green patch nearby. In reality, participants stated
that this is a pond of algae, which has formed as the water and garbage flowed down
from the river and into the periphery of the refugee camp. Participants claimed that
such a photo relates to their lives in several ways. First, these images are a reminder
of the humanitarian catastrophe facing Lebanon with little effective intervention
measures to bounce back from it. Participants chose these photos as a symbol of
the deterioration of Lebanese infrastructure and waste management due to the
Syrian influx to land already suffering from pollution. Secondly, these images show
the severe nature of refugee life, where access to clean water is a luxury instead of
being a fundamental right. These photos are also a reminder of the serious issues
associated with the Syrian crisis that residents are facing in Lebanon, such as the
strain on water supply, pollution, contaminated rivers and lands, and the spread of
poverty-related problems.
Some of the photos above display pumps installed near the river and pipes
carrying water to refugee settlements. The reality seen in these photos is the
devastating impact of the sporadic informal settlements along Lebanese rivers,
especially the excessive waste and pollution afflicting that area. Some participants,
however, highlighted that the river water was polluted even before the outburst of
the Syrian war and the arrival of Syrians to its land. According to participants, the
primary cause of this unsanitary foul-smelling water infrastructure is the poor
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management and planning by the crisis response plan strategists— Lebanese
government, the UNHCR, and donors—leaving wastewater, human excrement,
industrial chemical overflow and residuals from quarries unattended. According to
the participants, these organizations are aware of but mostly negligent about this
longstanding water crisis. One of the main problems highlighted by the participants
is the issue of ongoing corruption; unlicensed over-abstraction and illegal activities
operating along Lebanon’s main rivers such as the Litani. Some participants
recapped the “You Stink”— Tul3it Rihetkun—movement protesting the garbage
crisis and lack of trash collection in most municipalities due to tractor pull scandals
over public waste management that Lebanon was and is still enduring. According
to the participants, these demonstrations started when Lebanese communities were
inundated with piled-up rubbish in the streets due to a shortage of garbage
collection agencies and expiration of a dubious contract between the Lebanese
government and the exploitative company Sukleen, among many other issues. All
participants reiterated that there is a social distrust in the inconsistent public
services that subcontract their managerial operations to monopolistic private
businesses with dubious political connections and hiring personnel.
At the same time, most participants agreed that the Syrian presence in
certain areas further deteriorated the water pollution, with refugees resorting to
throwing their waste in the river instead of being proactive and disposing of it in
corresponding garbage collection bins. Participants argued that the dirty river water
is pumped directly to the informal settlements for consumption by Syrians who end
up suffering from poor hygiene, sanitation issues, and various health problems.
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Still, one participant criticized the unavailability of collection bins near the informal
settlements, justifying the negative coping strategies. Syrian residents utilize to
adapt within their (in)accessible environment. Accordingly, the last photo in this
collection shows a humanmade waterhole, intended to collect water for agricultural
use, showing a pump and pipe, as well as wet clothes left to dry. All participants
stated that most Syrians’ health problems were related to a lack of clean water,
proper sanitation, and hygiene. Although this water was intended for agriculture
use, the nearby Syrian refugee settlement is accessing it for domestic use as well.
Some participants elaborated on Syrian women’s agency, where this infested water
gets pumped out of the hole into the camp and is used for cooking, bathing,
washing, laundry, and other household practices. Even though women play a key
role in securing the household food and water resource management, some
participants view that these women are still affected by their insufficient decisionmaking power within their household and community at large. This structural
dynamic, highlighted by the photo-elicitation session, highlights the Syrian
women’s significant plights as inherently private, awaiting the male head of the
household’s approval and prevents these women from making the suitable choices
in order to receive adequate care. Under those circumstances, the possible perils of
Syrian women using this type of water supply not only jeopardizes Syrian lives
within this camp, but also threatens the nearby health facilities, the continuity of
overburdened service delivery, and weak local governance. Even though the
problems in acquiring safe access to clean water differed slightly by shelter type,
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according to participants, this type of Syrian resilience prevents local health
institutions from containing and preventing similar disease outbreaks.
All participants view additional refugee demands to the already neglected
water resources has set the country on a self-destructive path. Participants’
suggested solutions were twofold: immediate relocation of refugee settlements
away from the polluted rivers to areas where supplies of clean water are available.
In the meantime, participants reiterated the need to hold the Lebanese government
accountable for improving its public services and addressing the issue of river
pollution as a sustainable long-term goal for the sake of its own citizens. Most
participants advised of the need to encourage water treatment and safe water
container maintenance amongst refugee households, raising awareness on how to
take care of national resource, as well as creating waste management initiatives
through education, strict regulations, enforcement, and punishment. Some
participants also highlighted the need to involve the international community in
finding ways to incorporate Syrian refugees in hygiene promotion and treating
Lebanon’s water supplies.
Theme 2: Identity & Insecurity
Five groups of photos were classified under the theme of identity and security. Both
co-constituting themes were recurrent in the photo-elicitation process as
participants viewed them as affecting not only Syrian refugees but also the hosting
Lebanese communities. The participants’ engagement in the gendered nature of
refugee representation provided a critical assessment of the stereotypical simplistic
division of roles of Syrian men as perpetrators and women as victims with no
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agency. Meanwhile, the coresearchers’ projection of their positionality—as
Lebanese citizens in search of local stability—was visibly highlighted when
discussing the following pictures, (re)negotiating their position towards the Syrian
presence in Lebanon.

Figure 19. I Want, But I Do Not Need

The above photo portrays rundown tents in Syrian refugee settlements in Lebanon
where electricity cables are hanging above some tents and satellite dishes are
installed on top of others. According to participants, the contrast in this picture
depicts the resilience and systemic privileges within the Syrian refugee
communities—where the rundown tents represent poverty while hanging electricity
cables represent resilience efforts and satellite dishes characterize some form of
luxury. All participants stated that most informal settlements are built on privately
owned lands, which Lebanese property owners are free to rent at any price. Some
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volunteers also stated that most Syrians, often within one camp, originate from the
same region, sharing common socio-cultural and religious values. One participant
criticized the fact that a shawish is always a man, who informally governs the
Syrian settlements as its representative, affecting and excluding Syrian women
from most decision-making processes. The fact that he is, often, the sole person
who negotiates the settlement rental with the landlord, collects the rent, and the one
who organizes the structure of the camp, gives him the public sphere decisionmaking privileges that citizenmen often hold and that other Syrians, especially
women, do not enjoy. Several participants questioned the UN humanitarian relief
system’s reliance on shawishs as the interface between the aid programs and
refugees themselves, privileging one (male) Syrian over others. According to some
volunteers, this dynamic creates space for manipulation and unequal opportunities
of having a dish on the top of some tents and not others. This photoelicitation
generated by some participants helps the study illustrate the impact of the LCRP’s
approach to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon. It portrays a clear case of how refugee
resilience can be interpreted in many ways; it can range from Syrian shawishs
adapting to new realities as the de facto informal-settlements’ supervisors and
thrive by maintaining a securitized refugee system that guarantees their relative
power over controlling most of the receiving aids, exploiting the relative
vulnerability of other residing Syrian refugees.
According to one commentary made by the Century Foundation,
Lebanon’s treatment of Syrian refugees as a security problem (en)gendered a rise
of “local Syrian strongmen known as the shawishs within Lebanese displacement
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camps” illustrating one of the many impacts of Lebanon’s crisis response approach
to the Syrian refugee crisis.634
Consequently, the commentary states that “the shawishs are a perversion in a
system that is reinforced by State Security actors, ignored by the ministry of interior
and local municipalities, convenient for landowners, and problematic for aid
organizations and refugees.” 635 Positioned as the middlemen, most shawishs
control the Syrians’ livelihood and aid opportunities, using their given power to
(re)negotiate their status with the landowner and aid organizations, barely serving
the interests of Syrian refugees living in the camps.
On another note, most participants believed that images, like the one
pictured above, are justified portrayals of the growing distrust and tensions between
the Lebanese communities and Syrian refugees, as most Lebanese currently suffer
from economic and social exhaustion, seeing Syrian refugees as a privileged burden
and a source of insecurity rather than as people in need. The different sets of
privileges stated within this photoelicitation lie in the fact that Lebanon suffers from
a chronic electricity problem, where most towns get less than eight or twelve hours
of power daily. 636 The participants could not ignore the Lebanese society’s
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anxieties and weariness that the informal refugee camps, as illustrated in the above
picture, abuse and exploit their stay by extending illegally electricity cables and
dishes. From their discussion, the co-researchers state that those in camps tend to
get power and cable on a more regular basis than Lebanese residents at little to no
cost. Their position here can be interpreted as empathetic with the poor Lebanese
complaints that some “Syrian refugees receive more benefits than they do.”637 As
such, during photo-elicitation, participants justified several incidents of hostile
attitudes toward Syrian refugees from local communities as a reaction to the illicit
work committed by refugees in urban and rural areas. According to participants,
this situation could be attributed to the fact that many refugee camps are informal,
blaming the Lebanese political deadlock that (en)genders the susceptibility of these
camps to harboring criminals and terrorist groups. Hence, pictures of satellite dishes
and power lines triggered more questions among participants such as: what other
kinds of luxuries do refugees “enjoy” inside their tents?
Meanwhile, one participant highlighted the fact that the Lebanese uproar
against Syrians abusing electricity is out of place. It came with the fact that Syria’s
supply of electricity to Lebanon remained intact despite the raging war it is
witnessing. This photoelicitation reinforced the participants’ negative view of their
government’s ineptitude. It can be interpreted as the actual upheaval should be
focused on the corrupted weak Lebanese system for causing severe electricity cuts,
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due to domestic political turmoil and personal gains. Even though the proposed
solutions were limited, all participants blamed the Lebanese government, which
was, still, expected to carefully manage these settlements and reduce them in scale
so that they become secure to neighboring communities. Also, some participants
echoed the Lebanese citizens’ overburden and outcries for the return of many of
these refugees to secure areas in Syria where fighting has ended. Without such
solutions, participants ascertained violence to be inevitable between Syrian
refugees and Lebanese communities, especially when tension arises.

Figure 20. Refugee Food Assistance
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The above photo shows a store sign announcing that it is part of the food program
organized by UNHCR. Participants explained that the current refugee aid system
resulted in the monopoly of a limited number of stores where Syrian refugees could
use the debit E-cards issued by the UNHCR to purchase food and supplies.
Participants explained that this UNHCR program started to fight corruption, ensure
the effective distribution of food supplies, and direct aid to Syrian families while
empowering local businesses. In this case, the program seems to have failed Syrians
where one participant highlighted an interesting aspect of this photo—the fact that
the shop was closed. This fact triggered an interesting discussion among
participants who justified the shop’s closure either because of personal reasons,
Ramadan (an important Muslim holy period), it ran out of supplies, or most Ecards
ran out of debit.
Having a closed shop during the daytime meant to some participants the
failure of the food and aid program to deliver the required assistance to vulnerable
Syrians residing in an area where a local store owner has the privilege to deny
Syrians assistance. One participant also highlighted the severe impact of the Syrian
refugee crisis on local Lebanese businesses to the point that many stores in remote
areas were no longer open since they have lost their begrudged Lebanese clients
and, thus, became dependent on desperate Syrian clienteles. Overall, the photo
above relates to the devastating impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on local
businesses where gendered power relations complexly impact how aid assistance is
translated in local context. Under those circumstances, a local store’s provision or
denial of aid products (en)genders local resilience efforts by both communities;

301

Lebanese residents would boycott welcoming Syrian shops and residing Syrians
adopting unhealthy food rationings strategies in order to survive. Participants
claimed that many of the host communities initially welcomed Syrian refugees in
their homes or on their properties. However, by 2014, the already economically
embattled Lebanese began to show definite signs of exhaustion and tension toward
Syrian residents, especially with the terrorist attacks of 2014 that overtook
Lebanese cities and the Lebanese army. As a result, and according to the
participants, most Lebanese blame Syrian refugees for almost every economic or
social problem, as well as any threat to security.
Based on the photo-elicitation discussions, the participants persistently
blamed the Lebanese government for failing to enforce local standards in regulating
local businesses that leaves both populations vulnerable to illicit opportunistic
business activities. Some argued that the situation is as such because the Lebanese
government was politically corrupt giving business privileges to their devoted party
members, while others pointed out the inconsistencies in foreign support and the
failed outsourcing of humanitarian aid programs. One of the suggested solutions
was to push for more direct aid and customized support for the different Syrian
refugees, since this would attract more local businesses to participate in the
program, creating competition, while reducing local pressure and corruption.
Another suggested solution was to organize and regulate the presence of Syrian
refugees in Lebanon, at least as far as the informal settlements are concerned for,
they represent the primary source of economic instability and security threats.
However, the only all-agreed upon solution was to find ways to help refugees safely
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return to their country because, after seven years of refuge, Syrians’ living
standards in areas such as these have deteriorated tremendously.

Figure 31. Lost Identity

The above photo shows a wallet discarded on the sidewalk. Interpretations were
that it could have either fallen from someone or was stolen and then discarded.
Participants argued that the valuables inside a wallet do not only include cash or
credit cards but more importantly, identity cards. In a country where identity and
identity politics prevail, and where refugees are classified and treated accordingly,
one’s self is often summed up in a plastic card issued by government officials. For
a Lebanese citizen, losing their identity card would mean a real bureaucratic hassle
and will lead to a colossal waste of time attempting to get a new one, if possible.
For a Syrian refugee, losing their identity card means the possibility of going to jail,
with dim to no hope of legitimately returning to Syria.
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According to some participants, this situation would lead Syrians to
negatively adapt to their new realities using illegal measures to access socioeconomic gains, especially when many terrorists rely on stolen identity cards to
facilitate their mobility within the country. Consequently, all participants agreed
that Syrian women were the weaker link in this vicious cycle—having their
identification cards managed by either their spouses or, even worse, the informal
settlements’ shawishs, who end up monopolizing most transactions within the
public sphere. One participant echoed some of the Syrian women’s lack of
confidence in reporting incidents of abuse, exploitation, and harassment to local
authorities due to lack of trust in the Lebanese authorities in taking action or, worse,
the fear of reprisals by their abusers. 638
Meanwhile, most participants approved of one suggested solution to
develop more inclusive and stricter security measures. One example approved by
some co-researchers was the automated system for issuing temporary identification
cards by the UNHCR using biometrics that would be officially acknowledged by
Lebanese authorities as a way for refugees to be legally visible by local authorities.
However, a couple of participants were hesitant of using such intrusive measures
that would end up surveilling the Syrian’s daily activities and potentially sharing
their information with third-party interest groups, thus stripping away their privacy.
This commended recommendation of issuing legal identification cards to Syrians
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residents simultaneously came with some of the discriminatory fears of Syrian legal
permanent presence within the participants’ country. It seems as if their altruistic
inclinations could not overpass the fears and enshrined vindications of Syrian
(Sunni) hyper-masculine domination over Lebanon. Still, we do find some empathy
from some of the participants’ or perhaps a self-projection of their own collective
fear over an intrusive state that uses notoriously intelligence services (Mukhabarat)
in order to track, terrorize, and eliminate individuals who pose a threat or are just
undesirable.
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Figure 22. Raising Awareness

The collection of photos above shows some of the published literature and
large posters issued by the UNHCR and other humanitarian programs involved in
aiding Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The posters are seen on the walls of a store
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behind a pile of balls or on boards installed in a remote area near refugee camps.
These photos appear to reflect part of the efforts to create awareness among Syrian
refugees and Lebanese citizens on issues about the refugee crisis. However, most
photos reveal more technical problems rather than easy solutions. One participant
explained that the poster on the wall of the store could be barely seen, as it is
(un)intentionally hidden by merchandise. Similarly, the pamphlets on the roads are
difficult to recognize from a distance. This is not to mention that the posters are in
remote locations that are difficult to reach by pedestrians or by someone commuting
on public transportation. Other participants reiterated that low literacy among many
Syrians makes these posters of limited use. In fact, the majority of the refugees in
those informal settlements are children and young women from poor upbringings,
mostly reserved in the private sphere, which, according to all participants, explains
their lack of the necessary tools to successfully navigate the public sphere.
According to all participants, these posters exist because the UNHCR and
governmental agencies find many difficulties in reaching out to Syrian refugees and
communicating with them on an individual basis. Even with printed banners with
animation about the preferred processes on how to acquire security and support,
many participants agreed that refugees distrust the Lebanese government and
international organizations, fearing that registration or submitting their personal
information could, still, get them in trouble with the Lebanese law. Similarly, some
participants added that neither the Lebanese government nor the relief agencies
have the resources and capability to cover all the informal settlements because of
the chaotic way these camps are scattered.
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With the lack of trust and the obstacles related to logistics, the most
effective solution suggested by most participants was to resort to social and mass
media. Educational and informative programs on media such as TV and radio can
always reach larger populations of Syrians who get most of their information
through these outlets. At the same time, all participants agreed that the UNHCR
and other humanitarian organizations already use the WhatsApp application to
reach Syrian refugees, sharing information and updates from respective agencies,
which makes posters obsolete.
Still, some participants criticized this information gap as a significant
barrier to most Syrians in accessing relevant news of Syrian conflict, forging crossboundary networks, and, most importantly, recognizing available aid programs.
According to one participant, Syrian women are not the primary news bearers,
vulnerable to inadequate, sporadic, and random misinformation. Most of these
women do not have access to cellphones, impeded from accessing real-time
information that would help them navigate safely within the public sphere. Most of
the older Syrian women that the volunteers worked with either struggle to learn
how to navigate the different types of communication devices or the younger
females have their cellphones confiscated by their male counterparts. This
information precarity is further exacerbated with the limited and costly network
coverage that isolates most Syrian women, who have little control over the nuanced
or inaccurate news circulated about them, becoming dependent on versions of
stories. According to one participant, this situation created a new dynamism of
female-lead Syrian initiatives to rebuff those inaccuracies by forging external
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alliances through media outlets. Online platforms, such as the Facebook group “I
am a Syrian in Lebanon,” were utilized as viable outlets to voice out their realities,
while at the same time crafting alternative Syrian stories and seeking adequate
assistance and support from fellow Syrians.

Figure 23. Fear Of The Other

This title includes two photos of tents inside an informal Syrian settlement. The
tents are viewed as vulnerable and exposed, and yet appear as if they are
aggressively hiding whatever is inside, with small entrances. The photos show the
reality of life inside informal refugee camps at the edge of towns, roadsides, near
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rivers, or agricultural lands. Interestingly, on the exterior of the tents, the UNHCR
logo can be seen, depicting their ineffective presence within the occupied space in
providing refugees with some form of safety and protection from visiting outsiders.
The half-built open tents, the scavenged pallets, and the hazardous extended cables
shown are nothing like what the UNHCR promoted for refugee assistance and
protection. One participant believed that Syrian adults and children living inside
the tents can barely enjoy any security or privacy and are subject to voyeurism.
Also, the participant highlighted that most informal camps are isolated from nearby
communities, both by physical and invisible cultural barriers.
The volunteers chose these photos as a depiction of how most Syrian
women refugees suffer from minimal privacy protection, especially those who live
in ITS, relatively far from any town center, as they are vulnerable for anyone to just
drive by and terrorize them.639 Street vigilantes, local police, and soldiers raid the
informal tents, in the guise of checking permits, only to harass the women residing
there.640 This dramatically increases the exposure to GBV, as in a patriarchal social
context, the female body is a central subject of gazing, and Syrian women are
perceived as sexual beings, especially in the case of younger women, having not
developed sufficient experience in dealing with sexuality.641
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On another note, all participants agreed that most Syrian inhabitants are
apprehensive to intruders asking all sorts of questions. According to some
participants, there were many times that they witnessed the same unfriendliness in
some of their visits. Syrians residing in the camps, especially women, are anxious
and angry about being exploited by newcomers whose sole purpose is to get a
success story out of their misery.
Some participants stated that Syrians were mostly reluctant from
journalists’ visits, researchers, and agency representatives, where most external
visit purposes aimed to get interesting photographs while twisting Syrian refugees’
stories in order to gain enough attention. Rightfully, this could be described as
“research fatigue” where alternative privileged individuals come up to refugees in
order to rush questions with no tangible positive change for the refugees. This photo
argument made me reassess at that moment my position in all this photo-elicitation,
for the person most (in)directly benefitting from these participants’ work is me so
far. That is why, we all agreed at that moment that once the dissertation is finished,
we would hold another (non)virtual session for future planning.
The participants, later, elaborated on the notion of special interest where
some agencies’ goals and interests do not necessarily correspond to the messages
that the Syrians wanted to spread. As a result, the participants’ portrayal of how
Syrians distrust external visitors with an external agenda resonates with the study’s
aim of debunking the tendencies of reports, policies, and studies misusing an
essentialist image of Syrian refugees—as either potential masculine threats that
need to be controlled or feminized victims in dire need to be protected—for
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personal benefit. Both projected images silence the complex Syrian realities and
forcibly strip away their agency. According to one participant, these ill-equipped
intruders ask questions, take a photograph and, eventually, go back to the comfort
of their homes, leaving the depicted Syrians in the same conundrum. Other
participants responded that many other refugees seize the moment of foreigners
coming to showcase impoverishment and request assistance. In fact, during both
our visits the shawish, assisted by several women and a dozen children, gave us a
tour around their informal camp highlighting all sorts of problems that many
resident Syrians face. One example is when the shawish presented us with a couple
of Syrian families and introduced them as illegal, having not acquired their UNHCR
registration documents yet, not wanting to leave the camp out of fear of
apprehension. Others joined in and complained about their health problems and
lack of medication or even hospitalization and requesting aid to pay for these
procedures. Even though these examples contradicted the first impression that the
participant wanted to highlight, still, a common theme within both is the refugee’s
agency and resilience in either wanting to voice out their insecurities or shut all
communication efforts down not wanting to be exploited.
The participants’ suggested solution to end this situation is difficult and
costly. One example is to provide an information outlet for these refugees to craft
their own stories and be able to express their perceptions and feelings about their
own realities publicly. At the same time, all participants viewed that the ultimate
solution requires some political agreement and a strong will by the Lebanese
government to allow refugees to access secure housing until their safe return to
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their homeland. According to participants, this problem can only be solved with the
latter solution for most Syrians will continue to be exploited if there is news to
“sell.” In the meantime, all participants agree that the terrible living conditions
Syrians endure in Lebanon will not change, and if these types of news stories
continue, neighboring Lebanese communities will feel more tension and
apprehension about the weight and cost of the continued Syrian refugee presence
within their neighborhoods.
Theme 3: Labor & Gender Roles
Three sub-themes are identified under this thematic category, addressing the issues
of labor among refugees, especially among children, as well as the participants’ view
of the shifting and changing gender roles that seem imposed on many Syrian women
as a result of the impact of the war.
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Figure24. Child Labor

One of the two photos above shows a child filling water in a bottle out of a
muddy hole while the other shows a young child watching a sibling work in a
vegetable field next to a dirty river filled with garbage. On the one hand, these
photos speak of extreme poverty, unacceptable suffering, and despair combined
with survival. On the other hand, they reflect issues of child labor as a result of the
Syrian refugee crisis. The photos were taken during the holy month of Ramadan
when most adults were fasting and sleeping during the day, while the children, who
do not have to fast, worked. However, even during other months of the year,
participants were used to seeing young children working, whereas mothers are more
likely to stay inside the camps and fathers or adult males barely seen.
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These photos tell the stories of refugee children striving to survive under
inhuman conditions. What makes their suffering worse is the combination of
cultural values and traditions that are not equipped for times of war. All participants
agreed that most of these children were born as refugees, inside the informal
settlements in the absence of adequate family planning, and strong drive among
refugees to beget more children for religious or cultural reasons. Either way, the
participants stated that birth rates of Syrian refugees are growing exponentially,
imposing a much more significant burden on the international community that is
unable to offer enough aid, and on the Lebanese government and society that are
suffering, mostly, from overpopulation.
In addition to the massive Syrian population residing in specific Lebanese
communities, the limited capabilities of the Lebanese state, and the weak efforts of
the UNHCR, the problem is caused and exacerbated by cultural factors, among
many.
According to one participant, many Syrians reiterated an ill-informed, birthencouraging, Arabic cultural saying to them when asked about the reasons for
childbearing: “Child’s livelihood comes with his birth—Al walad rizkhou ya’ti
ma3aho.” Many of the refugees believe that they must continue begetting children
despite the crisis and lack of resources, partly for traditional reasons that have to do
with the practice of raising children to help in generating more possibilities of
livelihood and expanding family status, and therefore strength.
In addition, it is important to note that there is also a lack of legal protection
for refugee children that allows their parents, shawishs, or others to exploit them in
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labor and different fields such as becoming beggars or even thieves on the streets,
where they are subject to all kinds of verbal, emotional, physical and sexual abuse.
Interestingly, the Labor
Code in Lebanon states that no child under eight years old is allowed to work. Still,
Lebanese laws do not extend to foreign residents, leaving Syrian children
unchecked. 642 Swapping one form of danger for another–sexual harassment and
verbal abuse—one Syrian child recounts: “It was very hostile—people used to call
me the ‘Syrian dog’ and other things […] I would get really hurt, sometimes I would
just sit and cry. It was humiliating.”643
On one end, we find that with all the efforts made by both LCRP initiatives
to ameliorate and expand the current education system, Lebanese schools barely
accommodate 100,000 of the 300,000 Syrian children.644 With not enough teachers
qualified to cover this sudden increase in student registrations, “some schools send
Lebanese children home after half a day and then teach Syrians in the second
half.”
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development of any child by restricting them from the necessary educational
programs.646
Furthermore, all participants believe that most refugee children born in
Lebanon have no documents and are not registered, which raises many serious
questions about their stateless future when they choose to stay, return home, or even
seek asylum in third countries. According to one participant, the only recourse the
impoverished Syrian families are unable to undertake is a costly and complex legal
process to register their children, failing to prove family ties when legally crossing
state borders. Most participants agree that roughly half a million Syrian children
born in Lebanon lack legal documentation. These children are, thus, unable to enroll
in public schools for they are legally nonexistent and lack proof of their age.
Ideally, the participants’ projected solutions would be to educate, inform,
and create awareness about family planning to motivate Syrian refugees to avoid
giving birth on a large scale. However, some participants viewed this as extremely
difficult when there are very few resources to provide Syrians their most basic
needs, let alone finding enough resources for education and awareness. In addition
to this, it is impossible to persuade Syrians not to carry on with their lives, avoid
getting married, or to have children, when they have already spent seven years in
Lebanon with no hope that the war in their country will come to an end shortly.
Thus, most participants acknowledged the presence of few initiatives in certain
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hospitals and clinics to ease Syrian birth registration rules providing birth
certificates in hopes of reinstating some legal presence. All participants agreed that
the only viable solution left is to create a low-cost legal mechanism to register the
oppressed Syrian children to access safety, education, and avoid informal labor at
all costs.

Figure 25. Shift Of Gender Roles
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The three photos above show the extent to which the participants showcase
Syrian women’s agency and what seemed to them as a shift of gender roles among
Syrian refugees in Lebanon. One photo shows a woman carrying a bucket
throughout the camp. The second photo shows a young girl carrying a child, and
the third shows a woman lifting a wooden plank. The most striking reality in these
photos is the absence of men in all three situations. This does not come as a surprise
to the participants since few adult men are usually to be seen within the informal
settlements. According to one participant, most men are either away during the day
or resting during Ramadan season inside the tents. As a result, Syrian women and
girls had to take on their responsibilities in managing the camp by conducting their
daily chores within the open camp’s public spaces without proper protection.
As Syrian women take on more responsibility and autonomy, for many of
them these opportunities and increasing responsibilities do not mean equality nor
security. All participants agreed that the significant number of females and children
inside the refugee camps compared to adult men has severe implications for both
Syrians and Lebanese residing there. Many Syrian women complained to some of
the participants that the sense of security is barely felt at the camps, and even more
so outside the camps, where women and children must occasionally venture to get
supplies, get documents processed, or work informally to earn additional income.
According to some participants, many Syrian women, as young as fifteen years of
age, witnessed a dramatic increase of gender-based violence, as they were often
seen as easy and desperate targets for sexual assault, rape, and other forms of
intimidation.
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One volunteer stated that young boys have not been spared, especially as
many are sent by their designated shawish on the streets to work, beg, or steal from
the age of five.647 According to that participant, a boy at the age of 13 is a man and
is thus eligible to be a breadwinner, which means that he comes under more
pressure to generate income with any means available, considering the possibility
of starting his own family within few years. One participant highlighted the fact
that most children under seven years were born in Lebanon; not knowing any life
other than being refugees means that within a few years this population will be
growing at explosive rates, worsening the Syrians’ standard of living. As far as the
Lebanese are concerned, all participants view that this not only represents a
significant social or economic problem, particularly with the added strain on the
already weak and limited resources of the country, but it is also a problem of basic
security. One participant commented that theft, violence, crime, and rape became
way too common in these areas, and in many cases, Lebanese citizens are the
primary targets. As a result, simmering tensions between the communities and
increased harassment and violence against refugees by the security apparatuses in
the country became more blatant and somewhat justified.
Most participants highlighted the fact that there were several initiatives that
focus on training women facing adversity to develop enough skills to engage in a
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number of socio-economically viable and productive activities. According to one
participant, her nonprofit organization helps Syrian women develop ways to market
and sell their products in the local economy. By providing Syrian women with
adequate skills and training in the production of goods, marketing, distribution, and
sale, the organization hosts several funded projects to empower Syrian women by
encouraging them to communicate, exchange experiences, share issues, and support
each other at work.648 Still, most participants agreed that the available initiatives
were insufficient, deeply affected by discriminatory personal laws that inhibit most
of these women to thrive in a Lebanese context. According to some participants,
most projects that focus on women’s empowerment tend to be somewhat
encouraging and not challenging the main problem— structural patriarchal system
established within the Lebanese context. Some examples mentioned by participants
cover vocational training; most either offer computer lessons or language courses
or instruct them in gendered skills such as culinary activities, hair and make-up,
and embroidery. Although these programs do help Syrian women in generating
some safe income, one participant still criticized these programs of stereotyping
women’s division of labor that does not seem to promote nor achieve gender
equality nor legally empower Syrian women. In fact, the Kafala system exploits
Syrian women’s position by tying their work visas to individual sponsors who have
the sole authority in terminating their employment. All participants agreed that the
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only viable solution is to end the refugee and gender stigma towards many Syrian
women residing in Lebanon by calling for more gender-inclusive initiatives that
would truly benefit these women.
On the one hand, the co-researchers’ photo-elicitation of Syrian women’s
agency challenges the essentialist views of Syrian women refugees as a helpless
and indistinguishable mass. On the other hand, the participants’ depiction of the
disproportionate types of resilience activities—which most Syrian women must
adopt in order to survive within a discriminatory gendering environment—
resonates with the study’s aim: To explore how the agencies involved consider and
address these inequalities within their response and to highlight and understand the
intersectional gendered differences in the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

Figure 26. The Future
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According to all participants, the photo above depicts the overall tragedy of the
Syrian crisis in Lebanon. A woman is sitting on the floor of her bare tent, attending
to her sick child, covered in laced cloth to protect her from flies and mosquitoes.
On the one hand, all participants claimed that these scenes are recurrent within most
camps. Participants elaborated that Syrian children, living in unsanitary conditions,
are often at risk of terminal illness inside informal settlements, where access to
appropriate health care is costly and difficult to reach. This latter is especially the
case if the parents or child lack documentation; in this situation, the participants
believe that the process of acquiring adequate health care becomes almost
impossible.
On the other hand, some participants reiterated that many photos like this
are seen in skewed Lebanese media on a regular basis. At the beginning of the
Syrian crisis, many reported that newly published victimizing images of cases such
as these were shocking, compelling many Lebanese officials and citizens to take
immediate action to help refugees financially. However, some participants
critiqued that over the years, this warm support has faded away with the increase
of cases like these and, especially, after witnessing much Syrian involvement in
crimes and terrorist acts in Lebanon. Today, photos such as the ones above do not
reach the media, since they are considered part of the normal experience of having
so many refugees for so long in an overburdened developing country. All
participants criticized that the previous rush of sympathy is gone, especially with
the fact that official Lebanese rhetoric blames Syrian refugees for many of the
health problems within the country. Meanwhile, one participant highlighted the fact
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that previous types of financial support dwindled, and many Syrian women
complained to them that the aid provided by the UNHCR, whose logo appears in
the photo on the back wall of the tent, became irregular and scarce.
Some participants claimed that the lack of legal protection, the absence of
humanitarian assistance, and the sense of insecurity made women’s and children’s
condition much worse. Ignoring this problem or pretending that it does not exist
does not help, because cases such as these will continue to evolve until they become
a serious humanitarian disaster that will affect the entire region and not only
Lebanon. All participants agreed that there should be an immediate effort by
specialized agencies to assess probable illnesses, provide basic medical supplies,
and raise awareness among susceptible Syrians. Some participants suggested that a
more sustainable solution needs to involve effort from multiple parties to provide
enough resources to ease the Syrians’ struggle and to provide safety, security, and
resources to the most vulnerable populations, especially women and children.
3. Photovoice Results and General Findings
Due to the reflexivity of the process, the photo-elicitation session reproduced the
participants’ actual views and explanations of perceived policies’ impact on Syrian
refugees’ insecurities. The analysis part was, thus, useful to reflect on the photos’
visual representation of the complex and challenging social attitudes that can
contextualize local practices. This exercise yielded greater nuanced meanings to the
study’s conception of Syrian refugee (in)securities in specific Lebanese localities.

324

Mixed emotions were elicited throughout the photo analysis session, where
discussions bridged the distinct views each photo triggered and increased
knowledge production. While the participants held multiple and often competing,
perspectives on how to define Syrian refugee (in)security, there was a strong
consensus about the systemic gendered violence and exploitation that Syrian
refugees endure, especially women. Some participants focused on blaming the
inadequate funding that barely reaches Syrian women to empower them properly.
Others complained that the inadequate legal loopholes and corrupt Lebanese
bureaucratic agencies would naturally discriminate against these women even when
properly funded. Still, most participant’s recommendations projected some of the
politicized rhetorical fears of continuing Syrian presence within a country that is
often perceived as corrupt and unreceptive. On several occasions, the study shows
the participants recommending that Syrian refugees are better off going back to
Syria than remaining in a country that outlaws their assimilation, justifying their
claim on humanitarian grounds. These statements brought me back again to one
concept in social justice in which oppression is both a state and a process. 649 One
finds relational experiences of oppression and fear between two oppressed groups,
where one is perceivably less privileged than the other with distinct inequalities,
trying to survive an (en)gendered vicious cycle of violence.
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The major difference between foreign volunteers and local ones is that
foreign volunteers have more time to contemplate and choose the degree and time
of the aid and assistance they would like to allocate to help refugees in peripheral
spaces. Meanwhile, local volunteers are not as privileged due to the proximity of
the refugee crisis to their environment. Consequently, volunteers’ choices are
immediately performed. They have an interest in making sure to alleviate the
(in)tangible human sufferings within their communities. At the same time, the
participants aimed to project their own high value within the Lebanese context,
where, unfortunately, their primordial instincts of providing aid and (en)gendering
a support network of like-minded humanitarian people is something normalized
during the many times of war. Most volunteers stated that they find satisfaction of
being needed and doing meaningful work in a country they love but do not respect
for it neither includes them nor appreciate their presence. As a matter of fact, several
participants reported that they either contemplated, tried to leave, or wished to leave
Lebanon to a country that would appreciate their humanity, skills, contributions,
and most importantly a country that provides them a real sense of security. Their
desire to wanting to do something good and make a difference prompted them to
engage their new Syrian ‘guests,’ not leaving them in destitute, and a chance to be
part of an admirable contributing community. At the same time, due to the daily
discriminatory rhetoric that fuels their collective memory of fear of protracted
Syrian presence within their country, most participants seem to have also
internalized some of the public xenophobic paranoia of any type of legitimate
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Syrian integration in a country who is on the brink of a socio-economic, political,
and most importantly sectarian collapse.
This exercise brought a fruitful dialogical reconstruction of the multiple
gendered realities that the Syrian crisis (re)produced in Lebanon. The relational
experiences between the research participants and Syrian refugees enrich the
project in highlighting the multiple discriminations and collective fears that both
communities are resiliently braving. The different critiques made by the
participants of the needs and possible measures to overcome these insecurities seem
to echo both Lebanese and Syrian refugees’ complaints to them. All participants
were aware that our work is framed by, and often unintentionally complicit with,
the very power relations that we sought to dissect. After all, all participants knew
that their views were subjective and non-representative of the overall situation of
Syrians within the Lebanese context. The study shows that there were several
instances where dominant ideologies influenced their perception of residing Syrian
refugees. From the many photos assessed, participants chose the ones that would
portray selling themes of destitute that we all wanted to focus on. Even though all
participants agreed that photos of refugees in camps are by no means representative,
they all believed that framing them in that context would better highlight their
insecurities. In that regard, the participants were right for, according to the UN,
around 85% of Syrian refugees do not reside in ITS.650 Most Syrian refugees are
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scattered in urban and rural areas, very well integrated within the Lebanese
communities and hard to locate let alone let one take pictures of their private
settings. An article posted on the New York Times described how Lebanon had
absorbed most Syrians, which the author labeled as “A Refugee Crisis in Lebanon
Hides in Plain Sight.”651 Even though most pictures are accepted to be biased, still,
the co-researchers and I believed that the photo-elicitation session helped enhance
the pictures’ framing by expanding our knowledge of the different legal, economic,
social, and personal (in)securities deemed important to share when reporting the
different Syrian refugees’ daily (in)securities.
Several themes were exposed such as lack of food, shelter, sanitation, and
legal desperation. Meanwhile, participants’ differing interpretation of each photo
reflected the diverging norms and values that each participant held prior to the
group session and highlighted Syrian refugees’ agency by reflecting on the
(re)production of (in)direct (in)securities that these diverse groups of people,
legally labeled as displaced, pose on their host communities. Some examples
brought up by the participants included waste management, child labor,
development of informal economies, (re)enforcing the vicious insecurity cycle to
all parties. The majority of the themes expressed during the photoelicitation process
brought interesting criticism of the inefficiently gendered bureaucratic
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prioritization and stratification of crisis response management, which post-colonial
feminist scholars often highlighted.
All participants agreed that Lebanon’s refugee security strategies, networks,
and discourses were ineffective in securing both populations from the burdens and
threats they were facing daily. In fact, all participants agreed with this research’s
aim—that those policies labeling Syrians as either “displaced” or “refugees” fail at
protecting the residing Syrians from all sorts of harm. We find cases where Syrian
women registered through the UNHCR are not allowed to work. Whereas those
who choose to acquire a work visa under the kafala system are rarely qualified for
one of the three work permits—sanitation work, construction, or agribusiness—as
they are not culturally viable for Arab women who mostly work in feminized
occupational trades such as secretarial work and school instructors. Consequently,
to sustain their own and families’ livelihoods, Syrian women increasingly opt for
informal work—one that comes with a great deal of intimidation and manipulation.
Entering this illegal job market, makes Syrian women an easy target for genderbased violence, as they are legally powerless and could thus easily be coerced into
providing sexual services to avoid harassment.652
Furthermore, early and forced marriages have reportedly increased among
Syrian refugees in host countries, such as Lebanon, mainly because it is perceived
as a significant resilience coping strategy. Early marriages are perceived to be a
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deterrent and a form of protection of adolescent girls from future instances of rape
or kidnapping, under the pretext that by getting married a woman will come under
the protection of her husband. Also, due to financial strains from which Syrian
households suffer—with 70% of Syrian refugees living below the poverty line at
the end of 2015—the practice of child marriage is culturally accepted within
patriarchal social contexts. 653-654 This could be attributed to two major reasons: as
on the one hand, in patriarchal social contexts in which male providers feel young
daughters are perceived as a high liability that is not only financial, which relates
to “fewer mouths to feed,” but also social and personal as marriage is the ultimate
way of protecting women and their honor.
On the other hand, some studies show that it is not unusual for early
marriages to be a form of exploitation through disguised prostitution in patriarchal
contexts.655 In fact, some families tend to pragmatically wed off a young daughter
to the highest bidder especially when there are times of financial and economic
hardship and crisis.656 Accordingly, early marriage may be an indicator of forced
prostitution and a precursor to GBV, where Syrian refugee girls in Lebanon are
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being exploited by forcibly being married in exchange for legal support—getting a
Lebanese residency when wedded to a Lebanese man—and economic support,
which their low-income families sorely need. This practice is often justified by
religious groups as lawfully constituting protection for vulnerable girls who just
became women—adult enough to carry a family due to hitting puberty—even if
they were below the age of 14.657
Meanwhile, it is very tough for the legal system to separate child sex
trafficking and early marriage. According to the expert from Justice Without
Borders, “when there are cases where they find the families sell their daughter to
get some money from it, also it is legally not applicable to say that that is trafficking
because, within the culture, they “take money for their daughter.”658 Accordingly,
this expert expanded the idea by stating:
“As I say, when you talk about a penal issue, you consider the intention. If they got
the money because this is what is mentioned in Sharia, and it is Muslim, it is ok.
However, if their [family] intention is to get money to live better knowing what
future awaits their daughter, then yes. This is a crime.[…] and sometimes the family
is based in Syria. Therefore, we cannot do many things.”659
This illustration adds to previous feminist critics of how the practice of
perpetuating unequal relations co-constitute systemic social, historical, and
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material forms of oppression that are grounded and continually reformulated,
elevating Syrian women’s insecurities and imposed gendered roles. As such,
several cases were brought up in newspapers and media, where women, forced to
adapt to their new realities, provide sexual favors to bargain for food, shelter, and
other needs to secure themselves and their undocumented children.660 Meanwhile,
most participants viewed their government’s painful policies as mechanisms that
(re)produce more insecurities within Lebanese communities. As a matter of fact,
60% of the increase in crime in Beirut is in some way directly related to the refugee
population where 26 percent of the prison population is of Syrian nationality.661
Even with this entire maneuver, a large number of Syrians were still left without
proper residency papers; unable to officially register the births of their offspring in
Lebanon. 662 A legal expert working with Justice without Borders—a Lebanese
NGO that promotes human rights—echoed one Lebanese newspaper reporting that
International organizations involved in the issue of Syrian refugees in Lebanon
have submitted reports that of the 1.6 million refugees there are around 300,000
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Syrian women who gave birth in 2017.663 During the interview, the legal expert
from Justice Without Borders stated that:
“There are maybe around 200,000 or more children who are not registered.
Concerning the Lebanese law, after the first year of birth, [Syrian infants] who get
one year old require a decision from court to prove the parental lineage. Such a
procedure is costly as they would have to perform a DNA exam on the kid and the
parents, costing around US$150 per person. This sum is to be added to the cost paid
to the court, the lawyer, and the clerk. […] Syrian refugees do not have access to
justice. They do not know that their children are stateless. They will have problems
in the future. They will not be able to return to their country. They could be arrested
because they do not have any ID.” 664
Even though the expert’s analysis of the legal implications that the number of
births of Syrians carries additional negative consequences on both Syrian and
Lebanese communities, the number is exaggerated, not reflective of the estimated
data collected by the involved agencies. The Minister of State for Refugee Affairs,
Mouin Merehbi, the UN refugee agency spokesman in Lebanon, Khaled Kabara,
and Medical Coordinator for Doctors Without Borders, Mounia Amrani, quickly
debunked this viral news stating that such a number was impossible, fake news, and
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part of a xenophobic anti-Syrian refugee agenda in Lebanon.665 Still, there is no
doubt that an accurate number of Syrian births is impossible to provide. After all,
Syrian presence in Lebanon is not limited to those officially registered in the state
records nor with the UNHCR. Ultimately, even though the numbers are not as high
as portrayed, the increasing annual rate of stateless births can only pose a bigger
demographic threat to both Lebanese institutions and Syrian refugees’ livelihoods,
justifying local and international anxieties over civil unrest between Lebanese and
Syrians in many host communities.666
Meanwhile, it is also crucial to note that there are severe gaps in general
awareness on matters relating to reproductive and sexual health for both men and
women who come from modest backgrounds with no literacy, nor sex education.
These knowledge gaps have resulted in high birth rates and an increase in infant
mortality and deformity percentages.667 This reality along with the overall financial
shortages and economic hardships has only resulted in a vicious spiral of poverty
and desperation for both Lebanese and countless Syrian refugees, where womenheaded households are the most vulnerable groups. At the end of 2015, the UN had
only received 57% of the funds it requested for its work in supporting refugees in
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Lebanon. 668 The severe shortage of funds resulted in the reduction of monthly
payment to Syrian refugees—from US$27.70 to US$13.50 per person per month.669
As a consequence, the UN warned of an increase in Syrian refugees
resorting to negative coping strategies such as a reduction of food intake and
expenditure on education and health, coupled with an increase in debt, informal
work and street begging. 670 Such actions would result in various negative
consequences on the already burdened Lebanese infrastructure. In some areas, the
population has doubled, putting much pressure on the already dire Lebanese
infrastructure, housing, health services, and educational services. Overpopulation
and waste management strategies were mismanaged, posing a threat to most
residents, violating their right to public health. As a result, trash could be seen all
over the country, and dumping in public spaces and burning became the norm
across the country. According to one research conducted by experts from the
American University of Beirut, “77 percent of Lebanon’s waste is either openly
dumped or landfilled even though they estimate that only 10 to 12 percent cannot
be composted or recycled.”671
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(December 1, 2017),

In this respect, this photovoice method helped this research highlight that
topbottom production of a stereotypical gendered image of “displaced” Syrians
brings counterintuitive results. It adds to previous feminist literature’s critiques that
overgeneralized refugee management policies end up ignoring the intersectionality
of complex agencies within the refugee population. Thus, most participants agreed
that while the intent of photographic depictions of Syrian refugees may very well
be to humanize its subjects and show their agency, the resulted photos cannot
capture the whole scenario of Syrian refugee insecurities in Lebanese context. Still,
they believe these pictures do a better job in capturing Syrian destitute and agency
when compared to most media visual depictions that often creates distance between
the privileged spectator and the object of his gaze; dehumanized Syrian refugees.
Most news images objectify Syrian women and children refugees as innocent
victims, lacking protection and agency, and Syrian men posing security threats to
Lebanon’s security and identity. Also, the top-down physical marginalization of
informal Syrian settlements pushed most Syrian women and their families to live
in hazardous unsanitary habitats. Still, this exercise brought more information to
the Syrians’ situation than it may appear in general rhetoric.
In fact, the participants highlighted that the geographic settings and the
refugees’ social background affect Syrians’ position of power over others within
different contexts.
The degree of agency that Syrian women are legally allowed, due to their precarious
legal status and due to their gender, affects their limited opportunities and
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expectations. Most participants agreed that the problematic generalization and
misrepresentation of the Syrian refugees led to discriminatory policies and
exclusionary practices that silence the already marginalized voices of Syrian
women, enticing societal acceptance of intersectional violence to occur towards the
diverse groups of Syrian women residing in Lebanon. However, through
adaptation, and by using various means, most participants believe that Syrians
(re)negotiate their way out of the different vulnerabilities. Several pictures
portrayed this agency and resilience that seem to vanish under media practices and
public discourse.
Moreover, some participants suggested that loopholes within security
practices get used and abused by opportunistic agencies and Syrians as well,
pushing special interests at the expense of the general communities’ wellbeing. As
long as gender-biased laws and security practices emerge, generate, or perpetuate,
a cycle of victimhood persists, and any sustainable solution for the Syrian crisis
would remain unabated. Despite the many efforts’ refugees make to escape the
horrors of war, governments, international agencies, and nongovernmental
organizations seem to provide little to no relief to most of those refugees when
looked at from a top-down lens. According to the participants, the shawish
phenomenon is living proof of the erection of uncontrollable complex resilience
effort that tends to (re)enforce hierarchies of power relations and discrimination
within the local context.
Meanwhile, all participants blamed the Lebanese government officials and
humanitarian aid initiatives for the inadequate policies and mixed messages.
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Instead of providing refugees with secure shelters, as mentioned in the policy
planning, Syrians are still discarded in mediocre living conditions on the outskirts
of towns, open to all sorts of discriminations. In that case, some participants
perceive that most aid techniques are complicated, time-consuming, and mostly
sporadic, unreachable by most Syrians. Consequently, many Syrians get pushed
into homelessness, sickness, or any other type of vulnerability. As seen before,
generalizing gendered vulnerabilities creates discriminatory social norms,
exclusionary practices and, in some cases, structural violence against refugees with
a constitutive power to reinforce, even (re)produce, local anxieties. All participants
agreed that reinforcing current misperceptions of residing Syrians as a potential
threat or a burden pushes most Syrian women not to report sexual abuse, provide
survival sex, beg, and work informally for exploitative wages to survive. 672
Therefore, echoing another feminist argument, all participants believed that without
adopting a nuanced approach, considering the different socio-political sensitivities,
refugee management policies become problematic, pushing Syrians’ resilience
efforts into silence. In effect, Syrian women refugees had to switch gender roles to
adapt to the new realities, suffering the brunt and most devastating implications of
discriminative securitized practices.
As such, the findings from this project helped this dissertation expand its
understandings about the different systems of oppression within the visuals
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collected and discussed by the research participants. On the one hand, discussing
the many negative consequences that come out of these generalized policy
processes produced increased empathy and appreciation towards most Syrian
refugees—women and children. On the other hand, several participants felt the need
to emphasize some positive stories and initiatives, which crucially needed to be
expanded on, amid what is an extreme negative bias in the coverage of the refugee
crisis in Lebanon. In times of hostile refugee political attitudes and practices, all
participants felt the need to disseminate accurate stories that have the potential to
empower the people whose voice is silenced by channeling the right humanitarian
approach. Participants view that Lebanese citizens must get involved as much as
Syrian residents should in order to relate more to the individual Syrian insecurities.
Consequently, their effort to connect on an individual level would humanize the
previously portrayed faceless numbers of refugees, generating sensible questions
and, potentially, common sustainable solutions for both communities.
To solve the problematic issues with emergency relief, there is a need to
reassess the underlying assumptions and approaches towards working with the
diverse Syrian population and empower them rather than save them and fix them.
Thereupon, this project helped disrupt some of the stereotypes and inaccuracies that
prevail in the mainstream representations of Syrians refugee insecurities in
Lebanon, particularly the victim and threat narratives that flatten and objectify
Syrians’ issues, especially women. In that sense, the photovoice project was
conceived as a deliberately transnational project— between an external academic
and local refugee workers and volunteers regarding the topic of a transnational
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Syrian population—aimed at challenging the stereotype of Syrians as a foreign
nuisance, a threat, or vulnerable victimized population in the hopes of promoting
self-reliance initiatives for refugees. By thinking through images about the political
ramifications of Syrian refugee insecurities, all participants supported the critical
engagement of dissecting the problematic issues that the Syrian crisis protracted in
the Lebanese context. Meanwhile, it is essential to state that the appropriation and
generalization of the research findings, applying them to all Syrian refugees in
Lebanon, is a practice that this dissertation is keen to avoid.
The findings of this study contest the idea that Syrian refugee (in)security
is a zero-sum game where aid assistance and protection services are either available
or not. Contextual dynamics and critical variables complicate the Syrian refugee
response mechanisms that continually exacerbate their insecurities with the
humanitarian, socioeconomic, political, and security dynamics at hand.
Consequently, their agency and resilience efforts would (re)produce further local
insecurities (re)impacting Lebanon’s economy, social fabric, and national stability.
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VII. A VICIOUS CYCLE OF SYRIAN REFUGEE INSECURITIES
As seen throughout this dissertation, forced displacement due to warfare is one of
the most traumatic types of human experience, where its depth and breadth pose
significant challenges to asylum seekers, neighboring host states, and nongovernmental entities involved with managing crises. Exploring the case of Syrian
refugees in neighboring Lebanon, a nation populated by roughly four million
people, the dissertation investigated the securitization–refugee protection nexus as
it permeates a South-South forced migration case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.
This concluding chapter incorporates the interweaving feminist scholarships on
security studies and refugee governance to critically investigate what seems to be a
vicious cycle of multifaceted predicaments across the construction, management,
and impact of Syrian refugee (in)security, wherein Lebanon is undergoing a
massive demographic transformation.

Figure 27. The Vicious Cycle Of Refugee (In)security

341

In effect, the figure above synthesizes how different political and socio-economic
elements influence a securitized translation of refugee protection norms in the case
of Syrians in Lebanon. It gave visibility to the various relational processes across
numerous spaces, where refugee insecurities are constantly (re)negotiated and
translated, (re)impacting their surroundings. This figure highlights how involved
bodies—host communities, Lebanese government officials, and humanitarian
agents—silence Syrian refugees through multiple systems of oppression. By
examining the critical gaps within the Lebanese politics of Syrian forced migration,
this interdisciplinary study shows how securitized refugee management practices
had intersectional effects on Syrian people who occupy marginalized identities,
such as class, ethnicity, and gender. As a matter of fact, Syrian refugee governance
policies seem to have affected both Lebanese insecurities and Syrian refugees’
livelihoods and self-determination, making the latter’s survival increasingly
precarious, especially Syrian women’s.
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For the most part, processes of

homogenization and practices of objectification play a dominant role in
(re)positioning some Syrian refugees at an advantage over others, creating a
‘blowback’—“a metaphor to denote unintended negative consequences”
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Syrian refugees’ relations with the local population.
Therein, this final section is divided into three different sections, borrowing
Sara Meger’s theoretical framework regarding securitization, where Meger detects;
a non-linear chain of processes of homogenization, objectification, and
‘blowback.’675 Accordingly, this section explicitly assesses the implications of this
vicious cycle from the research findings, while also integrating them with the
study’s theoretical background and relevant literature findings.
1. Homogenization
As detailed in Chapter IV, geopolitics and biased social attitudes influence the
domestic translation and application of universal refugee protection norms. Tracing
different critical junctures in Lebanese Syrian rapport, the study finds that local
relations between Lebanese communities and Syrian residents have significantly
deteriorated in recent years. While Lebanon has shamed developed Western
countries by hosting a million and some of the Syrian refugees at a time when most
of them closed their borders, the research finds that Syrian refugee insecurities were
(en)gendered with distressing consequences. Even if the main bodies that manage
the Syrian crisis in Lebanon are gender neutral, they seem to exacerbate a gap
between gender-sensitive policies theoretically advertised on paper and their
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securitized practices in the field. 676 Here gender, as an essential organizing
principle, consistently maintained the unequal Lebanese–Syrian relationship,
where, Lebanese rhetoric homogenizes Syrian de facto refugees as threatening,
reigniting a collective memory of an oppressive Assad regime that would want to
further Syrian influence on Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance.
On the one hand, like many host countries, Lebanon legitimizes its
sovereign right to refuse asylum seekers’ requests to enter and remain regardless of
eligibility. 677 Subsequently, Lebanese law does not extend residency rights to
foreigners living in the country except under very limited circumstances, restricting
their access to public health care, education, jobs, among many.678 As highlighted
in chapter IV, with such measures in place, refugee insecurities in the case of
Lebanon were pushed away from being a national governance problem of a weak,
severely divided, and overwhelmed state to become heavily dependent on
exclusionary (in)security practices.679
On the other hand, while the Lebanese government and people have
welcomed more Syrian refugees than any other country, the presence of so many
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Syrians became a controversial intersecting political, economic, social and
religious issue for most Lebanese constituents. For instance, numerous Lebanese
individuals perceive the presence of Syrians within the country as the cause of their
worsened (in)securities and access to work, even though, according to a survey,
only 9% said they or their family members have actually been direct victims of
Syrian led assault. 680 In fact, as of 2017, 50% of registered Syrians operate in
construction work and agribusiness—jobs that are traditionally filled by Syrians in
Lebanon, even before the refugee crisis. 681 The (mis)perceptions of Syrians in
Lebanon are thus the result of inflammatory sectarian public discourse against the
95% of those registered with the UNHCR agency (Sunnis) and not factual
occurrences. According to chapter IV, Lebanese concerns were furthered by
sporadic (in)security incidences of terrorist attacks and lone crimes such as theft,
murders, and gender-based violence led by Syrians within the country.
This situation increased the Syrian women refugees’ insecurities. As stated
in Chapter IV, between 1976 and 2005, Syria dominated Lebanon both politically
and militarily. Thousands of Lebanese were murdered, kidnapped or imprisoned by
the Syrian authorities, and until this day, thousands remain missing.682 The crisis in
Syria has reversed the power dynamic between the two nations, and while the
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Lebanese government has welcomed over 1 million and some Syrian refugees,
hostility toward them is not uncommon because of historic and deeply rooted
animosity, highlighted in chapter IV.
According to a Syrian woman called Leila residing in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon:
“Before, Syrians in Lebanon had dignity. Now, after the crisis, all Syrians just walk
with our heads down.” 683 In politicized contexts such as this one, it is not
uncommon for the women of the
“other” group to become the objects of eroticized imaging, a process that was well
documented, for instance, in the context of North Korean refugees residing in South
Korea.684 This comes in line with the objectification of women and transformation
into targets of GBV during political conflicts. Although, the situation in Lebanon
is not like the atrocities of mass rapes committed in many other wars, there are
nonetheless some similarities in the manifestation of hostility toward the women of
the enemy.685
Still, several Lebanese performative contestations towards Syrian presence
within the country are not only tied to a xenophobic collective memory of
Lebanon’s subordination to the Syrian Assad regime. These tactics are also the
product of a refugee host community’s fatigue towards a protracted massive Syrian
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refugee crisis as well as donor fatigue with a decline in aid funds. Notably, as
international funding fell short, the Syrian refugee crisis proved to be very
expensive for the Lebanese public with an estimated cost of $7.5 billion just in
2015.686 A decrease in GDP, an increase in unemployment rates, and a surge of
poverty levels resulted in the gradual regression of the economy and the overall
living standards of Lebanese citizens. According to Chapter V, severe cuts of
international grants and funding—a reaction to the official decision taken by the
Lebanese government to close the borders to Syrian refugees—were also a factor
that did not help.687
The LCRP 2017-2020 mentions that in 2016, “only 56% of the total appeal for
Lebanon’s funding requirements” was covered, primarily due to instances of
mistrust between several donor communities and governmental agencies. 688 In
effect, short-term solutions addressed the protracted Syrian refugee crisis and basic
needs of impoverished host communities, reducing any prospects for long term
socio-economic stability.689
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To this end, Lebanese politicians threatened the international community that
the shortfall in funding could launch another massive wave of Syrian migrants to
Europe, adding to the enduring burden of refugee inflow a few years back. 690
Correspondingly, the Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil severely urged the
international community “to quit lecturing Lebanon on humanity and to stop
encouraging Syrians to stay in Lebanon.”691
The latter statement triggered aggressive policy measures ensue, reducing all
incentives for Syrian refugees to stay in Lebanon, wanting them to return to Syria
as soon as possible.
Based on Lene Hansen’s definition of “security as silence,” 692 chapter V
highlighted a range of securitized mechanisms that the Lebanese government
normalized when managing Syrian refugees, reproducing gender hierarchies and
hegemonies, affecting residing Syrians asymmetrically. Imprudently, these
securitized behaviors became anchoring objectifying practices on how to manage a
homogenized refugee crisis. In effect, several practices, highlighted in the above
figure, homogenized Syrian refugee insecurities, (en)gendering exclusionary
refugee (in)security practices—such as visa restrictions and border control, a no
camp policy, curfews, and checkpoints, among many—despite the Syrians clear

“International Plea For Syrian Refugee Jobs Sparks Anger In Lebanon,” Arab News, (June 24, 2018),
http://www.arabnews.com/node/1292241/middle-east.
690

“International Plea For Syrian Refugee Jobs Sparks Anger In Lebanon,” Arab News, (June 24, 2018),
http://www.arabnews.com/node/1292241/middle-east.
691

692

Ibid.

348

vulnerabilities. Accordingly, this study supports Emanuel Adler and Vincent
Pouliot’s argument that practices are “socially meaningful patterns of action.”693 It
seems that the Lebanese government’s exclusionary measures possess coconstitutive securitized practices, where only two forms of durable solutions were
available for the UNHCR to sustain the legal determination of Syrian refugees in
Lebanon; resettlement and repatriation, which both are arduous, somewhat
unrealistic, options for the one million and some registered Syrian population.
Meanwhile, Lebanon’s attempt to find temporary solutions to the mass influx of
Syrian refugees within the country, encompassed a wide range of violation to its
human rights obligations— such as limited access to aid and livelihood, and ad hoc
detention, assault, and deportation, limiting humanitarian agencies such as the
UNHCR from accurately addressing Syrian refugees’ needs.
2. Objectification
As seen in the above figure, Chapter V investigated the contextual changes that
shape and are shaped by specific refugee crisis response plans between two political
institutions with distinct interests and competing goals. The organizational cultural
theme analysis teased out how a variety of interests clash between protecting Syrian
refugees and protecting the host state’s national interests. The focus of the study
was on two core institutions with seemingly different knowledge claims and
approaches to managing the Syrian crisis: the Lebanese government and the
UNHCR. Chapter V highlighted how both interested bodies decontextualized the
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majority of Syrian refugees’ specific needs, homogenizing the diverse Syrian
groups as both dependent and problematic. Thus, similar to what Elizabeth
Olivius’s work captured, both LCRP documents objectified the many Syrian
insecurities through extensive procedural measures of refugee management
practices that would hinder a viable translation of global refugee norms into
meaningful actions. 694 As highlighted in the figure above, numerous cases of
discriminatory tactics, justifying the host society’s conduct of unease,
counterproductively enticed exclusionary refugee management practices that
would further bonded and informal labor exploitation, poor living conditions, debts,
and homelessness, and incarceration and deportation due police and municipal
harassment, among many.
In that respect, the UNHCR’s struggle to adapt their internationally
recognized gender-sensitive norms to local policies distorted their refugee
protection and humanitarian assistance goals when translating them into the
Lebanese context. Even if the well-intentioned humanitarian agency would want to
provide these essential services to the majority of the Syrian refugee population—
Syrian women and children—they end up objectifying their needs under
overgeneralized targeted approaches, failing to empower and protect the majority
of the ‘vulnerable’ population. Chapter V traced how humanitarian policies’
principles are still short in practice when not enabling and empowering almost 80%
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of the registered refugee population—women and children—and their resilience
capabilities. By tracing the significant organizational cultural themes of the two
consecutive LCRP documents and their development, the study showed what the
expert from Abaad pointed to: “all those response plan mechanisms are mainly
designed for the international humanitarian community [and not Syrian refugees
themselves].” 695 Instead of involving these targeted groups in crisis response
planning, the plan’s strategy focused on appealing for more funds for the various
projects dependent on donors voluntarily choosing who, what, where, and when to
fund.
Consequently, the elaborations, transformations, and changes made
between the plans do not advance the necessary protection and assistance that
targeted vulnerable groups desperately need. What initially seemed like a similar
schema that the humanitarian community and Lebanese government share,
evidenced by their use of common appropriation of agenda initiatives and goals, a
closer inspection highlights a more complex gendered story of both harmony and
tension between both sides. While both parties genuinely aim for socio-economic
stability and increase of government services and aid, the selective prioritization of
gendered projects, such as targeted approaches, the specific monitoring
mechanisms, and the lack of transparency, seemed to affect the management of the
Syrian the refugee crisis negatively. As such, the study showed that even the second

695

Abaad Expert interview with author, (June 20, 2017).

351

LCRP version failed to provide basic humanitarian services to the majority of the
Syrian refugees, Syrian women.
The humanitarian approach seen in both LCRP documents mostly
reinforces an image of Syrian refugees as a burden: disempowered, passive and
helpless. Accordingly, the organizational cultural theme longitudinal analysis
reinforces Heather Johnson’s visual construction argument of the myth of a refugee
identity, where female refugees are portrayed as depoliticized legally, socially, and
economically for the success of humanitarian missions.696 These Syrian women are
heavily dependent on the framing of the UNHCR, not capable to fully capitalize on
their own skills as self-help mechanisms. Chapter V exposed that the elaboration
and transformation of the crisis response plan(s) led to a minimal change of
approach, where little prioritization of gender-sensitive assistance was made. This
latter, thus, increased the gap between theory and actual mitigation of genderrelated political or socio-economic problems regarding the homogenized and
objectified refugee population.
Due to several compromises persisting within both Lebanese crisis response
plans, neither LCRP document fully ensured Syrian refugee safety nor selfsufficiency. In that regard, the given compromise that persists within both plans
furthered the deteriorating Syrian refugees’ insecurities when residing in Lebanon,
especially for Syrian women. In that respect, the dominant governing humanitarian
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projects counterproductively dehumanized Syrian refugees as part of a larger
targeted group of vulnerable people, highlighting their overwhelming numbers and
insecurities’ statistics that pose a threat to Lebanon’s fragile stability, in order to
ensure a good amount of aid and funds for their projects. Accordingly, the study
found that refugee participation in the planning, implementation, or management
of the LCRP operations was absent, increasing the gap between policy management
and actual mitigation of gendered political and socioeconomic problems, especially
for Syrian women refugees. The UNHCR’s refugee crisis responses between 2014
and 2018 increasingly institutionalized Syrian refugees’ insecurities through
standard operating procedures (SOP) for intervention and control in the interests of
nationalist donor states, devoid of genuine concerns regarding the multifaceted
needs and risks refugee women experience in their daily lives. Meticulous exercises
of counting, calculating, and coding refugees through census and surveys
reinforced the inefficient gender-neutral methods of “knowing” the refugees. Thus,
their perceptive needs end up contrasting and contradicting the LCRP mission’s
idea of enhancing gender mainstreaming through protection and assistance that
were meant to alleviate various targeted groups from their daily insecurities.697
The lack of taking the experiences of the majority of Syrian refugees—
women— seriously forces gender sensitive issues to be silenced, in favor of more
overgeneralized accounts that group all refugee insecurities into one single unit.
One study finds that most Syrian women in Lebanon face institutionalized multi-
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systemic violence that are often silenced due to reductive (in)security measures that
homogenize them under an abstract gender-neutral Syrian community698. Before
the crisis, Syria had one of the highest rates of educated women in the Middle East.
However, in the case of Syrian women, UNESCO’s estimates show that Syrian
girls are twice more likely than boys to be kept from attending school in Lebanon
due to family fears of being victims of gender-based violence.699 In effect, Syrian
women refugees took the hardest toll from sexual exploitation to gender based
violence, raids, arbitrary arrests, and numerous apprehensions that continue to be
common practice and everyday reality in Lebanon. According to a study conducted
by the “Institut Des Sciences Politique,” 73% of Syrian-women refugees reported
feeling insecure in moving any time of the day or night, resulting in different types
of insecurities. 700 Adding to that, the lack of valid residence permits is one of the
main reasons Syrian women are unable to seek redress from local authorities or
even move around safely. With children to take care of, adult female Syrian
refugees heading their household’s responsibilities expand beyond domestic
activities, while still hindering them from gaining full access to the public sphere.701

698

Rola Yasmine & Catherine Moughalian

Janice G. Raymond, “Pity The Nations: Women Refugees In Lebanon.” Coalition Against Trafficking in
Women Report, (December 6, 2017), http://www.catwinternational.org/Home/Article/727-pity-the-nationswomen-refugees-inlebanon.
699

700

Institut Des Sciences Politiques USJ, Survey On Perceptions Of Syrian Refugees In Lebanon, (March,
2015), http://www.sciences-po.usj.edu.lb/ pdf/Executive%20Summary.pdf
Rola Yasmine and Catherine Moughalian, “Systemic Violence Against Syrian Refugee Women And The
Myth Of
701

Effective Intrapersonal
Interventions,”
Reproductive
Health
47, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1016/j.rhm.2016.04.008.

354

Matters 24,

no.

Meanwhile, without gender inclusive protection measures, thousands of Syrian
women of various ages suffer from an extremely precarious administrative and
legal status that makes them vulnerable to arrest and deportation. While, some
progress was made in providing social protection services for women against
gender-based violence (GBV) in Lebanon, such as the new domestic violence
legislation and the availability of a 24-hour hotline for reporting. Still, the study
showed that these services are barely implemented and are generally limited to
Lebanese women.702
Although there is a multitude of private networks’ efforts that respond to
the immediate needs of refugee, without legal guarantee, they were unable to fulfill
the minimum requirement for an adequate refugee reception. Evidently, these
women are in much worse conditions than those who are registered and suffer thus
from much heavier economic burdens than any other refugee group in the country.
Because of their intersectional identity as both Syrian refugees and women within
exclusionary Lebanese refugee securitized practices, their interests and experiences
are frequently marginalized and further complicated depending on gender, class,
religion, age, and ethnicity, among many interlinking identieis.703 According to the
representative of Justice Without Borders:
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“Sexual violence is a national crime, but when you check the national laws, there
is no clear definition of what sexual violence is. There is no definition of what rape
is. Rape marriage is clear, but there many other kinds of sexual violence that are
not mentioned. Moreover, when we talk about sexual violence in conflict, the
sexual violence could be investigated as a genocide, as a crime against humanity,
and as a war crime, but most of the gender-based crimes in neighboring states are
not mentioned.” 704
The expert interviewee’s statement echoed this study’s argument that, under
Lebanese laws, single, divorced, or widowed Syrian women are not viewed as
qualified independent women capable of managing their immediate families. As
such, they become easy target for men who find out that they do not have any male
support.705 As highlighted in Chapter V, public spaces become more dangerous for
Syrian women, especially when they are without a male companion. Moreover,
while issues related to Lebanese civilians generally involve security forces (e.g.,
the police), those related to Syrian refugees are managed by a different category of
security apparatuses such as the Lebanese military intelligence, the General
Security Directorate, and the Lebanese Information Division. These intelligence
entities are rather focused on combating terrorism and dealing with serious state
security threats and are not specifically trained to deal with gender-sensitive
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procedures on how to protect women from daily local threats.706 Meanwhile, under
the guise of fighting terrorism, humanitarian bodies, such as the UNHCR, share the
registered refugee’s information through information sharing programs between all
partner agencies.707
In this case, cultural choices may be, explicitly or implicitly, made by local
authorities who sense that they can have impunity or realize that the target of their
gender violence is powerless and with little or no protection. According to Amnesty
International’s report on Lebanon, one Syrian woman stated: “After a while, the
police would pass by our house or would call us and ask us to go out with them. […]
Because we do not have legal [residence] permits, the officers threatened us. They
said that they would imprison us if we did not go out with them.”708 This statement
reiterates the study’s evidence that, for example, victims of prostitution and humantrafficking rings do not usually report their predicament or seek help from local
authorities even when they may have the opportunity to do so. 709 As a result, the
intersection of refugee (in)security practices and sexist Lebanese domestic laws
diminish the ability of humanitarian gender-sensitive programs to change the various
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discriminations that Syrian women experience in Lebanon. This latter leads to a
series of Syrian resilience efforts to cope with their new status quo, selling back
those insecurities to the local Lebanese population, and creating a “blowback” that
would affect the Syrian relations with the local population—such as negative coping
skills, resistance, and contempt.
3. Blowback
The structural subordination of the status of Syrian refugees, in general, and Syrian
women, specifically, leads to the invisibilisation of their agency, (re)enforcing their
disproportionate shouldering of their precarious situation through objectified
negative coping mechanisms and increased local (in)securities. As demonstrated in
Figure 12, exclusionary possesses of Syrian refugee (in)security homogenization
and objectification co-constitute securitized practices that (re)produce social
anxieties over the increasing local vulnerabilities. Accordingly, Chapter VI
borrowed Susanne Zwingel’s term “impact translation” to shed light on the
gendered local repercussions and contextual resilience efforts of Syrian refugees,
where the intersectionality of gender, class, and ethnicity play an instrumental role.
We find that most Syrian refugees, especially women, adopted new coping
strategies, (re)impacting their new realities, in turn, Lebanon’s (in)security.
In this sense, Chapter VI of the dissertation traced the gendered impact
translation of securitized Syrian refugee management practices through the method
of Photovoice. This participatory grassroots methodology provided a “culturallygrounded contextually situated site for reflection on visual images and associated
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meanings,” describing, understanding, and elaborating Syrian resilience efforts
within certain communities.
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Evidently, the study showed how the

intersectionality of Syrian refugees’ insecurities was reinforced through
exclusionary settings. Consequently, various resilience practices of refugees,
particularly women, appropriate, negotiate and modify the little legal provisions
they have for personal goals, while, “further complicating issues of agency,
ownership and humanitarian gender equality interventions.” 711 Other instances,
such as the shawish phenomenon, are living proof of the erection of intersectional
systems of oppression and resilience efforts that further (re)enforce hierarchies of
relational power and discrimination within specific contexts. These facts of gender
bias and structural inequalities, thus, created a loop of aggression and exclusion that
culminated in the deterioration of local resilience and interactions, completing the
vicious cycle in the figure above, making it virtually impossible for Syrian refugees
to weight productive options.
Several themes were exposed in Chapter VI, such as extreme
impoverishment, lack of food, inadequate shelters, legal desperation, and shift of
gender roles. As shown above, despite all these hardships that the participants
highlighted, most Syrians adapted and were determined in doing their best to
support themselves and their respective families. Having lost family members,
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homes, and legal status, the study found that Syrians adopted different types of
coping mechanisms to brave through their hostile environments. A mesolevel of
resistance becomes particularly significant to inspect in the case of Lebanon, where
Syrians, generally, “are forbidden from forming or joining formal unions” having
little to no access to formal institutional protection.712 Syrians would thus build
support networks, and through agency actants build a sustainable resilience system
that would relatively enhance their human conditions, thwarting future shocks.
Consequently, the counterintuitive Lebanese approaches towards Syrian
refugees would then create blowbacks, seen in Chapter VI, with unintended
negative consequences on major Lebanese communities.
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The research

participants underscored several themes such as scavenging informal economies,
child labor, excessive waste and pollution that agonized all residing communities
on several levels. Another occurring theme that was not mentioned but is important
to highlight and add to the list is unlawful black-market activities, such as theft,
smuggling, human trafficking, prostitution, and drug dealing. 714 In that respect,
refugees who are not fortunate enough, stealing other people’s documents is
perceived as their only viable solution to acquire freedom of mobility. Small petty
crimes become the gateway to larger felonies that Syrians would coopt in their daily
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(in)security practices. As for the Syrians with a relatively privileged socioeconomic background opt for silent crimes in collaboration with the government
that include bribing local authorities for falsifying residency papers and forging
legal identity documentations from Syria, which increase the tendencies of local
authorities to be corrupted. The latter would affect not only the functioning of
concerned Lebanese institution but the entire Lebanese social fabric.715 With dire
financial standing, Lebanese complain that they cannot find jobs, that local rents
are rising, and that wages are falling.716 Both population groups would resort to
short-term solutions such as buying or lending money for cheaper or lower quality
food for lack of finances, igniting long-term health problems. As seen, in the
previous chapter, these harsh economic situations have in several instances obliged
Syrians to withdraw their children from schools in order to work and become an
additional means to contribute to the household income. Meanwhile, Syrianwomen and girls end up working under exploitative low wages, engaging in
dangerous and potentially hazardous work conditions, seeking marriage with
Lebanese men, or merely begging on the streets, increasing local anxieties and
gendered discriminations.
Thus, political actors and false media-dissemination would lobby for Syrian
refugee repatriation, fearing their permanent presence. These anti-Syrian
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BBC

News.

(January

5,

2015):

presence’s sentiments were increasingly evident within the participants’ arguments
during the photoelicitation session. As discussed previously, local attitudes towards
hosting Syrians are linked to continuing grievances over past Lebanese-Syrian
relationship, increasing tensions between both communities. Syrian refugees end
up negatively coping with their lack of legal status not able to access their basic
human needs, particularly Syrian women. Because of their intersectional identity
as both Syrian refugees and women within exclusionary securitized practices, their
interests and experiences are even more marginalized.
The variety of Syrian women’s resilience processes challenge established
gendered dichotomies between what is a public and what is a private sphere. As
seen in Chapter VI, living in a discriminatory and overwhelmed Lebanese system
led these Syrian women to increasingly depend upon sporadic emergency aid and
adopt negative coping mechanisms such as illicit work, child labor, child marriage,
begging, and prostitution. Some research participants blamed the inadequate
humanitarian funding that does not empower individuals in need. Others
complained that the legal loopholes and corrupt Lebanese bureaucratic agencies
would naturally discriminate against disadvantaged individuals even when
adequately funded.
Most participants suggested a drastic change need to be made in the underlying
assumptions and approaches to Syrian presence in order to work with the diverse
Syrian population and empower them rather than save them or fix them. Until then,
a vicious cycle of (in)securities is (re)produced with a series of practices of mistrust
and aggression between Lebanese constituents and Syrian refugees. For these facts
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of gender bias and structural inequality create a loop of aggression and exclusion
that culminates in the deterioration of local resilience and interactions, widening
the xenophobic Lebanese rhetoric towards Syrians, making it virtually impossible
for any Syrian refugee to weight productive options.
4. Significance Of The Study
This project involved bodies—Lebanese citizens, Lebanese government official,
and humanitarian agents—whose heterogeneity would otherwise be silenced and
marginalized through homogenization and macro decontextualized practices. That
is why, by involving local “bodies”—Lebanese citizens as research subjects, this
step would create an encouraging space for Lebanese subjects who typically do not
get a voice, and whose voices are often ascribed to them, to be involved as coresearchers in the exploration of Syrian refugee (in)security. This exercise brought
a fruitful dialogical reconstruction of some of the multiple gendered realities that
the Syrian crisis (re)produced in Lebanon. As such, the study drew on primary
sources, grey literature, human subjects, and visual materials to gain in-depth
interdisciplinary knowledge of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. It utilized
multiple tools such as expert interviews, in-depth longitudinal cultural theme
analysis, and a participatory method named Photovoice to understand the multilevel challenges where refugee (in)security is (en)gendered and experienced. Thus,
this dissertation provides an original approach to the IR field by discussing the
gender dynamics within the critical scholarship of security studies and refugee
governance.
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All things considered; this dissertation is by no means attempting to produce
a comprehensive understanding of refugee (in)security. It aims to develop new and
more inclusive approaches to gain in-depth knowledge of a compelling case of
Syrian refugee (in)security in Lebanon. Accordingly, this transnational feminist
research considerably filled an empirical and methodological void in IR scholarship
where the gendering of refugee (in)security is multilayered, continually shifting
through processes of construction, interpretation, and application that span an array
of political, humanitarian, socioeconomic, and security complications. This type of
research enabled me to explore multi-leveled sites and processes of Syrian refugee
insecurity construction, policy translation, and highlight some of the negative
impacts in the local context, which play an instrumental role in informing how
refugee (in)security is (re)produced. The growing anti-Syrian sentiments and
refugee sensitivities frequently fuel xenophobic public discourse on the
exaggerated impact of the Syrian refugees on host communities. The study
highlighted several cases of how the essentialized refugee “crisis” is projected
through dubious overstated numbers, such as Syrian annual births that further
threaten Lebanon’s demography, security, socioeconomic stability. Consequently,
efforts to help the different people escaping persecution in Syria get complicated
and harder to achieve tangible results.
Without trying to overcome the inherent relational or even structural
differences, Syrian refugee management practices seem to further gender both
communities’ social fabric, economic stability, and security. Therefore, this
dissertation highlights the benefit of an interdisciplinary research in IR scholarship,
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examining the importance of situating gender within critical scholarship in the field
of security studies and refugee protection regimes, as a strategy to integrate insights
across disciplines, furthering our knowledge of a significant social phenomenon:
the (en)gendering of refugee (in)security. The use of multidisciplinary methods and
data add to the existing feminist literature on securitized refugee governance and
expand their visibility by providing a sophisticated understanding of the various
spaces where refugee (in)security constructions, management practices, and local
experiences materialize. It echoes their argument that refugee management
practices need to acknowledge contextual differences, thus avoid pathologizing and
further stigmatizing the diverse groups that make up the refugee population.717
The insurance of holistic Syrian refugees’ protection from gendered
violence requires both the Lebanese government and non-governmental
organizations need to understand better the diverse groups they are trying to
manage and coordinate with them in order to find common ground. This radical
shift would then open up new opportunities for all groups involved to equally adjust
to the current challenges, going beyond the securitized host government practices
and the sometimes-counterproductive humanitarian agendas of service providers.
By joining forces, these efforts would be a first step in destabilizing the existing
power relations previously appropriated and used to limit any form of normative
social change. Instead of viewing refugee women’s insecurities as secondary to the
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host state interests and refugee governance in general, refugee women, such as in
the Syrian case in Lebanon, need to be prioritized and empowered. Their issues
need to be mainstreamed and dealt with accordingly.
As such, further work and research on Syrian refugee agency and resilience
practices could help improve the current efforts in planning, coordination,
innovation, funding, and partnerships by (re)shaping organizational cultures within
refugee governance programs. Gender comprehensive research and policy planning
should not just examine refugee politics as a rights-based system for they tend to
disregard local traditions and practices that, till this date, regulate women’s rights
within the private sphere and not by legal regulations as other parts of the social
life. After all, universal rights do not automatically translate domestically by
excluding silenced voices. Instead, per Susanne Zwingel’s argument, transnational
networks of norm entrepreneurs are encouraged to not clash with the local sphere,
establishing meaningful connections with the targeted communities through
continual long-term processes of (re)negotiation and (re)interpretation.718 As such,
these approaches would serve as an adaptation strategy of refugee empowerment,
paying more attention to explore host state’s communities and their needs,
understand the domestic settings and practices, and involve the marginalized
groups of displaced people as purposive subjects with agency rather than
categorizing them based on their vulnerability and special status. Only by doing
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that can crises be turned into opportunities of (re)constructing favorable conditions
for all the affected communities to be empowered and adequately bounce back.
As such, this project seeks to expand the IR field by reaching a wider audience as
a result of interdisciplinary research. It equips both academics and practitioners
with the necessary tools to understand multilayered social phenomena and
meaningfully contribute to both theory refinement and policy implementation,
while also questioning existing paradigms and global structures that tend to
homogenize, objectify, and discriminate women. The feminist theories that are
relevant to this study emphasized the importance of a multi-layered approach and
the richness of bottom-up perspectives when analyzing the experienced Syrian
refugee insecurities, specifically women. By conducting a longitudinal cultural
theme analysis of crisis response plans, developed by several interest groups with
competing goals, future studies could explore the emergence, elaboration, and
transformation of their management processes across time. Such studies would,
thus, tease out relevant changes and assess these plans’ continued engagement with
and contribution to empowering their targets. As for the human centric Photovoice
approach, including both host communities and Syrian refugees, especially women,
this study was able to capture the similarities and differences of perceptions of what
constitute a refugee crisis and resilience programs. This approach would assist
future projects in highlighting the interlocking systems of oppression and
celebrating the gender-inclusive stories of both host communities and people
fleeing persecution in their home country. This method would then bridge the
present exclusionary practices in refugee crisis response plans and perceived
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dichotomy of interests between host state security and refugee protection
mechanism. Therefore, this type of approach enhances further dialogue over local
anxieties and refugee best practices, turning crises into opportunities. That way,
future projects could look beyond copious statistics to the extraordinary everyday
experiences of the millions of individuals who are involved and entangled in what
is labeled as a ‘refugee crisis.’ These projects would be better equipped in opening
up new context-specific opportunities that challenge the currently securitized
refugee status-quo and go beyond decontextualized humanitarian agendas. After
all, when all refugees are seen the same, each one of them is different.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Gender Marker Guidance Note

Gender Marker
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Gender Marker is a tool that is used to code
humanitarian Sector Response Plans (SRPs) on a 0‐2 scale based on programming design. This will be
applied to each of the country operation’s SRPs under the 3RP. A sector response that is designed well
and intentionally addresses the needs and capacities of women, girls, men and boys, be it a resilience
development activity or humanitarian activity, has the best chance of being implemented in a way that
assists all of these groups to improve their lives.
The codes tell whether or not a SRP is designed well enough to ensure that women, girls, men and boys
will benefit equally from it. If the activity has potential to generate gender equality results, the marker
predicts whether the gender results are likely to be limited or significant.
A gender code is assigned based on three critical components: 1) there is gender analysis in the needs
assessment that provides relevant sex and age‐disaggregated data and gives insight into local gender
issues 2) this needs assessment is used to identify sector responses and activities and 3) gender‐related
outputs or performance indicators. There has been a high level of donor interest in the IASC Gender
Marker.
Gender Analysis of Needs Activities Outcomes
Gender Marker

Description

Gender Code 0

Gender is not reflected in any component of the Sector Response Plan. There
is risk that the Plan will unintentionally nurture existing gender inequalities or
deepen them. In principle, the Code 0 is used until a project has been
properly assessed.

Gender Code 1

The Sector Response Plan is designed to contribute in some limited way to
gender equality. Gender dimensions are meaningfully included in only one or
two of the three essential components: needs assessment, sector responses and
performance indicators.

Gender
2a

Code The Sector Response Plan is designed to contribute significantly to gender
equality. The different needs of women, girls, boys and men have been
analyzed and integrated well in all three essential components: the needs
Gender
assessment, sector responses and performance indicators.
Mainstreaming
Gender
2b

Code The principal purpose of the Sector Response Plan is to advance gender
equality. The entire Plan either:
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Targeted Actions a)
Targets women, girls, boys and men who have specific needs or suffer
from discrimination
b)
Focuses on building gender‐specific services or more equal relations
between women and men.

It is the responsibility and accountability of Sector Leads to advance gender equality in their
respective areas. All sectors should therefore have a gender marker code for the overall sector plan.
Sectors may wish to have a gender marker code at the output level, but these will not be published in
the 3RP plan.
Sector process for Gender Marker:
•

Prior to the design phase, the Sector Leads would contact and inform Gender Focal Points and GenCap
Advisers, where present, about the process and support-needs/expectations in terms of project review
(re Gender Marker)719.

•

During the planning phase, GenCap Advisers will regularly discuss with sector leads the development
of the sector plan.

•

After reviewing the first draft of the plan GenCap Advisers will provide a matrix with comments and
recommendations for revision of Gender Marker codes for each sector to Sector Leads and Agency
Gender Focal Points.

•

It is the responsibility of Sector Leads to, where necessary, strengthen gender mainstreaming in their
sector plans.

•

Sector reviewing teams should consider GenCap comments and whether these have been incorporated.
It is therefore crucial for GenCap to participate in initial discussions and planning/review meetings so
that members are clear on Gender Markers expectations.

•

Revised plans can be sent back to GenCap for a second review. Further comments can be made and
Gender Marker codes revised in the matrix.

•

The GenCap’s final matrix/comment sheet is shared with ALL Sector Leads so they are aware which
projects in which sectors need attention. Sector Leads are asked to review and ensure that only
ACCURATE codes have been entered in the system.

•

Codes are finalized at the country level after consultations and clearance at country level.

Gender mainstreaming means the distinct needs, capacities, and contributions of women, girls, men
and boys are integrated in a meaningful way in the three critical components of the SRP: the needs
assessment, sector responses and performance indicators. These activities would be code 2a. Examples
of gender mainstreamed activities for each sector appear in the sector‐specific Gender Marker tip sheets
posted on the web portal.

719

Ideally, the Protection Sector should appoint a Gender/Protection Focal Point to each Sector in order to
support the process.

407

A Sector Response Plan (SRP) designed well enough to warrant a good gender code (2a) must be based
on gender analysis which is the engine for ensuring gender is addressed throughout the activity (gender
mainstreaming). This means exploring women’s as well as men’s needs and the different risks they
face, the various roles and activities they undertake, their coping skills and ideas on solving problems.
The most reliable information on the different realities facing males and females will come from the
women, girls, boys and men themselves in consultations segregated by sex and age (whether by focus
groups or individual interviews) and facilitated by a same‐sex facilitator. A well-designed activity will
be grounded in activity teams listening to the diversity of male and female voices, both young and old.
Women, girls, boys and men have immediate “practical” survival needs particularly in humanitarian
crises. Most practical needs arise from inadequate living conditions. They include access to safe water,
food, adequate housing and personal safety. Women, girls, boys and men also have longer-term
“strategic” needs and interests. These often focus on having choices, mobility and power to shape their
own lives. Men and women, girls and boys, share some, but not all, practical and strategic needs. It is
especially important to understand and respond to their different needs that arise from the division of
labour and responsibilities between males and females as well as from women’s subordinate position
in society.
Both practical and strategic needs can, and wherever possible should be, addressed in gender
mainstreamed activities (code 2a).
The gender marker is a sector tool. The following steps can improve the capacity of your sector to
incorporate gender equality measures:
1. Sector leads/coordinators ensure that gender equality is a priority in the SRP and is visible in all plan
elements. It is important to ensure gender issues are identified and addressed in the SRP. The SRP
provides a foundation for the design of activities and also demonstrates thorough integration of gender
issues.
2. Build capacity of sector members and activity partners to design gender‐responsive activities that feed
into the SRP through using the Gender Marker. Use the sector‐specific tip sheets and the how‐to‐code
tip sheet so that partners can practice coding their own activities. Field experience already shows that
this practice helps teams see how to strengthen the gender dimensions of their activity design.
3. Explore and facilitate links for sector partners with a gender specialist who is familiar with the gender
marker and can answer questions.
4. Train the Peer Review Panel on how to assign gender codes in advance. Coding must be quick, easy
and accurate during the time‐pressed vetting process. Use the how‐to‐code tip sheet as a guide and
practice coding.
5. Provide the Review Panel with contact details of the Gender Marker Focal Point who will be available
to help resolve any coding confusion during the vetting.
6. Advise the Sector Chairs on the assigned gender code for the SRP and provide suggestions on how to
improve (if applicable).
7. A GenCap Advisor, UNDP Gender Regional Advisor or Focal Point will review the codings for Sector
Response Plans and provide feedback to the sector coordinators about to meaningfully incorporate
gender equality measures (see above).
8. The Gender Marker codes will be recorded in the 3RP documents.
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The responsibility for accurate gender coding rests with the Peer Review Panel. The gender code will
be inserted into a dedicated ‘Gender Marker’ field in the 3RP Template.
It is essential that the gender code be accurate. The Inter-Agency Task Force or equivalent Refugee
Heads of
Agency Meeting will ensure that each Peer Review Panel has verified the gender code for each Sector
Response Plan. The GenCap Activity will verify coding and offer support where needed to consider
how to incorporate gender equality measures into the SRPs.
Country operations are encouraged to review the performance indicators at the Mid-Year Review for
indications of equitability of access to resources across sex and age.
Tip sheets for sectors on how to code using the Gender Marker are available on the Syria Refugee
Response web portal and are featured on http://humanitarianresponse.info, including
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/philippines/document/gender-marker-tip-sheets
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Appendix B: FIU Ethical Board Approval Form
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Appendix C: Expert Interview Consent Form:
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Appendix D: Photovoice Consent Form
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